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Preface
On March 27, 2004, a conference entitled “Workers’ Compensation: Current and Emerging Issues” was held at the University of Rhode Island. The
conference was convened in memory of Terry L. Thomason, who served as director of the university’s Schmidt Labor Research Center from the summer of
1999 until the time of his death on April 20, 2002. The chapters in this volume
were ﬁrst presented as papers at the conference.
Special thanks go to all the authors who prepared papers and presentations
for the conference, and subsequently revised their work for inclusion in this
volume. Their hard work and dedication honors Terry Thomason’s memory.
Thanks go as well to the conference’s additional speakers: Honorable
George E. Healy, chief judge of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation
Court; George H. Nee, secretary-treasurer of the Rhode Island AFL-CIO; and
Sheldon Sollosy, chairman of the board, Beacon Mutual Insurance Company.
Conference moderators Charles T. “Ted” Schmidt, Amy Tabor, and Timothy
P. Schmidle are also thanked, as are Richard Scholl, current director of the
Schmidt Labor Research Center; Mary Pinch, the Center’s secretary, who handled conference logistics; and graduate students Andrea Cecconi and Mohammad Abbas Ali.
The conference could not have taken place without the generous ﬁnancial
support of the following sponsors: Beacon Mutual Insurance Company, Julie
Grand-Landau, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, Greater
Rhode Island Industrial Relations Research Association, and the faculty of the
Schmidt Labor Research Center.
Finally, neither the conference nor this volume would have been possible
without the support and guidance of Terry’s wife, Julie Grand-Landau. Julie
provided both moral and ﬁnancial support to the project from the very beginning. All of us involved in this volume intend it to be a lasting tribute to Terry
and a gift from our hearts to Julie.
Matthew M. Bodah
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Foreword
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Terry Thomason, who was a
distinguished scholar, an outstanding teacher and administrator, and a good
friend of those who contributed chapters to this endeavor. Terry died April
20, 2002, at his home in Newport, Rhode Island, at the age of 51. His death
extinguished a life and career much too soon. Yet, Terry left a legacy in his
research and his contributions to his profession, his family, and his friends that
will persist for decades.
Born in California and raised in Alabama, Terry received an undergraduate and two graduate degrees from the University of Alabama in the 1970s. He
then worked as supervisor of personnel for the Newport News Shipbuilding
and Dry Dock Company for almost ﬁve years, where he mastered the real-life
lessons of labor relations. He enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Industrial Relations at Cornell University in 1984, where I met him. We worked on several
research projects together, I served as the chair of Terry’s dissertation committee, and he became a virtual member of our family.
Terry joined the faculty of management at McGill University as an assistant professor in 1988 and was promoted to associate professor in 1994.
Although he was a relatively junior faculty member, Terry assumed much of
the responsibility for maintaining the industrial relations program at McGill.
Terry then became the director of the Schmidt Labor Research Center and a
professor at the University of Rhode Island (URI) in 1999. During his brief
tenure at URI he took the lead in revising the graduate curriculum and earned
the admiration of his colleagues.
Active in the Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA), Terry coedited a volume on disability in the workplace, contributed chapters to that and
other IRRA research volumes, and was a member of the IRRA Editorial Committee. He was also active in the National Academy of Social Insurance, where
he served on the Steering Committee on Workers’ Compensation and served on
a committee that examined the adequacy of workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
Terry published more than 40 articles, chapters, books, and studies. I will
only mention a few here in order illustrate the depth and breadth of his research. He is probably best known for his research on workers’ compensation
and related topics, which corresponds to the scope of this volume. One aspect
of his research concerned dispute resolution and claims handling. His research
on the New York workers’ compensation program (Thomason and Burton
1993) found that the use of lawyers increased the probability that workers
would settle their claims with a lump sum (rather than receive continuing cash
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beneﬁts) and that the settlements substantially reduced the amount of beneﬁt
received by the workers. He was subsequently a coauthor of a survey of disputes and dispute resolution with two contributors to this volume (Thomason,
Hyatt, and Roberts 1998).
Another strain of Terry’s research on workers’ compensation pertained to
the effect of experience rating on workplace safety. In theory, experience rating should encourage employers to promote safety since fewer injuries result
in lower insurance premiums. But some scholars, including Les Boden, another contributor to this volume, have expressed reservations about the effect
of experience rating, in part because employers can reduce their insurance premiums by ﬁghting claims as well as improving safety. Terry and Silvana Pozzebon (2002) sent a questionnaire to Quebec employers to try to separate these
possible reactions by employers to experience rating, and found that both types
of behavior occurred. Terry also wrote a chapter (Thomason 2003), published
posthumously in a volume dedicated to his memory, that examined the relationships between workplace safety and experience rating and other economic
incentives. This is an excellent overview of research in this area, including
Terry’s own work, and is reprinted as a chapter in this volume.
Two other strains of Terry’s research on workers’ compensation are health
care costs in workers’ compensation and comparisons of the U.S. and Canadian
workers’ compensation programs. Silvana Pozzebon and Terry (1993) provide
an example of the intertwining of these strains. More recently, Thomason and
Burton (2001) documented the increasing disparity in medical costs between
the Ontario workers’ compensation programs and the programs in the United
States. This ﬁnding is one of the topics examined in the chapter by Cam Mustard and Sandra Sinclair included in this volume.
Terry’s major contribution in recent years in workers’ compensation involved the study of the effect of alternative insurance arrangements on the employers’ costs of insurance and on safety in the workplace. Although Timothy
Schmidle and I had both written dissertations examining the determinants of
interstate differences in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance, Terry
considerably expanded the theoretical sophistication and rigor of the statistical
analysis in this area in Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001). Among the
most signiﬁcant ﬁndings is that the deregulation of the insurance market in
most states in recent decades had been associated with a substantial (approximately 11 percent) reduction in insurance rates after controlling for a myriad
of factors, such as the level of beneﬁts and the injury rates in the various states.
The quality of this study was recognized when the Industrial Relations Section
at Princeton University selected it as one of the Noteworthy Books in Industrial
Relations and Labor Economics, 2001.
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Terry’s research interests included areas other than workers’ compensation. A recent volume, again published after Terry’s death and dedicated to
him, contained a chapter (Thomason and Burton 2003) examining the changes
in the extent of unionization in the public and private sectors. Terry was responsible for the most provocative part of the study, which examined the extent
of privatization between 1983 and 2002 in four sectors: hospitals, urban transit,
sanitary services, and elementary and secondary education. In all of these sectors, the share of employment in the private sector increased, and in three of
the sectors, the proportion of the total workforce (public and private) unionized
declined. In education, the private share of employment increased modestly,
but the unionization rate of the total workforce was stable, in part because the
proportion of teachers in the private sector who were unionized increased.
Terry was also interested in unions and collective bargaining in Canada
and in international comparisons. In Thomason and Pozzebon (1998), he and
Silvana reported on a survey of union organizers in Quebec and Ontario and
found much less evidence of management opposition to unions in these provinces than other studies have found among managers in the United States. They
attributed part of the difference to the legal environment in the two countries.
This survey, though truncated, should convey the range of interests, the
productivity, and the quality of Terry’s research. I was fortunate to have collaborated with Terry on several of these studies. Originally, I was the teacher and
Terry was the student, but over the 15 years of our association, he became the
senior scholar and I was the learner. He became a master of abstract theory and
modern econometrics. He also became an excellent writer who could translate complicated relationships into comprehensible manuscripts. He was also
a great collaborator, as was particularly evident in the volume on insurance arrangements involving Terry, Tim Schmidle, and myself, where we each found
our area of comparative advantage and we interacted to produce a product that
exceeded our individual contributions. Terry also had the ability to prod his
colleagues into moving the project along, an attribute afﬁrmed by Silvana Pozzebon, who reports that Terry was “inﬁnitely patient when it came to running
regressions, [but] was less so when it came to some of the other, more ‘boring’
aspects of the research project . . . I suspect my perfectionist tendencies drove
Terry crazy.”
Even if Terry may have occasionally shown exasperation with his research
colleagues, it is hard to imagine a nicer person to work with or—of greater
signiﬁcance—to be around outside of the workplace. One reason is that he
always had nonwork interests that could be kindled. In 1990s, as his devotion
to the University of Alabama football waned due to the distance between Tuscaloosa and Montreal and the lack of Tide luster on the gridiron, he became a
fan of the Montreal Expos. As their fortunes wilted, Terry turned to the study of

xi

Roberts.indb 11

6/7/2005 9:27:19 AM

Canadian politics for his avocation. His specialty was the separatist movement
in Quebec. Not bad for a McGill Professor who spoke French with a southern
accent!
At his memorial service, both Matt Bodah and Barbara Webster described
Terry as “a gentle spirit,” and Les Boden called him “a lovely, gentle person.”
His death was a loss to his wife, Julie Grand-Landau, his mother, Betty (Oates)
Thomason, his brother, Kevin Thomason, and all his friends, including the
contributors to this volume. We are all honored to dedicate this volume to his
memory.
John F. Burton Jr.
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1
Introduction
Karen Roberts
Michigan State University

The chapters in this volume were originally presented at a conference to honor Terry Thomason, held at the University of Rhode Island
in March, 2004. This volume is designed to be a tribute to Terry in
several ways. It is about workplace safety and health and issues related
to prevention and compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses,
a topic to which Terry devoted much of his research life. All of the authors in this volume are recognized experts on various areas of workers’
compensation, but more importantly had known Terry, perhaps been
able to work with him, and admired his work. The volume is intended
to serve as a detailed introduction to the workers’ compensation novice
but also provide insights to those more familiar with the area. We hope
this mirrors Terry’s own approach to his research, clear and insightful,
but also accessible to those less familiar with workers’ compensation
than he. The second chapter of this volume is a reprint of a book chapter Terry wrote on economic incentives in workers’ compensation. This
chapter is demonstrative of some of Terry’s best qualities as a workers’
compensation scholar—his instinct for the important policy and welfare questions and his ability to communicate the key issues clearly to
the reader.
Since its inception, workers’ compensation systems have wrestled
with questions about how to best structure beneﬁts. Traditionally, there
has been a triumvirate of criteria used to evaluate beneﬁts of workers’ compensation: adequacy, equity, and efﬁciency. Chapters 3 and 4
deal with this problem of beneﬁt structure and evaluation. In Chapter 3,
Boden, Reville, and Biddle examine the adequacy and equity of wage
replacement beneﬁts. They frame their discussion in terms of the tradeoff between beneﬁt adequacy and cost to discuss the nature of the data
that would be necessary to inform the policy discussion about beneﬁt
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levels. They begin with the topic of how to deﬁne “adequate” beneﬁts,
citing the debate and logic behind the commonly used two-thirds of
gross preinjury earnings. They then move on to the challenge of measuring the unobservable lost earnings and describe the approaches in
use in most of the literature. They then review the literature on beneﬁt adequacy for all cases and permanent disability cases, showing that
most studies ﬁnd that the beneﬁts fall short of adequacy norms.
Finding that the real replacement rates tend to be inadequate, Boden,
Reville, and Biddle then examine the question of beneﬁt equity—both
horizontal (similar losses should receive similar beneﬁts) and vertical
(different losses should receive beneﬁts proportional to those losses).
They note the empirical difﬁculty of determining beneﬁt equity but do
cite examples of useful policy data, including comparing whether or
not cases with similar temporary beneﬁt durations receive permanent
disability or other beneﬁts, and the examination of whether beneﬁt differences are proportional to loss ratings in permanent partial disability
(PPD) cases. They conclude their chapter with several policy suggestions designed to improve beneﬁt levels for those at the bottom of the
beneﬁt scale, thus at a minimum improving beneﬁt equity, and a set of
questions that, if answered, would lead to better policy.
Permanent partial disability is the most vexatious type in workers’
compensation. It is by nature complex because of the variability of the
degree of injury and the effect of injury on the ability to work. Compensation for PPD is even more complex, as states vary considerably
in their approaches to this sort of disability. In Chapter 4, John Burton
presents a detailed discussion of the various models used in the different states for evaluating disability and structuring beneﬁts, and then
discusses a list of criteria that might be used to evaluate these different
models.
Burton begins with a presentation of a conceptual framework for
understanding PPD that discusses the nature of permanent injuries, possible compensation schemes, and the determination of which types of
permanent injuries should be compensated, with particular emphasis
on whether compensation should be for the impairment or the earnings
loss and whether noneconomic losses that do not directly affect earning capacity should be compensated. Following that, Burton describes
how this framework is implemented by the states. He discusses three
basic approaches: 1) the permanent impairment approach, 2) the loss of

Roberts.indb 2

6/7/2005 9:27:21 AM

Introduction 3

earnings capacity approach, and 3) the wage loss approach. He then discusses how the states structure beneﬁts for these various deﬁnitions of
loss. The complex set of potential PPD beneﬁt systems begs the question Burton raises next: What criteria should be used to evaluate these
different beneﬁt delivery systems? He presents ﬁve: 1) beneﬁt adequacy, 2) beneﬁt equitability, 3) delivery system efﬁciency, 4) prevention
and rehabilitation efﬁciency, and 5) affordability. Burton raises several
research questions including whether or not these criteria are the right
ones and, assuming that they are, how the different state approaches
measure up.
The chapters on beneﬁt structure serve as a good preamble to Douglas Hyatt’s chapter on dispute resolution in workers’ compensation, as
they provide ample discussion of beneﬁt features that could easily be
disputed by the various parties. One of the initial motivations behind
the passage of workers’ compensation insurance statutes was to eliminate the need for tort as the sole remedy in determining whether and
how much occupationally injured individuals would be compensated.
For most cases, workers’ compensation has succeeded in that goal, but
for a signiﬁcant minority, resorting to formal dispute resolution systems
is necessary. In Chapter 5, Hyatt tells the story of two Canadian commissions charged with investigating and evaluating dispute resolution
in workers’ compensation to illustrate why cases end up in disputed
status and what sort of research is needed to address those causes. His
primary argument is that stakeholder discontent with the dispute resolution system cannot legitimately be seen as resulting solely from poor
execution. Rather, he argues that difﬁculties with dispute resolution in
workers’ compensation and periodic increases in dispute activity arise
from multiple sources: increasing complexity of work-related injuries,
rising worker rights as evidenced by expanding appeal rights, the increasing awareness of inconsistencies in adjudicative decisions at the
initial level, and growing use of experience rating that increases the
sensitivity of employer costs to claims activity.
Hyatt describes a vicious circle at the appeals level: an efﬁcient appeals system motivates those at the initial hearing level to pass off the
more difﬁcult cases to the appeals level, clogging that system and converting an efﬁcient system into one that malfunctions. He suggests that
more research is needed to better understand how many levels of dispute resolution is most efﬁcient, and how alternative dispute resolution
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or resorting to the court system might ameliorate current problems.
While interest in performance management and the development
of good performance measures has increased in both the public and
private sectors over the last several decades, workers’ compensation
administrative agencies have lagged behind in this area. The two chapters on beneﬁt structure and the one on dispute resolution all highlight
the need for good information with which to identify where the workers’ compensation system is succeeding, needs adjustment, or is failing.
Chapter 6, by Allan Hunt, provides an overview and description of the
current state of performance measurement and management information systems in workers’ compensation. Hunt begins with a description
of the history of performance evaluation in workers’ compensation, and
while applauding past efforts, he notes several weaknesses, including
inconsistent measures across states, the inclusion of some measures that
are beyond control of the state agencies, and data that only permit comparison with a limited number of states.
Noting that performance measurement is more highly developed
in the publicly administered jurisdictions in Canada and Australia,
Hunt demonstrates how the combination of descriptive information can
paint a telling picture of strengths and weaknesses of a claims system
by combining basic descriptive statistics that make interjurisdictional
comparisons. The chapter concludes with a discussion of state-of-theart programs under way in both the United States and Canada. One such
program, from the Nova Scotia Workers’ Compensation Board, shows
a well-conceived multistep system linking organizational goals to organizational outcomes.
Workers’ compensation is primarily designed to compensate injured
workers during their recuperation and pay for their medical care. However, it is also often described as providing safety incentives through its
pricing structure. In Chapter 7, Karen Roberts examines how workers’
compensation insurance is priced and what incentives are embedded
in that price structure. The chapter begins with a description of how
premium is determined. She contends that while the pricing structure
is commonly presented as containing safety incentives to employers,
because proﬁt-maximizing insurers rather than welfare-maximizing
government determines the pricing structure, there is reason to question the effectiveness of pricing as a safety-promotion tool. In the next
two sections, Roberts examines the incentives this pricing structure is
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Introduction 5

intended to have on employers and the insurer perspective on pricing,
respectively.
Although there is evidence that experience rating may have an effect on employer safety behavior, Roberts discusses several of the weaknesses in the relevant research, in particular, the use of proxy measures
for experience rating and evidence that employers may not understand
pricing sufﬁciently well to respond to its incentives. She uses the insurance literature to bolster her initial contention by showing that from the
insurer’s perspective, the objective of pricing is to adequately cover
expected indemnity, rather than to change employer safety behavior. In
the ﬁnal section, Roberts reviews the literature on the effect of regulating workers’ compensation insurance pricing on employer incentives,
in particular, how those incentives are distorted. She concludes with the
question of whether it is sound policy to rely on the private insurance
sector to provide workplace safety incentives.
Chapter 8 examines a contributor to cost variation—health care.
One of the beneﬁts under workers’ compensation is full health care
coverage for the work-related injury or illness. The vast majority of
workers’ compensation claims are for medical care only, and in the
United States, increases in the cost of health care are important drivers
of overall workers’ compensation cost growth. Two Canadian researchers, Cameron Mustard and Sandra Sinclair, explore an observed but
poorly understood phenomenon, speciﬁcally, that workers’ compensation health care costs are lower in Canada than in the United States
both in terms of real dollars per claim and as a share of total premium
costs. Mustard and Sinclair identify three factors that they argue explain
the difference between Canadian and U.S. costs: 1) lower medical care
prices in Canada, 2) lower rate of medical care inﬂation, and 3) higher
intensity of health care service provision in the United States.
Mustard and Sinclair frame their discussion by contrasting the predominant privately ﬁnanced system in the United States to the singlepayer public system in Canada. They note that the private health care
system in the United States has a substantially higher rate of overhead,
indicating that this market-driven system has not led to more cost-efﬁcient delivery of care; they then discuss in what ways the market in
the United States has failed. The authors explore the possibility that
the higher intensity leads to better health outcomes for U.S. workers,
thus justifying the higher costs, but can ﬁnd no evidence of better U.S.
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outcomes. Their study provides lessons about how to structure health
care delivery and ﬁnancing in workers’ compensation as well as in the
general health care system.
Workers’ compensation is a multidisciplinary subject, examined
through multiple lenses: economic, legal, medical, psychological, and
as a form of insurance. Most of the chapters in this book take a traditional economic approach. In Chapter 9, Seth Seabury, Robert Reville,
Hilary Rhodes, and Leslie Boden examine the behavioral economics
perspective and how it may contribute to a better understanding of
workers’ compensation. Standard economic theory frequently relies
on the assumption that economic actors have perfect information and
behave rationally. In the context of occupational health and injury, behavioral economics departs from this assumption and focuses on how
individuals accumulate and process information about risk and uncertainty. After presenting and summarizing the research on compensating
wage differentials, the standard economic approach, they present prospect theory, a behavioral economic framework.
Prospect theory postulates about the decision rules individuals use
when faced with imperfect information and the systematic errors people
appear to make in assessing risk. Speciﬁcally, Seabury and his coauthors
examine three biases: 1) the availability bias, 2) the optimism bias, and
3) the accumulation bias, each of which distorts individual understanding of risk and subsequent behavior. Following this discussion, the authors detail the nature of irrationality as presented by prospect theory,
where individuals fail to accurately match risk to potential gains and
losses. They then discuss the implications for prospect theory for the
use of the standard model. Their discussion generates a wealth of ideas
for future research. Examples include incorporating how individuals
perceive risk, as opposed to actual risk, in determining compensating
wage differentials, examination of how worker learning about risk affects bias and decision making, and the use of risk perceptions in providing safety incentives and promoting safety.
Most workers’ compensation programs are state-based, and although they all share certain basic features, there is considerable diversity across states. On occasion, the policy suggestion is made that
workers’ compensation could be more simply and fairly administered
if it were a federal program. In Chapter 10, Peter Barth’s description of
the Black Lung Program, a federally administered program designed
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to provide compensation to workers with occupational disease due to
coal dust exposure, is a cautionary tale for advocates of federalization
of workers’ compensation. Barth’s chapter chronicles the legislative
history of several programs collectively referred to as the Black Lung
Program.
Barth’s description details policy formation based on insufﬁcient
understanding of the scope of the problem, inadequate understanding
of the state programs with which the federal program was to eventually coordinate, and changes in federal government administrations that
brought signiﬁcant changes in ideological perspectives on how best to
address problems of occupational disease. Barth notes that, despite the
long history, the problems emanating from this program are relevant
today: the Black Lung Trust Fund is currently in serious debt, and a new
federal occupational disease program for energy employees has just
been created. The chapter concludes with a set of lessons learned from
the Black Lung Program, which is of great value to policymakers.
The ﬁnal chapter in the book, Chapter 11, tells a political success
story, one where contention in the workers’ compensation system had
brought the state to the brink of collapse, but where vision and courage
by stakeholders who had been adversaries turned the situation around,
making the state system a model of cooperative problem solving. Matthew Carey begins his chapter with a description of the Rhode Island
system leading up to its 1990 crisis, when the dispute system had bogged
down and the National Commission on Compensation Insurance had
proposed a 132 percent increase in rates to cover expected beneﬁt and
claims costs. Carey then goes on to describe speciﬁc reforms in the
critical areas of the Rhode Island workers’ compensation system: implementation of a pretrial conference to streamline adjudication, use of
nonprejudicial agreements for beneﬁt payments and settlements, installation of penalties for fraud for both parties, a change in partial disability compensation, designation of Beacon Mutual as a competitive state
fund, and the creation of a multistakeholder advisory council. Perhaps
the most signiﬁcant of these is the latter, as it has proved to be a forum
for cooperative problem solving for nearly 15 years.
For a variety of reasons, workers’ compensation has been declining
as a share of the total wage bill for over a decade. Nevertheless, approximately $50 billion worth of beneﬁts are paid annually to injured
workers. Real costs are higher than that because of the cost of program

Roberts.indb 7

6/7/2005 9:27:22 AM

8 Roberts

administration, disputes, and proﬁt. This volume provides an overview
of most of the central features of workers’ compensation and some of
the research gaps that need to be ﬁlled for this type of social insurance
to be more efﬁciently and equitably administered. Approximately 1 in
20 full-time equivalent workers becomes injured at work per year, so
the need for effective disability insurance will continue. This volume is
intended to contribute to the ongoing effort to improve workers’ compensation.
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Economic Incentives
and Workplace Safety
Terry Thomason

The problem of work injuries is a substantial one. Recent estimates
put the cost of workers’ compensation beneﬁts paid to injured Canadian
workers and their families at more than $6 billion annually, or nearly 1
percent of gross domestic product. In the United States, workers’ compensation beneﬁt payments amount to over $40 billion annually. And
workers’ compensation beneﬁt payments represent only a small portion
of the economic costs of work injuries. Work injuries also entail losses
due to lost production, damage to plant and equipment, and the uncompensated losses suffered by injured workers that are estimated to be as
much as four times the cost of beneﬁts (Heinrich et al. 1980).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
discusses the economic theory of work injuries and illnesses. Speciﬁcally, this section examines employer and worker incentives for safety
in the absence of government regulation. The chapter then discusses
safety incentives created by different types of government regulation.
Conclusions are drawn in the ﬁnal section.
ECONOMIC THEORY OF WORK INJURIES AND ILLNESSES
Work injuries are an unwelcome by-product of economic activity.
In part, they are random events, but they are also, to some extent, under
the control of workers and employers. Employers can reduce the number of workplace injuries and illnesses by investing in safer technology,
providing workers with personal protective equipment (such as hard
hats and safety glasses), training workers and their supervisors, etc.;
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workers can avoid accidents by following safe work practices and by
taking greater care on the job.
Both parties incur costs when an accident occurs. Workers’ costs
include potential loss of income and medical expenses associated with
treatment and rehabilitation as well as intangibles, such as pain and
suffering and disability that reduces the ability to enjoy leisure activities. Employers’ costs include interruptions in production and damage
to capital equipment and physical plant.
Since accident prevention also entails costs to employers and employees, public policy should encourage employers and employees to
minimize the combined costs of accidents and accident prevention that
are incurred by both workers and employers.1 It is possible to spend
both too much and too little on accident prevention. Investment in accident prevention is socially efﬁcient when total costs are minimized,
that is, when an additional dollar spent on prevention reduces accident
costs by exactly one dollar.
As indicated, both employers and workers affect workplace health
and safety. We can expect that—if they are rational—both actors will
make accident prevention decisions that are privately efﬁcient. That is,
we may expect that each will make decisions that minimize their own
accident and accident costs individually; however, their decision making process may not consider costs that are incurred by the other party.
However, under some conditions, it is at least arguable that employers do consider the workers’ accident costs when making investments in workplace health and safety and thus make socially efﬁcient
decisions as well. To understand this argument, let us consider a world
where there are two types of employers, those with safe workplaces
and those with hazardous ones. Assume that workers employed by safe
ﬁrms do not risk having an accident or illness while at work—i.e., the
probability of injury or illness is zero—while one of every ten workers
employed by hazardous ﬁrms will have an occupational accident each
year. Let us further assume that workers are aware of the probability of
accidents at both types of ﬁrms and that they are free to choose the type
of ﬁrm for whom they will work.
Under these assumptions, we may expect that if everything else
were equal—i.e., the compensation package and other terms and conditions of employment—all workers would prefer employment at the
safe ﬁrms. In order to attract workers, hazardous ﬁrms will be forced
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to increase wages above the level paid by safe ﬁrms. In other words,
we would expect to ﬁnd that hazardous ﬁrms pay a compensating differential and that the magnitude of this differential will be related to
the workers’ expected accident costs, including the cost of lost income,
medical expenses, pain and suffering, etc.
So, for example, let us assume that the average cost of accidents
for workers is $10,000 and that the average annual salary of workers in
safe ﬁrms is $40,000.2 Since the probability of an accident at a hazardous workplace is 0.1, then expected accident costs at that workplace are
$1,000 (= 0.1 × $10,000). This means that hazardous employers must
pay their employees an annual salary of $41,000 for employment at a
hazardous ﬁrm to be equally attractive as employment at a safe ﬁrm.3
Thus, the employer’s accident costs include the expected accident costs
borne by workers. Importantly, employers will be able to reduce the
compensating differential and, consequently, their accident costs, by reducing the incidence of workplace accidents and illnesses.4
The economic model presented in the preceding paragraphs rests on
a number of key assumptions, which many have questioned. In particular, the model requires that workers have complete and accurate information with respect to the risk of injury or death and an absence of barriers to worker mobility, i.e., that workers are free to move in and out of
the labor market or between employers at relatively low cost. However,
critics point out that it is likely that either workers do not have access
to good information about injury risks or barriers to mobility prevent
workers from moving to safer jobs. As a result, wage differentials due
to the risk of injury either do not arise or they are inadequate, i.e., they
do not fully compensate workers for the risk of injury.
Do employers, in fact, pay a compensating differential to workers
exposed to greater risks of injury or illness? To answer this question the
researcher must address a number of methodological issues that are not
easy or simple to resolve, and existing statistical evidence is decidedly
mixed. By and large, research investigating the relationship between
the risk of fatal injury and wages has found a risk premium, while studies examining the relationship between wages and non-fatal risks have
not (see Viscusi 1993, for a recent review of this literature). However,
Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) demonstrate that even fatal-risk differentials are extremely sensitive to the regression speciﬁcation.
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Importantly, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the risk differential is fully compensating, even for fatal injuries. In addition, research
suggests that, after controlling for the risk of injury and a variety of other factors affecting wages, the wage differential is substantially larger
for unionized workers than for nonunion workers (Olson 1981; Dickens
1984; Fairris 1992; Siebert and Wei 1994; and Sandy and Elliott 1996).
This result, which indicates that union workers get a greater premium
for the same level of risk, is difﬁcult to reconcile with the hypothesis
that wage differentials compensate workers for the expected cost of accidents.5 Finally, psychological research suggests that people overestimate the likelihood of a low probability event and underestimate the
likelihood of a high probability event (Viscusi 1993). This systematic
bias implies that workers will generally demand a risk premium that is
less than fully compensating.
Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ compensation provides cash beneﬁts to workers who are
unable to work as the result of an occupational injury or illness as well
as medical beneﬁts and rehabilitative services to all who are injured as
the result of a workplace accident.
These beneﬁts have the effect of reducing accident costs for workers
and, consequently, the risk premium paid by hazardous employers. As
a result, we may expect that the worker’s incentive for avoiding workplace injuries will have been reduced because their accident costs have
been reduced by the medical and cash beneﬁts provided by the workers’
compensation program, a problem known as risk-bearing moral hazard
in the insurance literature. We might also expect that workers’ compensation beneﬁts would increase the workers’ willingness to expose
themselves to greater risks on the job, but that these beneﬁts would also
increase the likelihood that workers would report an injury that would
have otherwise gone unreported or even falsely report a nonwork-related injury as occupational. This latter problem is known as reporting
moral hazard. In either event, because workers’ compensation reduces
the cost of workplace accidents for workers, we would expect it would
also reduce the compensating wage differential. In fact, there is some
statistical evidence indicating that as compensation becomes more generous, the risk premium for hazardous work is reduced.
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Do workers’ compensation beneﬁts affect employers’ incentives to
prevent workplace accidents? The answer depends on the way in which
compensation beneﬁts are funded. If the employer is liable for workers’
compensation beneﬁts paid to his or her ﬁrm’s injured workers, then the
employers’ incentive structure will be unchanged by the introduction of
workers’ compensation. However, if there is no relationship between
employer costs and worker beneﬁts, then the employer’s incentive to
prevent accidents is reduced by workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
In Canada and the United States, workers’ compensation beneﬁts
are funded through a payroll tax paid by employers. A two-step process
determines tax (or assessment) rates in most provinces. In the ﬁrst step,
industrial classiﬁcations are used to group ﬁrms who share similar risks
of workplace injury or illness, so that banks are grouped with other
ﬁnancial institutions, for example, food stores are grouped with similar
retail establishments, etc. The recent historical accident record of each
of these classiﬁcations, known as rate groups, is used to determine the
base assessment rate for each group. The assessment rate is set so as to
provide sufﬁcient income to fund all workers’ compensation beneﬁts
paid to workers and any expenses associated with workers’ compensation program administration.
In the second step of the rate-making process, known as experience
rating, the base assessment rate for some ﬁrms is adjusted to account for
the ﬁrm’s individual safety record.6 In other words, the assessment rate
for ﬁrms with better than average safety records (lower injury rates) is
reduced, and the rates of ﬁrms with worse than average safety records
(higher injury rates) are increased.
Both steps of the rate-making process should reduce the injury rate
relative to a regime where all employers are charged an identical assessment rate unrelated to the risk of injury. Variation in the base assessment rate means ﬁrms in hazardous industries pay a higher base assessment rate than ﬁrms in relatively safe ones, so that the cost of goods and
services produced by ﬁrms in hazardous industries increases relative
to a regime in which a ﬂat assessment rate is charged to all employers.
In turn, this reduces consumption of goods and services in hazardous
industries relative to safe ones and subsequently employment; as the
proportion of employment in safe industries rises, the overall accident
rate will drop.
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However, the base assessment rate is only marginally related to
the ﬁrm’s accident experience. If the ﬁrm is not experience-rated, the
employer does not consider workers’ compensation assessments to be
part of the cost of accidents, since it cannot affect costs by preventing
accidents. However, if the ﬁrm is experience-rated, then a reduction in
the accident rate directly reduces its subsequent accident costs. Thus,
if the ﬁrm is experience-rated, the employers’ investment in workplace
safety will remain unchanged following the introduction of workers’
compensation insurance; however, if the ﬁrm is not experience-rated,
the employer’s safety investment will decline after workers’ compensation is introduced.
Thus, workers’ compensation unambiguously reduces workers’
safety incentives and increases workers’ incentives to report compensable claims. Furthermore, since not all employers are experience-rated,
the overall impact of workers’ compensation is to also reduce, on average, health and safety investments by employers.
Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Injuries: The Evidence
Since the introduction of workers’ compensation pre-dates the collection of injury rate data, there are only a handful of studies that have
attempted to directly examine this issue and those that do have produced contradictory results. Chelius (1976) found that the introduction
of workers’ compensation programs led to a reduction in fatal accident
rates relative to the tort regime that preceded them. However, Fishback
(1987) reached the opposite conclusion, using a different (and arguably
better) data set.
On the other hand, several studies have attempted to determine
whether there is a relationship between the generosity of workers’ compensation beneﬁts and the work injury rate. As indicated, economic
theory suggests that, where workers’ compensation insurance is less
than perfectly experience-rated, the accident rate should be positively
related to workers’ compensation beneﬁt generosity.
A large number of studies using different methodologies and data
sources have found the expected positive relationship between beneﬁt
levels and injury (or workers’ compensation claim) rates. Studies of
the U.S. workers’ compensation include Butler and Worrall (1983) and
Chelius (1982) who examined state-level claims and injury data and
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Hirsch et al. (1997) who used longitudinal survey data to estimate the
impact of beneﬁt generosity on the probability that a worker would ﬁle
a workers’ compensation claim. Canadian studies include Thomason
and Hyatt (1997), who examined provincial injury rates and Thomason
and Pozzebon (1995), who used data on individual workers to estimate
claim probability. Uniformly, these studies have found that higher levels of workers’ compensation beneﬁts are associated with higher injury
or claims rates or a higher probability that a worker would initiate a
compensation claim.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND WORKPLACE SAFETY
There are at least three approaches to the regulation of occupational
health and safety, all of which have been adopted by policy makers in
one form or another at one time or another. The ﬁrst—and the one most
commonly identiﬁed as occupational health and safety regulation—involves the promulgation of rules prescribing or proscribing speciﬁc
policies and practices by employers, which are enforced through onsite inspections and monetary penalties for infractions. The second approach comprehends systems of general safety incentives that reward
or punish employers on the basis of safety and health outcomes rather
than behaviors that are thought to affect those outcomes. This second
approach is embodied in the experience rating of workers’ compensation assessments, whereby employers’ compensation costs are tied to
their accident experience. The third approach, termed internal responsibility, pervasive in Canada, is designed to improve safety and health
conditions through workers’ empowerment and involves three principal
elements: 1) the worker’s right to refuse to perform unsafe work; 2) the
worker’s right to information on the nature of workplace hazards; and
3) joint labor-management safety and health committees, which are given a mandate to oversee safety and health conditions in the workplace.
The Economics of Regulation
Occupational safety and health regulation seeks to change behavior of the employer by changing the cost-beneﬁt calculus described in
the previous section, through imposition of monetary penalties or other
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sanctions.7 Speciﬁcally, regulatory sanctions lower accident prevention costs by the expected value of the sanction.8 In other words, ﬁrms
considering adoption of a particular safety practice must now weigh
expected costs of the sanction that will be imposed if they fail to do so.
Sanction costs are characterized as “expected” because, under some—if
not all—regulatory regimes, penalties are not imposed unless a violation is detected.
There are two costs that must be considered by efﬁcient regulators: the administrative costs of regulation (the cost of staff involved
in enforcement and adjudication), and the cost of regulatory effort (the
imposition of sanctions whose expected costs are either too great or too
small). Sanctions are too small (large) if the costs of accident prevention, including the expected savings from the avoidance of sanctions,
are less (greater) than associated accident costs. The cost of error is
equal to the difference between accident costs and the cost of accident
prevention if the regulation in question is adopted and enforced. The
goal of efﬁcient regulation is to minimize the sum of these costs.
Direct Regulation of Workplace Hazards
As indicated, direct regulation attempts to change employer behavior by promulgating regulations that prescribe or prohibit speciﬁc
employer or worker practices. Regulations are enforced through workplace inspections and penalties for noncompliance. Critics argue that
direct regulation fails to recognize important variation across ﬁrms with
respect to technology and other characteristics. In other words, a safety
practice that is efﬁcient for one employer may not be efﬁcient for another, so that there are potentially substantial error costs. In addition, a
system of direct regulation in which the regulator agency responsible
for promulgating rules is one-step removed from the workplace and is,
therefore, slow to respond to technological change. Once again, this
could result in substantial error costs.
Furthermore, as Dorman (1996, p. 197) notes, “Most occupational
risks are transitory . . . Safety features mandated by law may be unavailable or malfunctioning from time to time, but inspectors are not likely
to know this.” In other words, the probability of detecting noncompliance is low so that the regulators must substantially increase the magnitude of the sanction imposed. Finally, direct regulation is costly to
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administer. It requires an extensive bureaucracy to develop standards,
inspect workplaces, and to resolve disputes with employers concerning
the appropriateness of penalties.
Most research examining direct regulation is conﬁned to an examination of the effects of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) of 1970. At best, this research has produced mixed results with
respect to OSHA’s effectiveness, although more recent research—and,
in some ways, methodologically superior—tends to ﬁnd results that
support the hypothesis that direct regulation reduces injury rates. (This
question is also taken up by Mendeloff [1979, Chapter 11], with some
comparative discussion on the United States and Canada.)
Much of this early research involved a time-series analysis or crosssectional pre- and post-OSHA comparisons of aggregate injury rate data.
By and large, these studies were unable to ﬁnd the expected reduction in
the incidence of workplace injuries (Smith 1973; Mendeloff 1979; Currington 1986). However, Smith (1992, p. 566) notes data problems render such comparisons problematic: “Because the Occupational Safety
and Health Act fully covers the private sector, and because before-andafter comparisons are generally infeasible, a convincing study of the
overall effects of the Act has not been—and may never be—done.”
Another group of studies has evaluated the impact of OSHA enforcement activity—that is, the effect of inspections and ﬁnes—on the
incidence and severity of workplace injuries. Following Smith (1992),
these studies may be classiﬁed into two categories: those using aggregate industry injury rate data and those using plant level data.
Enforcement variables used in research examining industry aggregate accident rates include lagged measures of the probability of inspection and the expected penalty for an OSHA violation. In general, these
studies found little or no effect for OSHA enforcement activity. For
example, Viscusi (1979) was unable to detect a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between injury rates and either inspection probability or
the expected penalty. In a later study, Viscusi (1986) found that OSHA
enforcement reduced the lost workday incidence rate by a modest 1.5
to 3.6 percent, although Smith (1992) argues that this result may have
been a statistical artifact—the product of changes in employer reporting
behavior resulting from a change in OSHA inspection strategies.
Arguing that these lagged penalty data were as much a measure of
employer noncompliance as a proxy for a deterrent effect, Bartel and
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Thomas (1985) estimated a system of structural equations in which the
probability of inspection and penalties per inspection were treated as
endogenous. They found that while OSHA signiﬁcantly reduced employer noncompliance, there was little relationship between noncompliance and the lost-time injury rate. However, these authors conclude that
OSHA indirectly reduced accident rates by placing a greater regulatory
burden—in the form of increased inspection probability—on ﬁrms with
higher injury rates.
A study of industry aggregate injury rates in Quebec by Lanoie
(1992) found a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between
inspection probability and the lost-time injury rate. However, the likelihood of a workplace health and safety inspection by an ofﬁcer of the
Quebec government was positively associated with injury severity,
measured as average number of workdays lost per injury. In addition,
Lanoie failed to detect a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
probability of penalty and either frequency or severity of work injuries.
Research using plant level data have generally reached more optimistic conclusions about OSHA’s effectiveness, although these studies
have also produced mixed results. Two types of studies have been conducted. Earlier research compared ﬁrms that had been inspected early in
the year with ﬁrms that had been inspected late in the year, hypothesizing that inspection effects should be more evident for the former group
of ﬁrms than for the latter group (Smith 1979; McCaffrey 1983). Using
data from 1973 and 1974, Smith found that 1973 inspections reduced
injury rates by about 16 percent while 1974 inspections induced a 5
percent reduction, although the latter relationship was not statistically
different from zero at conventional levels. McCaffrey failed to ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant effect using data from 1976–77. As Scholz and
Gray (1990, p. 299) note, taken together, these results suggest that “the
easily accomplished reductions in risk that OSHA inspections could impose may have already been implemented in 1976, leaving more complex issues of risk reduction, less amenable to quick ﬁxes.”
As Smith (1992, p. 569) points out, because these early studies
lacked data on citations and ﬁnes resulting from inspections, they were
only able to measure the abatement of injuries following an inspection;
as a result, these studies were unable to measure OSHA’s “deterrent” effect. Replicating this research, Ruser and Smith (1991) used a measure
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of inspection probability based on the average inspection frequency for
similar ﬁrms to estimate the deterrent effect. On the basis of this analysis, they concluded that: “there is virtually no evidence of a deterrence
effect” (p. 231).
Interestingly, recent plant-level studies, which use explicit beforeand-after comparisons of the same ﬁrms, provide evidence for a more
sanguine assessment of direct regulation, Using a unique data set that
allowed tracking of inspections and penalties for a large sample of individual ﬁrms over a seven year period, Scholz and Gray (1990) estimated both the deterrence and abatement effects of OSHA enforcement
activity. They found that a 10 percent increase in enforcement resulted
in a 1 percent reduction in the accident rate, a much larger effect than
detected in prior research, although one that the authors describe as
“modest” (p. 302). This reduction was primarily due to a “deterrence”
effect and, speciﬁcally, an increase in the probability of inspection, as
opposed to an increase in the average penalty.9
Importantly, Scholz and Gray argue that their results indicate that
economic models of occupational safety and health regulation, which
assume that ﬁrms optimize when making safety and health choices, fail
to account for the limited information processing capacity of managers.10 Due to their limited capacity, managers do not optimize, but often
engage in “ﬁre-ﬁghting,” responding to problems as they become more
signiﬁcant relative to other issues. As evidence, Scholz and Gray ﬁnd
that an unexpected increase in the accident rate in one year will lead to
a reduction in injuries in the next, and vice versa. In addition, they ﬁnd
a lag between OSHA enforcement activity and a change in ﬁrm health
and safety—a result that they claim is evidence of an organizational
learning curve. Ruser (1985) obtained similar results.
Nonetheless, overall the extant evidence suggests that OSHA has, at
best, resulted in a modest improvement in workplace health and safety
in the U.S. However, advocates of direct regulation argue that these
disappointing results are primarily due to difﬁdent administration and
a lack of funding than to a fundamental ﬂaw in this type of regulatory
regime. In particular, they point to two problems. First, the process of
adopting permanent health and safety standards under OSHA is slow
and cumbersome. Governed by the Federal Administrative Procedures
Act, the law requires a Notice of Intended Rulemaking and a subsequent
proposal, both of which must be published in the Federal Register. This
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is followed by a Public Hearing and comment period where all interested parties are invited to submit comments, which the agency must
consider before promulgating a standard.11 After they are issued, standards are subject to judicial review, and the Supreme Court has ruled
that the agency must provide substantial evidence that the standard is
based on a “signiﬁcant” risk. Second, agencies responsible for administering the Act are substantially underfunded, a problem exacerbated
during the Reagan-Bush administrations. Dorman (1996, p. 193) notes
that there are more ﬁsh and game wardens in the U.S. than occupational
safety and health inspectors.
Critics have expressed greater apprehension over the impact of direct regulation on economic productivity (Burton and Chelius 1997).
There is a public perception, shared by some economists, that the proliferation of industrial regulation in the 1960s, particularly with respect
to occupational health and safety and environmental protection was
responsible for anemic productivity growth since that time. Research
is sparse, however. One study, estimating annual total factor productivity for 450 U.S. industries between 1958 and 1978, found that OSHA
accounted for around 19 percent of the productivity slowdown of the
1970s (Gray 1987). Viscusi (1996) has estimated the cost and beneﬁts
of ﬁve OSHA regulations and found that for four of these, the costs of
the regulation exceed the beneﬁts in terms of lives saved. However,
Stone (1997) challenged Viscusi’s estimates, claiming he ignored other
beneﬁts, such as the reduction in injuries and illnesses. His reanalysis
of one of these regulations showed it was in fact efﬁcient, when these
other beneﬁts were considered.
Nonetheless, if one assumes that the direct regulation of workplace
safety is inefﬁcient public policy, then it is possible that direct regulation could actually result in the deterioration of worker health. Keeney
(1994) has argued that a reduction in disposable income due to these
regulatory costs can lead to changes in spending on safety and healthcare more generally, greater stress due to job loss, and risky behavior
such as increased alcohol and tobacco consumption.
Internal Responsibility System
A principal criticism of direct regulation is that it fails to recognize
ﬁrm heterogeneity, so that standards appropriate for one ﬁrm are likely
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to be inappropriate for another. In contrast, the internal responsibility
system is highly adaptable to the particular circumstances of the ﬁrm
and is ﬂexible so that it can respond relatively quickly to technological
change. The design of safety “standards” is in the hands of the parties
themselves—labor and management—who are intimately familiar with
plant operation and who are therefore well placed to implement regulatory standards that are effective and efﬁcient. In addition, administrative costs, which are principally borne by employers, at least initially,
are relatively low. Enforcement is in the hands of the ﬁrm’s workforce
so that the probability of detecting a violation will be high.
On the other hand, the success of the internal responsibility system
is critically dependent on employee bargaining power. It is likely that
internal responsibility is less effective in nonunion workplaces than in
union ones. In addition, unions are political organizations that necessarily respond to the preferences of their memberships. And safety and
health are often given a relatively low priority by a rank and ﬁle that
sometimes appears to be more interested in wages and job security. Furthermore, the internal responsibility system can be used by employees
to shirk legitimate work assignments or by labor unions as leverage in
collective negotiations with employers. Finally, there are concerns that
labor members may lack the expertise, particularly in the realm of occupational health, to either design effective standards or monitor ﬁrm
compliance.
Unlike either direct regulation or general ﬁnancial incentives, there
is little direct evidence on the efﬁcacy of the internal responsibility system. Most of this research has examined joint health and safety committees (JHSCs) and much of it uses data on Canadian workplaces.12
By and large, however, the Canadian studies either examine process
issues or factors determining the relative effectiveness of JHSCs rather
than the question of whether or not they reduce injury rates or otherwise
improve worker health compared to workplaces without such committees. In addition, these studies often rely on subjective reports by the
participants rather than objective evidence. Nevertheless, some useful
information relevant to the question of the effectiveness of the internal
responsibility system may be gleaned from this research.
For example, Shannon et al. (1992) ﬁnd that lower accident rates
are found in ﬁrms where the JHSC includes a senior manager; where labor members had access to professional expertise; and where the JHSC
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had a broad mandate rather than a narrow one. Furthermore, Tuohy
and Simard (1993) ﬁnd that JHSCs were more effective in reducing
accident rates when the committee had an equal number of labor and
management members and where there are well-established operating
procedures. In other words, both studies indicate that JHSCs are more
effective when employers give them greater resources and support.
Three studies directly examine the issue of whether JHSCs ameliorate workplace safety. Cooke and Gautschi (1981) combined OSHA
administrative data with the results of a survey of 113 manufacturing
ﬁrms in Maine to investigate, among other things, whether joint labormanagement safety programs affected ﬁrm injury rates. They obtained
mixed results, which depended on ﬁrm size. Large ﬁrms with joint safety programs had lower injury rates than large ﬁrms that did not have a
joint program. However, this result was statistically signiﬁcant only for
ﬁrms with more than 300 employees and only at the 0.10 conﬁdence
level. For small ﬁrms, the opposite result was found; ﬁrms with joint
programs had higher injury rates. Boden et al. (1984) surveyed 290
large (more than 500 employees) Massachusetts ﬁrms but failed to ﬁnd
a relationship between the presence of a joint safety committee and
workplace injury or illness rates. Importantly, both of these studies—
Cooke and Gautschi (1981) and Boden et al. (1984)—use cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal data, and are, therefore, limited in their
ability to address the question of whether there is a causal relationship
between JHSCs and workplace safety.
On the other hand, the most careful examination of internal responsibility found that the internal responsibility system generally and JHSCs in particular were associated with lower levels of workplace injuries and illness (Lewchuk et al. 1996). This study used administrative
data from the Ontario Workers’ Compensation Board supplemented
with data from two surveys. The authors ﬁnd that both enactment of
internal responsibility legislation and the introduction of JHSCs were
negatively and signiﬁcantly related to the workplace injury rate. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that JHSCs may reduce lost-time claims by as much
as 18 percent relative to similarly situated ﬁrms without JHSCs. Importantly, they also ﬁnd that joint committees were more effective at reducing injury rates in unionized ﬁrms than in nonunion ﬁrms.
The latter results suggest that unions play an important role determining the effectiveness of JHSCs. Similarly, Weil (1991, 1992) has
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argued that unions improve the effectiveness of direct regulation. Using 1985 OSHA data from the United States, he has shown that unions
increase inspection probability; inspection intensity, as measured by the
duration of inspections per employee; and the scope of the inspection,
i.e., whether or not the inspection resulted in a physical examination
of the workplace. Weil also found that unions increased the number of
citations as well as the severity of the penalties. These results suggest
that there may be a synergy between direct regulation and internal responsibility, at least for unionized workplaces.
On the other hand, critics cite anecdotal evidence that shows that
unions use regulatory agencies and, in particular, occupational safety
and health agencies to enhance their power in organizing campaigns
and in collective bargaining (Northrup 1997). JHSCs would seem to
offer similar opportunities for unions to enhance their organizing and
collective bargaining outcomes. However, Schurman et al. (1998) note
that complaint-based inspections in unionized ﬁrms result in a higher
percentage of violations than similar inspections in nonunion ﬁrms and
argue that this contradicts an interpretation that unions use safety regulation to gain organizing and bargaining advantage.
Hebdon and Hyatt (1998) present conﬂicting evidence with respect
to this issue. They use Ontario data to examine factors inﬂuencing the
probability of a refusal to do unsafe work or the probability of a health
and safety complaint. In general, they found that while the probability
of both events was higher where there is a contentious industrial relations environment, they found no evidence of concerted harassment of
employers during collective negotiations.
More generally, we might expect that unionization could lead to
more optimal health and safety conditions. Workplace health and safety
has characteristics of a public good in that consumption is neither rival
nor excludable.13 In addition, free rider problems may prevent unorganized workers from negotiating the optimal provision of safety conditions by the employer. That is, workers will be individually reluctant
to reveal preferences because they fear that they will pay the full cost
of safety. Employers must therefore rely on information gleaned from
the labor market. However, such information necessarily reﬂects the
preferences of workers who are very different than the average worker;
these marginal workers are younger and are less likely to have family
responsibilities. Among other things, marginal workers are likely to be
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less concerned about workplace hazards and should be less willing to
trade off wages for increased safety.
On the other hand, unions, which are democratic political organizations, are more likely to reﬂect the preferences of the average workers.
In fact there is some evidence that unions in fact respond to the safety
objectives of more senior workers while management is more likely
to be inﬂuenced by the preferences of marginal workers (Kahn 1987;
1990).
General Financial Incentives
Both direct regulation and internal responsibility attempt to regulate
the safety process, imposing sanctions on employer behaviors thought
to affect the accident rate. In contrast, a regime using general ﬁnancial incentives regulates safety outcomes, imposing sanctions based on
employer performance with respect to results-based workplace safety
measures. One proposal for general ﬁnancial incentives is the injury
tax, whereby the government imposes a monetary penalty for each
work-related injury or illness (Smith 1974). A more prosaic form of
general ﬁnancial incentives is experience-rated workers’ compensation insurance, as discussed in the previous section, whereby the ﬁrm’s
compensation assessment is based, wholly or partially on its accident
experience.
Like the internal responsibility system, a system of general ﬁnancial
incentives imposes no speciﬁc requirement vis-à-vis ﬁrm health and
safety practices, allowing ﬁrms to select the most appropriate means
for attaining its safety goals. Furthermore, under a system of general
ﬁnancial incentives, administrative costs will be lower than those incurred under either direct regulation or the internal responsibility system. However, because experience-rating adjustments to workers’ compensation assessments are based on the ﬁrm’s claim experience rather
than its accident experience, experience rating provides employers with
incentives to engage in claims management as well as accident prevention. Claims management includes a number of less than desirable practices, including retaliation against workers who initiate compensation
claims and legal challenges to legitimate claims by injured workers. In
addition, for actuarial reasons, true experience rating is not feasible for
small ﬁrms.
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There is substantial research investigating the impact of experience
rating on the frequency and severity of work accidents. In general, these
studies have found considerable evidence that experience rating is associated with lower injury rates, although there are a few exceptions
(Hyatt and Thomason 1998). However, research that fails to ﬁnd the expected effect is, in general, methodologically weaker than studies that
do (Hyatt and Thomason 1998). Studies investigating injury severity
have generally produced mixed results. There are two possible explanations for the disappointing results with respect to injury severity: either
employers have less ability to affect severity than the incidence of injuries or the effects of experience rating on incidence overwhelm the
severity effect. That is, on the margin, experience rating induces employers to reduce the frequency of less severe injuries. In either event,
severity studies are generally less informative and will not be reviewed
here. However, a brief review of injury rate research follows.
Research examining the impact of experience rating on workplace
safety, most of which uses U.S. data, falls into one of three categories.
The earliest studies exploited the fact that U.S. experience-rating formulae are different for large and small ﬁrms, so that large ﬁrms are
more likely to be experience rated and are more extensively experience rated than small ﬁrms. Since a difference in injury rates between
large and small ﬁrms could be ascribed to ﬁrm size effects unrelated
to experience rating—such as, scale economies in accident prevention
efforts—these studies examined the relationship between beneﬁt generosity and accident rate. As indicated previously, empirical research conclusively demonstrated work injuries are positively related to beneﬁt
levels. However, if experience-rating induces ﬁrms to improve workplace safety, then this relationship should be attenuated in large ﬁrms
relative to small ones. That is, as beneﬁt levels become more generous,
experience rated ﬁrms will increase their safety investment, partially
offsetting the increased level of injuries resulting from worker moral
hazard. Several studies found this hypothesized relationship (Ruser
1985; Butler and Worrall 1988; Ruser 1991); only one failed to do so
(Chelius and Smith 1983).
As indicated, the positive relationship between beneﬁt levels and
the work injury rate is primarily attributable to a reporting effect; workers are more likely to report an injury when beneﬁt levels are high than
when they are low. It is unlikely that fatal claims are subject to this
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reporting phenomenon, so that the relationship between beneﬁt levels
and fatal injury probability should more accurately reﬂect the impact of
beneﬁts on employer behavior. Four studies have examined this relationship, and three found that the incidence of fatal injuries was negatively associated with higher beneﬁt levels, as expected if experience
rating has safety-enhancing effects (Moore and Viscusi 1989; Ruser
1991; and Durbin and Butler 1998). Only Butler (1983) failed to ﬁnd
the hypothesized negative relationship.
Several studies have taken advantages of “natural experiments” to
compare injury rates before and after the implementation of an experience rating program. Chelius and Kavanaugh (1988) examined injury rates of two New Jersey colleges before and after they elected to
self-insure and ceased to be covered by private compensation insurance.14 Chelius and Smith (1993) compared occupational injury rates
for small ﬁrms in Washington, which gives experience-rated discounts
to these ﬁrms, with injury rates for small ﬁrms in states that do not
offer these workers’ compensation claim rates in Ontario and British
Columbia, respectively, before and after the introduction of experience
rating in those provinces. Shields et al. (1997) explored the effect of
the implementation of “large-deductible” compensation insurance policies—where insured ﬁrms are responsible for the ﬁrst several thousand
dollars of compensation costs—in Texas. Finally, Durbin and Butler
(1998) used state-level U.S. data to investigate the effects of both large
and small deductible policies as well as a rule change that lowered eligibility criteria for experience rating.15 With the sole exception of Chelius
and Smith (1993), these experiments found that experience rating was
associated with lower injury rates.
Out of 14 studies reviewed here, 11 found evidence that experience
rating results in an amelioration of workplace health and safety. This
evidence was produced by research that is remarkably mixed with respect to both data sources and methodology. And, as indicated, a careful
examination reveals that studies failing to detect this relationship were
methodologically weaker than those that did. Taken as a whole the evidence is quite compelling: experience rating works.
However, as Hyatt and Thomason (1998) point out, the leap from
the observation that experience rating is associated with lower injury or
claims rates to the conclusion that experience rate enhances ﬁrm safety
is short, but perilous. Experience rating may lead to increased claims
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management by employers, who ﬁle claims, as well as pro-active staffing practices designed to screen job applicants likely to ﬁle a workers’
compensation claim. This has the effect of reducing injury reporting,
while leaving workplace hazards undisturbed. Two studies show experience rating increases employers claims management activity.
Examining a large set of administrative records from Ontario, Hyatt
and Kralj (1995) found that experience-rated employers were signiﬁcantly more likely to appeal claims than non-experience rated employers, and that the likelihood of an appeal for experience-rated employers
increased as a function of the ﬁnancial incentives that they faced. Kralj
(1994) analyzed a small survey of Ontario employers in which managers were asked to report their impressions of the effects of experience
rating on their behavior, i.e., changes in accident prevention and claims
management practices resulting from experience rating. He found that
while both prevention and claims management behaviors increased,
experience rating had a greater impact on accident prevention efforts.
Thus, while it is clear that experience rating leads to more intensive
claims management efforts, this is not the only effect. Furthermore,
claims management is not an unalloyed evil. The denial of fraudulent
claims is both equitable and efﬁcient, and there is evidence indicating
that a prompt return to work leads to more successful rehabilitation.
Using a survey data set consisting of over 450 Quebec manufacturers, Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) examined the estimated relationship between experience rating and a wide range of ﬁrm health and
safety and claims management practices. These practices included, for
example, the amount of health and safety training provided to workers,
the extent to which the ﬁrm disputed workers’ compensation claims,
the number of in-house personnel devoted to claims management or
accident prevention activities, and ﬁrm expenditures on personal protective equipment. They found that experience-rated ﬁrms were both
more likely to engage in more aggressive claims management and to
make greater effort to increase workplace health and safety. Interestingly, however, the evidence also suggested that high wage ﬁrms are
more likely to reduce workers’ compensation claim costs by increasing
their accident prevention efforts (relative to their claims management
efforts) than low wage ﬁrms. This result implies that there may be a
“high road” and a “low road” response to experience rating.
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CONCLUSIONS
The past 20 years have seen a substantial accumulation of knowledge concerning the effects of various policy options, although much is
left to be learned. It is by no means certain that policy makers have fully
taken advantage of this knowledge or that they have developed a coherent policy with respect to occupational health and safety problems.
Rather, policy has developed in a piecemeal fashion as jurisdictions
have experimented with various approaches to these problems.
Until recently, these approaches tended to emphasize direct regulation and, more recently, internal responsibility; general ﬁnancial incentives are little used. Workers’ compensation programs have only
recently introduced experience rating to the assessment process, and
in most provinces in Canada, there are restrictions on its application,
which substantially limit its effectiveness. For example, in British Columbia the experience rating adjustment is limited to 30 percent of the
base assessment rate.
However, considerable evidence indicates that general ﬁnancial incentives are effective in reducing accident rates. Moreover, experiencerating does not share many of the problems associated with the other
two approaches. In addition, both the costs of direct regulation and its
apparent limited effectiveness call into question whether a broad application of direct regulation is appropriate.
Nonetheless, general ﬁnancial incentives, particularly in the form
of experience-rated compensation assessments, are not a panacea. Two
problems may be identiﬁed. First, because accidents are, by deﬁnition,
random events, general ﬁnancial incentives are not easily applied to
small ﬁrms—the small ﬁrm’s experience is not necessarily indicative
of its underlying safety. Second, due to the long latency of many occupational diseases, it is difﬁcult to assign responsibility to a particular
employer. Finally, direct ﬁnancial incentives assume that ﬁrms engage
in an optimizing cost-beneﬁt calculus, but the evidence suggests that
limited information processing capacity may lead managers to satisﬁce.
Under these circumstances, direct regulation could provide a needed
shock to focus managerial attention on safety and health problems.
While this implies a continued role for direct regulation, it also
suggests a more limited and targeted approach. More speciﬁcally, due
to the high costs of direct regulation, the resources required by this
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option should be directed at high-risk industries. This would include,
in particular those in which there are numerous small ﬁrms, such as
construction and those in which there is a relatively high probability
of catastrophe—that is, an accident in which there is signiﬁcant loss of
life—such as underground mining. In addition, these resources should
also be directed to the problem of long latency occupational disease,
where it is unlikely that general ﬁnancial incentives will be effective.
This includes funding research that would investigate the relationship
between occupational exposures and subsequent disease development
as well as funding for monitoring workplace exposure.
Key Messages
• Much has been learned in the last two decades regarding effective policies to reduce disabling injury at work.
• Both direct regulation and internal responsibility have been widely used in Canada, whereas general ﬁnancial incentives recently
have become more pervasive as they are in the United States.
• Financial incentives do appear effective in reaching injury rates
whereas the limited effectiveness of direct regulation raises questions about its value except where it may be targeted at high-risk
individuals and longer-latency occupational disease exposures.
• General ﬁnancial incentives are limited in their value for small
ﬁrms.
• A stronger role for workplace exposure surveillance is necessary.

Notes
This chapter reprinted by permission. See Thomason (2003).
1. Accident prevention costs are manifested in higher production costs and lost
productivity, which means that there are fewer goods and services including, for
example, medical and rehabilitation services for those claimants who are injured
or become ill due to a workplace accident or exposure.
2. The $10,000 ﬁgure for accident costs subsumes an evaluation of the monetary
value for intangibles such as pain and suffering.
3. This example assumes that workers are risk neutral, i.e., they are indifferent be-
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4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
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tween income that will be paid with certainty (such as the wage income available
from safe employers, where there is no risk of injury) and income that is uncertain (such as the wage income paid by hazardous employers, where there is a 10
percent chance that the worker will lose wage income due to a work accident). If
the worker is risk averse, as is generally thought to be the case, then the worker
would demand a salary higher than $41,000 to compensate him or her for the
additional risk incurred by working for a hazardous employer.
It is important to note that workers will continue to have an incentive to avoid
workplace accidents and illnesses even if the wage is fully compensating, i.e., if
it compensates workers for all of the expected cost of injury. This is because the
worker will continue to incur costs if an accident occurs, unless he or she is able
to purchase insurance that covers those costs.
Interestingly, one of the few studies that failed to ﬁnd this relationship used a
Canadian data set (Martinello and Meng 1992).
It is not feasible to experience rate small ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms with only a few employees. Because work accidents are random events and because their employment base is small, the number of accidents does not provide a reliable estimate
of the underlying risk of injury.
It is also possible that Occupational Health and Safety regulations could attempt
to inﬂuence the behavior of employees, although none of the existing regulatory
models contemplates this.
Alternatively, sanctions raise the costs of not engaging in accident prevention.
Scholz and Gray also used their data set to replicate prior research in order to determine reasons for the discrepancy between their results and the results of these
earlier analyses. They concluded that Smith (1979) and McCaffrey (1983) failed
to ﬁnd signiﬁcant abatement effects because they had not accounted for longterm enforcement effects. Smaller deterrence effects found by Viscusi (1986)
were attributed to sample differences. Speciﬁcally, the Scholz and Gray sample
contained plants that were larger, more dangerous, and more heavily inspected
than the average manufacturing plant examined by Viscusi. Scholz and Gray
hypothesized that the plants in their sample were more amenable to the ameliorative effects of OSHA enforcement than the average plant.
The phrase “limited information processing capacity” is not meant to apply only
to the abilities (or limitations) of managers. Rather it refers to limitations that
constrain us all (including university professors).
For example, Meisenhelter (1991) notes that a period of six years elapsed between OSHA’s initial work on a Hazards Communication standard — similar
to WHMIS — before it was ﬁnally issued in November 1983. Over 200 written
comments were submitted totaling over 12,000 pages. There were 19 days of
hearings, which produced 4,250 pages of transcripts.
A literature search uncovered only two studies examining the effect of an aspect
of internal responsibility other than JHSCs on workplace safety. Lanoie (1992)
estimated the impact of refusals to do unsafe work in Quebec, using industry
aggregate data. He failed to ﬁnd a relationship between the number of refusals
per employee and the lost-time injury rate. However, Lanoie’s data show that
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refusals are negatively related to injury severity, although this relationship is
only marginally signiﬁcant in two of his four speciﬁcations and statistically not
different to zero in the other two. On the other hand, Cousineau et al. (1995), who
also used Quebec data, found that refusals were positively related to one type
of injury (“struck by or striking against”) thought to be particularly susceptible
to safety regulation, while negatively related to two other types (“caught in or
between” and “falls or slips”). However, the latter two relationships were not
statistically signiﬁcant.
13. A rival good is one that may be consumed by one and only one person. If it is
possible to prevent the consumption of a good, it is excludable. A candy bar is a
good that is both rival and excludable, while, clean air is both nonrival and nonexcludable. These distinctions are important because it is generally thought that
a private market is perfectly capable of efﬁciently providing rival and excludable
goods, but not goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable.
14. Firms that self insure, an option available in most U.S. states for ﬁrms that meet
certain ﬁscal requirements, are, by deﬁnition, perfectly experience-rated.
15. In most U.S. states, there is a minimum payroll requirement that a ﬁrm must
satisfy in order to become experience rated.
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Workers’ compensation is the primary form of ﬁnancial support
available to people who are injured or become ill as a result of their employment. In 2001, workers and their medical care providers received
$49.4 billion in workers’ compensation payments, and employers paid
out $59.2 billion (NASI 2003). By covering medical costs and replacing lost earnings, workers’ compensation can minimize the economic
impact of workplace injuries and illnesses, although other impacts will
remain.
The designers of workers’ compensation programs did not intend
for nonmonetary losses to be covered. Workers lost the right to receive
payments for “pain and suffering” in the quid pro quo in which they
were required to give up their ability to sue negligent employers in
exchange for workers’ compensation beneﬁts that were provided on a
no-fault basis. But, presumably, they did intend for lost earnings to be
covered, although the question of how much of the lost earnings should
be covered by workers’ compensation beneﬁts remains an unsettled issue. While beneﬁt adequacy is a central goal of workers’ compensation, other goals often come into conﬂict with adequacy. These include
high workers’ compensation costs to employers, concerns about worker
fraud, and excessive time off work. Responses to these perceived prob-
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lems include reducing cash beneﬁts and limiting eligibility for workers’
compensation beneﬁts.
This pattern was particularly evident during the 1990s, when more
than half the states modiﬁed their workers’ compensation laws. During
that period, many of the laws that were passed were designed to reduce
employers’ costs by either reducing beneﬁts or limiting the number of
claims ﬁled (Burton and Spieler 2001; Boden and Ruser 2003).
Traditionally, workers’ compensation systems have required employers to pay beneﬁts to workers whose injuries or illnesses “arise out of and
in the course of employment.” Other contributing factors, like preexisting medical conditions, the aging process, and workers’ lifestyles may
have contributed to work-related disabilities, but this did not in principle
prevent workers from receiving beneﬁts. Laws passed in the 1990s limit
the compensability of conditions that are not solely caused by workplace
risks. They do so by creating a number of new requirements for receiving
beneﬁts. These include requiring that work be a major or predominant
cause of the disability or eliminating compensation for the aggravation
of a preexisting condition or for a condition related to the aging process.
Other restrictive laws allow workers to demonstrate disability only by using objective medical evidence. These new laws can make it much more
difﬁcult to receive compensation for chronic musculoskeletal disorders,
including carpal tunnel disease, noise-induced hearing loss, and most
back injuries. Thomason and Burton (2001) estimate that such legislation
enacted by Oregon in the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced beneﬁts for
workers and costs for employers by about 20 to 25 percent below what
the amounts would have been if the laws had not been enacted. Finally,
during the 1990s at least 22 states passed workers’ compensation antifraud laws. Following passage, some states began aggressive public
campaigns threatening criminal sanctions for workers who ﬁled fraudulent claims. These campaigns sent the message that it was dangerous to
ﬁle a claim, that the authorities would be checking up on you, and that
perhaps it was safer, even for truly injured workers, not to ﬁle.
In addition to limiting access to beneﬁts, several states reduced
beneﬁt payments in the 1990s. Some reduced the weekly beneﬁt paid
(for example Connecticut and Massachusetts), while others reduced the
maximum number of weeks that could be paid, even for workers with
permanent disabilities.
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The issue of beneﬁt adequacy was not addressed in any of these
cases. Legislators did not even have access to data on beneﬁt adequacy.
In fact, virtually the only quantiﬁed policy parameters available to legislators were cost-related: incurred beneﬁts per claim, claim frequency,
changes in costs and frequency, overall costs, premium rates, insurer
ﬁnancial data, and so on. Weekly beneﬁt payment parameters and beneﬁt payment data were available, but nobody could relate them to the
adequacy of beneﬁts, since losses incurred by injured workers were unknown.
In the research presented in this paper, we describe the kind of
data that would allow an informed discussion of beneﬁt adequacy as a
system goal and of the trade-offs between adequacy and cost. We ﬁrst
explain the measure of adequacy we use. This is followed by a brief
review of empirical studies of adequacy from 1950 through the 1980s.
Based on research completed in the last ﬁve years, we bring together
what we currently know about the adequacy of workers’ compensation cash beneﬁts in the small number of states that have been studied.
Finally, we discuss the implications of research to date for a workers’
compensation research and policy agenda.
THE IMPORTANCE OF WORK-RELATED DISABILITY
For the year 2002, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported
about 5,500 deaths1 and 5,000,000 occupational injuries and illnesses2
in the private sector. These numbers are substantial, but a growing number of studies indicate that they greatly underestimate the true extent of
the problem because many workplace injuries go unreported (Biddle et
al. 1998; Morse et al. 1998; Morse et al. 2001; Azaroff, Levenstein, and
Wegman 2002). Even in the face of substantial underreporting, the total
economic costs of occupational illness and injury have been estimated
to rival those of cancer and heart disease (Leigh et al. 1997, 2000).
These illnesses and injuries also have important noneconomic effects
on quality of life. Physical and psychological functioning in everyday
activities can be affected, self-esteem and self-conﬁdence reduced, family relationships stressed (Morse et al. 1998; Keogh et al. 2000; Pransky
et al. 2000; Strunin and Boden 2004). Although we do not address these

Roberts.indb 39

6/7/2005 9:27:28 AM

40 Boden, Reville, and Biddle

nonmarket effects of workplace injuries, they may well be as important
as the effects on earnings.
THE NATURE OF WORK-RELATED EARNINGS LOSSES
Many workplace injuries are minor and result in little or no time lost
from work. For these injuries, no lost earnings result. Workers may lose
a little time from the job to receive ﬁrst aid, but this does not affect their
wages. For other injuries, workers may need more substantial medical
treatment and may incur functional limitations that do not allow them to
return to their regular work immediately. These limitations may cause
them to stay home or may require restrictions on the tasks that they can
perform at work. The interaction of these functional limitations, workers’ skills, and job demands can lead to time lost from work or to work
limitations that result in reduced wages. These consequences of workplace injuries can last a few days, but they can also last a lifetime.
The factors that affect injury-related losses are not conﬁned to the
medical consequences of injuries. Labor market and other behavioral
factors can affect the amount of earnings lost. Economists have focused
on the incentive effects of workers’ compensation beneﬁts on how
quickly workers return to employment (for example Meyer, Viscusi,
and Durbin 1995), but these are not the only behavioral factors in operation. Friction between workers and employers over the amount of beneﬁt payments, disputes about readiness to return to work, and employer
concerns about fraudulent claims can result in the employer’s refusal
to offer a job or a worker’s refusal to return to the at-injury workplace.
Any of these can cause lost earnings to be considerably higher than
necessitated by the physical consequences of the injury as a result of
increased job search time and the loss of job-speciﬁc human capital.
When employees cannot work for a long time, their employers may
ﬁnd it too costly to continue to hold their jobs open and, as a result,
may replace them. The resulting job loss also can substantially increase
overall lost earnings. In addition, future potential employers may view
a long period off work or a workers’ compensation injury as a negative
signal about the worker, thus reducing future job opportunities.
This combination of functional limitations and labor market behavior leads to lost earnings that may persist for many years. This is the
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context in which workers’ compensation systems provide beneﬁts that
replace part of workers’ lost earnings.
DEFINING BENEFIT ADEQUACY
As a social insurance program, workers’ compensation is supposed
to cushion the ﬁnancial impact of injuries on workers and their families.
In principle, this means that cash beneﬁts should cover much of the
losses workers would otherwise incur. Beneﬁt adequacy can thus be
measured by the extent to which losses are replaced. The replacement
rate—beneﬁts received as a proportion of pretax losses—is thus the
fundamental measure of beneﬁt adequacy in this program.3
If we accept the replacement rate as a measure of adequacy, the
question of what replacement rate is adequate immediately follows.
There is no obvious answer to this question. One approach is to make
the worker whole by covering all ﬁnancial losses. Under this approach,
adequate beneﬁts would be 100 percent of after-tax losses net of job-related expenses plus any loss of fringe beneﬁts and any earnings lost by
other family members because of the injury. This would leave the worker ﬁnancially as well off as if the injury had not occurred. In addition,
high beneﬁts would increase employer incentives to control workplace
hazards. However, there are a number of reasons to consider lower replacement rates. First, providing full replacement reduces the incentive
to return to work and thus may increase the overall costs of injuries. In
addition, employers worry that the resulting high costs may affect their
competitive position. Finally, although employers generally pay workers’ compensation premiums, high premiums will reduce the demand
for labor and may lead to lower wages. In this sense, workers pay for
a part—possibly a large part—of the cost of workers’ compensation
insurance in the form of lower wages (Leigh et al. 2000, pp. 175–179).
At a high enough beneﬁt level, they might prefer to take higher wages
rather than increased beneﬁts. As in other forms of insurance, workers
might be willing to trade incomplete coverage for a lower premium.
There is no theoretical justiﬁcation for a speciﬁc adequacy benchmark, but we have chosen two-thirds of pretax earnings as our measure.
We justify it largely for historical reasons. Most states pay temporary
total disability (TTD) beneﬁts at two-thirds of preinjury earnings up to
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a maximum weekly amount, an indication of substantial agreement.4
This is also the standard used by the 1972 National Commission on
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws for temporary total and permanent total disability beneﬁts. Although there is no similar explicit
standard for permanent partial disability (PPD) beneﬁts, Berkowitz and
Burton (1987) and Hunt (2004) suggest using the two-thirds standard
for these beneﬁts as well. In addition, greater coverage of small losses
than of large losses is not generally an efﬁcient use of insurance. So if
two-thirds replacement is the standard for temporary disability, it is difﬁcult to justify a lower standard for PPD.
Given these considerations, we will use two-thirds of pretax lost
earnings as a standard of adequacy. For ease and simplicity, we will not
attempt to account for lost fringe beneﬁts (which would reduce the measure of adequacy) and expenses related to employment (which would
increase it).
MEASURING BENEFIT ADEQUACY
Measuring Losses
To measure the adequacy of cash beneﬁts, we use the replacement
rate, the present value of beneﬁts paid divided by the present value of
losses, both discounted to the date of injury.5 To measure wage replacement, we need to measure injury-related lost earnings and compare the
losses to workers’ compensation beneﬁts received. Although there are
some practical difﬁculties in determining the amount of income beneﬁts
paid, these difﬁculties pale in comparison to the effort required to measure lost earnings.
Lost earnings are actual earnings minus what would have been
earned if the injury had not occurred. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 adapted from
Reville (1999), display a conceptual model of lost earnings. Before the
injury, the worker’s earnings are observed. Figure 3.1 shows them at
about $19,000 annually and increasing slowly through time. After the
injury, the worker recovers at home or in the hospital. Earnings are zero
until the worker begins work again. At that point, wages may return to
the uninjured earnings path (indicated by the dashed line). This ﬁgure
displays a TTD. Upon return to work, some people continue to work
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Figure 3.1 A Conceptual Model of Temporary Injury-Related Losses
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fewer hours or at a lower rate of pay or experience more unemployment
than would have been the case had the injury not occurred. Eventually,
many recover to the preinjury earnings path, but others never do. In this
case, workers have a permanent disability. This is shown in Figure 3.2,
where injured earnings never reach the level of uninjured earnings.
If we could observe uninjured earnings, then we could simply
subtract them from injured earnings to determine lost earnings. This
is represented by the shaded areas in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. However,
a worker is either injured or uninjured at a moment in time. If we observe somebody’s injured earnings, we cannot observe their uninjured
earnings. So we must ﬁnd a way to estimate uninjured earnings from
another source.
Traditionally, workers’ compensation systems have used average
preinjury earnings as the measure of uninjured earnings, assuming that
the worker would have continued at the same level of earnings absent
the injury. In the short run, this is probably a good assumption. But
in the longer run, this assumption is less likely to hold. On average,
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Figure 3.2 A Conceptual Model of Permanent Injury-Related Losses
Figure 3.2 A Conceptual Model of Permanent Injury-Related Losses
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for example, most workers’ earnings rise as they get older, peaking at
age 45–50, then declining, with a sharp decline at retirement, which,
for many, is age 65. The age-earnings proﬁle differs depending on a
number of factors, including education. The earnings of more-educated people tend to be higher and peak later in life. One implication is
that, for workers with permanent disabilities, using preinjury earnings
might underestimate losses for young workers and overestimate them
for workers over 50.
An alternative is to estimate uninjured earnings of injured workers
by ﬁnding workers who are similar to the injured workers in all other
respects but who were not injured. If we can identify uninjured workers who have the same personal, job, and employer characteristics, the
same wage and job histories over the year before the injury, and so on,
then it is reasonable to think that their average (uninjured) earnings will
be close to the average uninjured earnings of their injured counterparts.
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This can also be tested by examining whether the uninjured earnings of
the two groups before the match period are the same.
Two approaches have been used to estimate uninjured earnings:
matching and regression. The matching approach uses a comparison
group of uninjured workers and matches each injured worker to one
or more uninjured workers with similar relevant characteristics in the
immediate preinjury period. In the research discussed below, up to ﬁve
uninjured workers are matched to speciﬁc injured workers if they were
employed in the same workplace at the time of injury and, in addition,
had wages in each of the four preinjury quarters within 10 percent of
the injured worker. Even though we wouldn’t expect this to be true in
every case, statisticians have shown that, under reasonable conditions,
average uninjured earnings of the two groups should be identical. The
most important of these is that comparison workers must be chosen so
that all factors that affect both the probability of injury and earnings are
accounted for.
Under these conditions, the average earnings of uninjured workers
matched to a speciﬁc injured worker provide an estimate of what the
injured worker’s earnings would have been in the absence of injury. In
each observed postinjury period, this estimate of uninjured earnings is
subtracted from the actual wages of the injured worker. This difference
produces an estimate of the injured worker’s losses for each period.6
These estimated losses are then averaged for all injured workers over all
observed postinjury periods to obtain an estimate of average losses.
The other currently used statistical approach to measuring losses,
the regression approach, doesn’t try to match individual injured and
comparison workers. Instead, it uses statistical regression techniques
to generate models of average earnings over time for uninjured workers with speciﬁc individual, job, and employer characteristics. It then
applies these models to injured workers with the same characteristics,
generating estimated uninjured earnings for those workers. This is similar to generating age-earnings proﬁles for workers with given characteristics. As with the matching method, the difference between the
postinjury earnings of injured workers and their estimated uninjured
earnings estimates their wage losses. These losses are then averaged for
all workers to obtain a measure of average wage losses.
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Measuring Beneﬁts
Measuring beneﬁts is generally easier than measuring losses, as
in many states insurers and self-insured employers report beneﬁt payments to state agencies. Beneﬁt payments typically are reported by type
of beneﬁt (medical, temporary disability, PPD, and so on). However,
cases involving disputed beneﬁts often are resolved by settlements in
which the parties agree to a speciﬁed amount as full and ﬁnal payment
of all beneﬁts. As such, these settlements often include not only payments to cover lost wages but also to account for future medical costs
and possibly other factors as well. Typically, settlements do not distinguish among types of beneﬁts, so we cannot tell how much is being paid
to cover lost earnings.
The approach in the research presented in this chapter allocates all
settlements entirely to cash beneﬁts. For this reason, it overestimates
both cash beneﬁts and the replacement rate. We believe that the bulk of
settlement payments goes to cover lost earnings, but certainly not 100
percent.
THE PROBLEM OF UNDERREPORTING
To this point, the discussion of adequacy has been based on estimating adequacy for injuries reported as lost-time workers’ compensation
cases. However, there is growing evidence that many injured workers
do not ﬁle workers’ compensation claims. Recent studies of ﬁling for
physician-diagnosed upper-extremity musculoskeletal disorders suggest that only in a small minority of cases did workers’ compensation
cover these cases (Biddle et al. 1998; Morse et al. 1998; Morse et al.
2001). Part of the reason for the low coverage rates for these cases is
that employers and insurers may not believe that all of them are workrelated. However, even in the case of work-related ﬁnger amputations,
an obviously work-related and reportable injury, Sorock, Smith, and
Hall (1993) found that 12 of 134 patients entitled to workers’ compensation beneﬁts were not paid from that source.7
It could be argued that the amount of underreporting and the losses
involved in unreported injuries should be taken into account in measuring adequacy, since workers with injury-related losses who do not
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receive cash beneﬁts have replacement rates of zero. So, for example,
if a state’s replacement rate was 50 percent but workers with 40 percent
of the losses received no beneﬁts, the true average replacement rate
would be 30 percent. We do not have adequate information to know
the proportion of losses that go uncompensated. As a consequence, we
cannot estimate the extent to which underreporting affects average replacement rates.
Although the amount of underreporting is related to the generosity
of beneﬁts, from a policy perspective the question of how to design the
beneﬁt structure is distinct from that of how to insure that all eligible
workers receive the beneﬁts to which they are entitled. Thus, it might
be better to view the estimates we calculate as measures of how well a
workers’ compensation system serves those who participate in it.
EARLIER STUDIES OF ADEQUACY
The study of workers’ compensation beneﬁt adequacy using claimlevel data began with the publication of a study of California workplace
injuries that occurred in the 1950s. In this study, Cheit (1961) derived
hypothetical postinjury uninjured earnings by adjusting preinjury earnings by changes in the general level of wages and by changes in earnings related to age. He concluded that more than half these workers
received permanent disability beneﬁts without any permanent earnings
losses.8 For workers who experienced permanent losses, however, PPD
beneﬁts typically replaced only a small fraction. For workers with ratings under 70 percent, he concluded that beneﬁts typically replaced
less than 10 percent of losses. Beneﬁts covered 36 percent of losses for
workers with the highest disability ratings.
Ginnold (1979) studied workers in Wisconsin who had an occupational injury in 1968 resulting in PPD beneﬁt payments. He measured
expected earnings by adjusting average earnings of injured workers in
the two years before injury by average changes in wages and prices for
the economy as a whole. He further adjusted this by an “age-education factor,” capturing how earnings change over a person’s working
life. Five years after injury, Ginnold calculated that male workers in the
group he studied still were losing an average of 16 percent of predicted
earnings. Ginnold estimated that permanent disability beneﬁts averaged
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either 16.4 percent or 24.6 percent of pretax lifetime earnings losses,
depending on whether he used a 5 percent or a 10 percent discount rate,
respectively.
In a study of people injured at work during 1968 in Florida, California, or Wisconsin, Berkowitz and Burton (1987) calculated expected
earnings using the preinjury average earnings of injured workers as a
base. They adjusted these preinjury earnings by a growth ratio derived
from the earnings growth of workers who were injured in California
in 1968 and who received permanent disability ratings between 1 and
5 percent. This adjustment was based on the assumption that injured
workers in the other states were similar to those in California and that
workers in California with disability ratings less than 6 percent had no
permanent loss of income after the healing period. Berkowitz and Burton measured income beneﬁts net of legal fees for 1968 through 1973.
Discounted earnings losses estimated by Berkowitz and Burton for permanently disabling injuries averaged 8 percent of potential earnings in
Wisconsin, 15 percent in Florida, and 18 percent in California. In this
study, pretax replacement rates in Wisconsin averaged 75 percent. In
Florida they averaged 59 percent, while in California they were only
46 percent.
Replacement rates estimated by Berkowitz and Burton for permanently disabling injuries for 1968 in Wisconsin are much higher than
those derived by Ginnold. Average beneﬁts paid in the two studies are
similar, but Ginnold calculated higher future earnings and thus higher
earnings losses. The primary difference between the two estimates appears to be that Berkowitz and Burton focused only on the six years
after the injury, while Ginnold projected earnings losses to the expected
working life of the injured workers. The average age of injured workers
is in the mid-30s, so the expected postinjury working life is about 30
years.
Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1979) measured income replacement among workers with permanent impairment ratings of at least 10
percent. These workers were injured between 1968 and 1970 in California, Florida, New York, Washington, or Wisconsin. The authors estimated expected earnings by adjusting preinjury earnings for inﬂation and for
average productivity changes in the private sector. In 1975, ﬁve to seven
years after injury, many of these workers still had substantial earnings
losses. The authors then calculated after-tax replacement rates for the
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year 1975, focusing on workers whose earnings losses were estimated
to be at least $500. For this group, workers’ compensation replaced only
9 percent of after-tax losses. For about one-third of the injured workers,
the study estimated earnings losses in 1975 at less than $500, with losses
averaging $45. This group received mean beneﬁts of $163.
RECENT STUDIES OF ADEQUACY
Methods
Beginning in the late 1990s, researchers began a series of studies
of lost earnings and beneﬁt adequacy in California, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. These studies are based on empirical
estimates of injured workers’ lost earnings (Biddle 1998; Peterson et
al. 1998; Boden and Galizzi 1999; Reville 1999; Reville et al. 2001).
Studies in all these states provide estimates of the losses of workers receiving permanent disability beneﬁts or settlements. In addition, studies
of Washington and Wisconsin also provide estimates of losses of workers who received cash beneﬁts only for temporary disability beneﬁts
(Biddle 1998; Boden and Galizzi 1999).
All these recent studies use state workers’ compensation claims
data linked to quarterly earnings data from the state agency responsible
for administering unemployment insurance. This provides data on earnings before and after the date of injury. Biddle (1998) and Boden and
Galizzi (1999) use linear regression methods to estimate both injured
and uninjured earnings. Their comparison groups are workers with minor injuries.9 To calculate uninjured earnings, Biddle uses workers with
medical-only injuries (with either no lost time or less than 4 days lost
time). Boden and Galizzi use injured workers who lost 8–10 days from
work but who lacked permanent disability beneﬁts.10 Both studies apply
these methods to all lost-time injuries and, in addition, separate injuries
into groups by whether permanent disability beneﬁts were paid and,
for claims involving only temporary disability, by the duration of disability.
Using data from California, Peterson et al. (1998) and Reville
(1999) were the ﬁrst to use matching methods to estimate injured workers’ losses. Their comparison group consists of between one and ﬁve
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uninjured workers at the same ﬁrm as the injured worker and with earnings in the year before the injury within about 10 percent of the injured
worker’s. A later study uses this matching method applied consistently
to the ﬁve states for which there are now adequacy measures (Reville
et al. 2001). In all these studies, the authors estimate losses only for
cases involving permanent disability payments or settlements.
The researchers in these studies acquired data on postinjury earnings for periods ranging from 3½ to 9 years after injury. Even for the
states with the longest period of postinjury earnings data, average losses
continue to be substantial throughout the entire observed period. Figure
3.3 shows the average actual earnings of workers with permanent disability claims in Oregon relative to the earnings of matched uninjured
workers. The difference between uninjured earnings (represented by
the horizontal line labeled “100 percent”) and actual earnings is the
estimate of losses. In this ﬁgure, we can see that these losses remain approximately 20 percent of uninjured earnings for at least ﬁve years after
injury. The long-term nature of these losses presents researchers with a
dilemma. Because the vast majority of cash beneﬁts are paid within ﬁve
years of injury, and losses continue long into the future, limiting estimated losses to the observed period would signiﬁcantly underestimate
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lifetime injury-related losses but not workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
As a consequence, replacement rates would be overstated. On the other
hand, many people would not be comfortable with the accuracy of losses projected 30 years into the future (the average age at injury is about
37). The results we report here are a compromise, with losses projected
from the end of the observed period until 10 years after the injury.
Beneﬁt Adequacy for All Lost-Time Cases
Studies of losses for all lost-time cases have been completed for
only two states: Wisconsin and Washington. These two studies were
done in the late 1990s and used regression methods. We have recalculated losses and beneﬁts for the Wisconsin and Washington regression
studies, using assumptions equivalent to those used in the matching
studies below.11
Boden and Galizzi (1999) used regression methods to estimate
losses and adequacy for workers injured in Wisconsin in 1989–1990.
As shown in Table 3.1, for cases with only temporary disability beneﬁts
paid, losses increase with duration of disability payments, with average
losses reaching over $53,000 for men receiving more than 16 weeks
of temporary disability beneﬁts. In fact, average losses for both men
and women in this category exceeded losses in the permanent disability
category.
Boden and Galizzi found that estimated quarterly losses for injuries
less than 6 weeks in duration were not signiﬁcantly different from zero
after the ﬁrst two postinjury quarters, so they set later losses to zero. For
some groups estimated losses were small and positive, while for others
they were small and negative. If we did cumulate these small positive
(but statistically insigniﬁcant) losses over 10 years, we substantially increase estimates of total losses and reduce estimated replacement rates
to about 10 percent for the groups with less than two months of TTD
beneﬁt payments. It is possible that small long-term losses are a consequence of averaging a very large proportion of cases with no losses with
a small proportion of cases involving substantial long-term losses but
for which beneﬁts were stopped after a short period. Researchers have
not yet been able to determine if this is the case.12
On the other hand, many workers in Wisconsin who lose at least
two months of work and who do not receive permanent disability pay-
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Table 3.1 Wisconsin Average Pretax Losses and Replacement Rates,
by Beneﬁt Category, 1989–1990 Injuries (2003 $)
Losses per injury ($)

Replacement rate (%)

Men
Women
Men
Women
(n=36,283) (n=18,026) (n=36,283) (n=18,026)
TTD beneﬁts only
8–10 days

704

483

67

68

11–14 days

1,098

888

60

51

2.1–4 weeks

1,541

991

69

74

4.1–8 weeks

2,899

1,935

74

75

8.1–16 weeks

24,118

16,372

16

17

16.1+ weeks

53,515

34,003

20

20

PPD beneﬁts

33,441

31,434

43

39

Compromise settlements

82,843

62,340

50

43

14,427

12,568

41

36

PPD beneﬁts and settlements
(including TTD beneﬁts)

All claims

NOTE: Does not include lost fringe beneﬁts. For groups with more than 8 weeks of
TTD, PPD, or compromise beneﬁts, losses are projected for 10 years. For other
groups, loss calculations are limited to the quarter of injury and the next quarter.
Real discount rate is 2.3%.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, updated from Boden and Galizzi (1999).

ments clearly have large and continuing losses. The relatively low average temporary disability payment suggests that these injured workers
have losses that continue long past the termination of these beneﬁts. In
terms of losses, they are in a similar position to workers who receive
permanent disability beneﬁts, except they do not receive these additional beneﬁts. As a consequence, their beneﬁts are much less adequate
than for permanent disability cases.
Biddle (1998) carried out a similar study of workers in Washington State who had job-related injuries in 1993–1994. In this study, he
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provided estimates for losses and replacement rates for 3½ years after
injury for temporary disability cases divided into groups by duration,
as well as for PPD cases and settlements. For this chapter, we project
Biddle’s initial results to 10 years postinjury, which are displayed in
Table 3.2. As with our estimates for the Wisconsin data, we have cumulated only two quarters of losses for people with, at most, 60 days
(8½ weeks) of TTD. As in Wisconsin, this method indicates generally
adequate replacement rates for the group with at most 60 days of TTD
(with only one replacement rate below 50 percent).13 For people with
disabilities lasting longer than 60 days, losses are very large and replacement rates are 30 percent or less. For permanent disability and
settlement cases, replacement rates are about 40 percent. Injured workers in Washington with at least 180 days of temporary disability beneﬁts
do somewhat better than those with a shorter duration of payments, but
they still do not do as well as those receiving permanent disability benTable 3.2 Washington Average Pretax Losses and Replacement Rates, by
Beneﬁt Category, 1993–1994 Injuries (2003 $)
Average pretax
wage loss ($)
Men

Women

Replacement rate (%)
Men

Women

TTD beneﬁts only
710

524

40

50

15–30 days 2–4 wk

1,765

1,179

56

76

31–60 days 4.1–8 wk

2,791

1,925

74

86

61–180 days 8.1 wk+

36,672

30,874

14

13

More than 180 days

84,741

73,557

30

27

48,362

38,190

41

44

Less than 15 days

PPD beneﬁts and settlements

NOTE: Does not include lost fringe beneﬁts. For groups with more than 8 weeks of
TTD, PPD, or compromise beneﬁts, losses are projected for 10 years. For other
groups, loss calculations are limited to the quarter of injury and the next quarter.
Real discount rate is 2.3%. Both wage losses and beneﬁts are observed for 3.5 years
following the injury or illness.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, updated from Biddle (1998).
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eﬁts or settlements. Overall, these results are similar to the Wisconsin
results in Table 3.1.
In both states, the data suggest that a substantial proportion of workers with very long-term losses do not receive permanent disability beneﬁts. These losses may occur because of labor market effects that persist
long after full medical recovery from the injury. For example, workers
who take months to recover from their injuries may lose their at-injury
jobs and thereby lose their investments in skills and seniority at those
jobs. This may cause long-term losses despite full medical recovery. If
permanent disability beneﬁts are only paid for workers with incomplete
recovery, these workers will not receive them. Another explanation for
this ﬁnding is that some workers who are eligible for permanent disability beneﬁts are not aware of their eligibility and that these beneﬁts are
not paid voluntarily by the responsible employer or insurer.
Beneﬁt Adequacy for Permanent Disability Cases
The most ambitious attempt to date to estimate lost earnings and
workers’ compensation adequacy across several states has studied permanent disability cases in ﬁve states: California, New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin. These estimates use matching methods as
described above.14 Table 3.3 shows the characteristics of the samples
used. Losses of 6,000–32,000 injured workers were analyzed, with
an average of about four matched uninjured workers for each injured
worker. Maximum follow-up time ranged from six years in New Mexico and Washington to nine years in Wisconsin (the beginning of 1989
through the end of 1997).
We studied these ﬁve states because they had collected the necessary data and were willing to share them with us. While there is no
reason to think that these states are representative of all 50 states, there
is substantial variation among the systems. Washington offers workers’
compensation insurance through its exclusive state fund, while California and Oregon have competitive state funds, and New Mexico and
Wisconsin have private insurers only. The states also have very different beneﬁt payment levels, with California paying $1.58 per $100 of
covered wages in 2001 compared with $1.68 in Washington, $0.88 in
Oregon, $1.12 in Wisconsin, and $0.86 in New Mexico (NASI 2003).
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Table 3.3 Sample Characteristics from Five States, PPD Claims
Number
of injured
workers

Number of
comparison
workers

State

Injury years

Earnings
years

New Mexico

1994–1998

1993–1999

5,996

25,128

California

1993–1995

1991–1999

32,358

128,722

Washington

1993–1994

1990–1998

13,317

47,371

Oregon

1992–1993

1988–1998

14,082

56,773

Wisconsin

1989–1990

1988–1997

16,186

69,480

SOURCE: Reville et al. (2001).

These workers’ compensation systems also have different features
that may affect the magnitude of lost earnings and, thereby, beneﬁt adequacy. California’s system is known as one of the most litigious, with
attorney representation in 75 percent of PPD cases and 30 percent of
lost-time cases (CWCI 2003), and Wisconsin’s is recognized for its low
rate of attorney involvement—only in 24 percent of PPD cases and 5
percent of lost-time cases (authors’ calculation from 1989–1990 Wisconsin workers’ compensation data). The other states’ litigation rates
fall somewhere in the middle. Litigation may increase tensions between
workers who feel they are being treated poorly and employers who feel
that they are being taken advantage of. This may well inhibit recovery
of earnings losses by making workers less interested in returning to the
at-injury employer and employers less interested in taking back injured
workers.
In addition, several states have programs providing incentives to
employers to hire disabled workers. Oregon offers its Employer-at-Injury Program, which assists time-of-injury employers with job modiﬁcations and other costs of reemployment. Both Washington and Oregon
have also instituted Preferred Worker Programs that offer subsidies to
other employers to hire occupationally disabled workers. Wisconsin
and Oregon have two-tier permanent disability beneﬁts that pay higher
beneﬁts to workers who do not return to work at or close to the preinjury wage. These provide incentives to the at-injury employer to offer
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jobs to their injured employees. Finally, the Wisconsin law provides for
penalties to employers who unreasonably refuse to hire injured workers.
Figure 3.4 shows the relative earnings of workers receiving permanent disability beneﬁts in all ﬁve states over the ﬁve years after injury
(with only four years of postinjury earnings available for Washington).
In each of the ﬁve states, the general pattern is the same. There is a
drop in earnings in quarters 1 and 2, and some recovery. However, the
pattern differs across states. The initial drop in earnings is steepest in
Wisconsin, California, and New Mexico. Wisconsin and New Mexico
experience a larger recovery than those in California. Earnings drop the
least in Oregon and Washington.
Table 3.4 reports 10-year earnings losses and replacement rates for
the ﬁve states.15 The earnings losses results are also shown in Figure
3.4. Proportional earnings losses in California are the highest, followed
by Wisconsin and then New Mexico. They are lowest in Washington
and Oregon. In all ﬁve states, replacement rates are no more than 46
percent, varying from a low of 30 percent in Wisconsin to 46 percent in
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Table 3.4 Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates PPD claims,
(2003 $)
California
1994
Washington
Ten-year losses ($)

New
Mexico

Wisconsin

Oregon

68,139

47,925

40,172

55,404

44,691

266,797

290,956

194,287

250,773

232,478

25,372

19,456

18,398

16,374

16,273

Proportional losses (%)

26

16

21

22

19

Pretax replacement (%)

37

41

46

30

36

Potential earnings ($)
Total beneﬁts ($)

SOURCE: Adapted from Reville et al. (2001).

New Mexico. California has both the highest losses in dollars and the
highest proportional losses (losses as a fraction of potential earnings).
Differences across states in outcomes for injured workers may be
driven by differences in their workers’ compensation systems, but they
may also be driven by differences in the characteristics of injured workers and their employers. For example, we can see from Table 3.4 that
the potential earnings of injured workers in Washington are 50 percent
higher than in New Mexico. In addition, industry composition and the
proportion of employers who are self-insured (an indirect measure of
employer size) differ among the ﬁve states. These factors may affect
both losses and beneﬁt adequacy. To control for them, we match the
PPD claims in California with claims in each of the other four states
on industry (one-digit SIC) and insurance status of the employer. We
retain matches where the other state’s claims are within 10 percent of
the average wage of the matched California claim over the four quarters
before injury. We then examine the losses and beneﬁts of these California-matched claims in each state.
The question we seek to answer is, if workers with PPD claims
in the other states have the same preinjury wage and are working in
the same industry, in ﬁrms of similar employment size, and with the
same insurance status as PPD claims in California, what will be their
lost earnings and replacement rates? The answer is in Table 3.5. Except
for New Mexico, whose estimated replacement rate decreases substantially, replacement rates change by three percentage points or less. In
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Table 3.5 Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates PPD claims,
Other States’ Workers Matched to California’s (2003 $)

Ten-year losses ($)
Potential
earnings ($)
Total beneﬁts ($)
Proportional
losses (%)
Pretax
replacement (%)

California
1994

Washington

New
Mexico

Wisconsin

Oregon

68,139

47,181

45,423

49,895

42,129

266,797

255,695

237,431

248,121

258,743

25,372

19,127

17,077

15,964

16,627

26

18

19

20

16

37

41

38

32

39

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

none of the ﬁve states do replacement rates come close to the two-thirds
standard for adequacy.
Table 3.5 compares losses and adequacy across the ﬁve states, but
it does not account for one very important difference among the states:
the fraction of workers with temporary disability beneﬁts who also receive permanent disability beneﬁts varies from 17 percent in Wisconsin
to 41 percent in California (Table 3.6). If we assume that the distribution of injury severity is the same from state to state, then an additional
24 percent of injured workers in Wisconsin with TTD who lost more
than 7 days off work would have received permanent disability beneﬁts if they had been injured in California. Judging from the results
of the studies in Wisconsin and Washington described above, workers
with long temporary disability but no PPD beneﬁts tend to have high
and continuing losses. And because they have high losses and don’t get
PPD beneﬁts, they have very low replacement rates. Averaging them
in with other Washington workers who received PPD beneﬁts would
reduce the overall average beneﬁts for the 41 percent who would have
been eligible for beneﬁts if they worked in California. For this reason,
Wisconsin’s workers’ compensation system is even less generous compared with California’s system than indicated in Table 3.5. The same is
the case for the other three states.
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Table 3.6 PPD Claims as a Proportion of all Claims with More than
Seven Days of TTD Beneﬁts (%)
California
1994

Washington

New Mexico

Wisconsin

Oregon

41

21

23

17

31

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

To account for differences in the propensity to award permanent
disability beneﬁts, we attempt to create for each state a sample of 41
percent of the most severe injuries involving more than three days off
work.16 Because we do not have an independent measure of severity, we
use workers’ compensation beneﬁts as a proxy. We begin with all permanent disability cases. To make other states comparable to California,
we randomly select additional people in each temporary disability duration group so that the proportion in that group that would have received
permanent disability in California is included in the comparison.
For example, in California, 96 percent of workers in the top 10 percent of temporary disability durations are receiving permanent disability. In Washington, 64 percent of workers in the top 10 percent are receiving permanent disability. We calculate the replacement rate for the
64 percent who actually receive permanent disability in Washington,
plus an additional randomly selected 32 percent of workers with temporary disability in the top decile (not including those receiving permanent disability) so that 96 percent of the top decile (including all actual
permanent disability cases) are represented in the sample. We repeat
this exercise for every decile so that the resulting sample is 41 percent
of all lost-time claims in each of the states.17
Table 3.7 displays the results of this exercise. It provides a picture
of losses and replacement for people who would have received permanent disability beneﬁts if they had been injured in California. By
deﬁnition, California’s losses and replacement rates are the same as in
Table 3.5. The other three states’ losses are lower than when only their
permanent disability cases are included, but their beneﬁts are lower yet.
The result is a decline in replacement rates for all three. The four states
have replacement rates between 23 percent and 37 percent—well below
the two-thirds standard of beneﬁt adequacy.
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Table 3.7 Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates, Four
States, Matched PPD Claims Augmented with Long-Term
TTD (2003 $)
California
1994

Washington

Wisconsin

Oregon

68,139

50,044

36,214

40,144

266,797

253,242

249,714

260,387

25,372

14,502

8,347

13,739

Proportional losses (%)

26

20

15

15

Pretax replacement (%)

37

29

23

34

10-year losses ($)
Potential earnings ($)
Total beneﬁts ($)

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

It is also notable in Table 3.7 that the proportional losses experienced by California’s PPD recipients are substantially higher than for
equivalent workers in the next highest state, Washington. Indeed, they
are 76 percent higher than the average losses of equivalent workers in
Wisconsin.
CONCLUSION
Beneﬁt adequacy is a central goal of workers’ compensation. Yet, in
most states we know little about whether cash beneﬁts are indeed adequate. Our initial studies in ﬁve states have shown that, for many groups
of injured workers, replacement rates do not approach the two-thirds
benchmark for adequacy. This gives us cause for concern, as there is
no reason to believe that other states’ replacement rates will be much
higher than the ﬁve states we have studied to date. It also underlines the
importance of conducting studies of adequacy in additional states.
To the extent that beneﬁts are inadequate, it would be helpful to
understand the effects of policies available to increase replacement
rates. Potential policy choices include increasing weekly beneﬁt payment levels, increasing the level of beneﬁts paid for each percentage
point of permanent disability, changing permanent disability guidelines
to increase the likelihood that people with a given level of lost earnings
will receive permanent disability beneﬁts, and eliminating roadblocks
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that prevent injured workers from receiving workers’ compensation
beneﬁts. Each of these policies would directly increase overall beneﬁt
payments to workers and therefore increase costs to employers. Additionally, each would buck the recent trend toward reducing beneﬁts
and eligibility.
Alternate approaches focusing on beneﬁts would try to improve the
distribution of beneﬁts by targeting beneﬁts more toward groups with
particularly low replacement rates or toward groups with particularly
large losses. These steps would improve the equity of beneﬁt distribution. However, unless they worked hand-in-hand with beneﬁt increases, they would imply substantial reductions in beneﬁts for untargeted
groups.
Another approach is to try, ex post, to target beneﬁts at people
whose compensation turns out to be incommensurate with their losses.
Most permanent disability systems provide beneﬁts in expectation of
losses. Naturally, sometimes people’s actual losses differ substantially
from what was predicted. To address this, Texas has a supplemental
beneﬁt program that identiﬁes people with large and continuing losses
and pays additional beneﬁts to them.
Other avenues to improve beneﬁt adequacy would focus on reducing lost earnings of injured workers or on reducing injury rates. Both of
these approaches have the potential to increase replacement rates without increasing employer costs. One area that may have great potential
is private or public policies directed at return-to-work at the at-injury
employer. Studies also have shown that, when the preinjury employer
rehires the injured or disabled worker, time lost from work is reduced
substantially and the employment trajectory is improved (Burkhauser,
Butler, and Kim 1995; Galizzi and Boden 2003). The Oregon Employer-at-Injury Program is an example of such an approach. As described
earlier, it provides subsidies to employers who offer modiﬁed or lightduty jobs to allow injured workers to return to work before they have
fully recovered from their workplace injuries. The primary goal is to
maintain employment at the at-injury employer and thus to improve the
trajectory of postinjury employment and earnings.
To fully understand the implications of these and other policy alternatives for improving beneﬁt adequacy, much additional research would
be required. Our understanding of the adequacy of workers’ compensation beneﬁts is in its infancy. The list of important unanswered ques-
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tions is long and could form the basis of a valuable research agenda.
Still, this does not absolve us from attempting to respond to the challenge of inadequate beneﬁts.
We end this chapter with a partial list of important questions that
we would like to see addressed in future research.18 Answers to these
questions would provide an empirical basis for policymakers to decide
among alternatives for improving the adequacy of workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
1) How do replacement rates differ among states? For example,
do states with high maximum weekly beneﬁts tend to have high
replacement rates? Do states with a high propensity to provide
PPD beneﬁts have high replacement rates? Does unionization
affect replacement rates?
2) To what extent could replacement rates from workers’ compensation be increased through more effective assistance with
return to work or job accommodations? How effective are current state programs designed to encourage the at-injury employer or other employers to offer jobs to injured workers?
How effective are vocational rehabilitation programs?
3) Are losses reduced and adequacy improved by two-tier PPD
systems that pay higher beneﬁts if employers do not rehire injured workers in comparable jobs?
4) How effective is the supplemental beneﬁt program in Texas in
increasing beneﬁt adequacy for workers with large losses?
5) To what extent do workers receive beneﬁts from other wagereplacement programs, such as Social Security disability or
retirement beneﬁts, unemployment insurance, state temporary
disability beneﬁts, employer sponsored pensions, sick leave or
private long-term disability insurance? How different would
total replacement rates be if they included payments from other programs?
6) Do injured workers also lose nonwage (fringe) beneﬁts? Which
beneﬁts are lost, and what is the value of these losses to the
worker? If we include lost fringe beneﬁts, how would this affect our measure of the adequacy of beneﬁts?
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7) How much are the increased costs to families because they
must care for injured workers or replace household work formerly done by them? How much are the offsetting savings to
workers from reduced work expenses, such as commuting,
child care, food, and clothing? And how do these impact beneﬁt adequacy?
8) Does absence from work, from any cause, lead to reduced future earnings? If so, how long an absence must occur before
the future loss becomes signiﬁcant? Does an absence as a result of work-related injury or disease exhibit the same or a different pattern of future wage loss than an absence due to some
other reason?
9) What impact do the costs of obtaining beneﬁts have on the
adequacy of the beneﬁts actually received by workers (e.g.,
what are the effects of delays and the reduction in claimants’
net recoveries after payment of attorney fees and litigation expenses)?
10) What is the relationship between pretax and after-tax wage replacement rates in different states?
11) To what extent can losses be predicted by medical information
about the injury, such as the information used in the American
Medical Association Guides?
12) Are there worker, employer, or labor market characteristics that
affect losses and replacement rates? Examples include gender,
race, age, preinjury earnings, and union status; employer size
and industry; and state unemployment rates.
13) In states where this issue has not yet been studied, are replacement rates relatively low for workers with long-duration temporary disability but no permanent disability beneﬁts? If this
disparity exists, can we determine its causes?
14) To what extent do states with high rates of litigation have
higher or lower replacement rates (net of attorney fees paid
by workers)? If any differences exist, what are the underlying
reasons for them?
15) To what extent are large losses of injured workers caused by
the functional limitations caused by their injuries?
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16) To what extent are these losses caused by labor market impacts
of time lost from work, injury-related job loss, or stigma attached to workers with long-term injuries and illnesses?
17) What is the magnitude of losses related to workplace injuries
that do not receive workers’ compensation income beneﬁt
payments? How do these uncompensated cases affect overall replacement rates? To what extent do changes in workers’
compensation laws affect the proportion of injuries that go unreported?
18) Can the methodology used in the recent studies of adequacy be
simpliﬁed and/or explained so that state agencies can conduct
adequacy studies?
19) What are the advantages and disadvantages of the various
methods used to estimate earnings losses in the earlier and recent studies of adequacy? For example, Ginnold (1979) relied
on state income tax records, and Berkowitz and Burton (1987)
relied on Social Security earnings records, while the recent
studies have relied on state unemployment insurance records.

Notes
1. See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm.
2. See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/osh.t02.htm.
3. Adequacy can also be measured by whether family income is restored to a socially acceptable level, such as the poverty level. This concept of adequacy is not
typically applied to the workers’ compensation program. However, limitations
on weekly temporary disability beneﬁts (typically to 100 percent of the state average weekly wage) do reﬂect this notion of adequacy to some extent. For a more
complete discussion of alternate measures of workers’ compensation adequacy,
see Hunt (2004).
4. Some states pay at a somewhat different rate, and others pay based on a measure
of after-tax earnings, but this is the predominant rate. For short-term injuries,
replacement is lower because of the impact of the waiting period.
5. Because beneﬁts and losses occur over time, and beneﬁts and losses years from
now are worth less than if they occurred today, we discount them, using an annual real discount rate of 2.3 percent. This is drawn from Social Security Administration studies. We also convert beneﬁts and wages to 2003 dollars to take
inﬂation into account.
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6. There is no reason to expect that individual workers’ losses will be captured by
this method, but only that the average difference between estimated uninjured
earnings and actual earnings will be an unbiased measure of average losses.
7. Fraudulent reporting of injuries would be the converse of underreporting. However, there are no studies that indicate that overreporting is nearly of the same
magnitude as underreporting.
8. Cheit drew this conclusion from looking at predicted and actual postinjury earnings of individual workers. This ﬁnding suggests that a substantial number of
workers had little or no work-related lost earnings. However, ﬁndings for individual workers are subject to substantial uncertainty. See note 12.
9. Uninjured workers could not be used in the regression context because personal
characteristics controlled for in this setting (for example, age and gender) are
unavailable for the uninjured workers.
10. To account for the losses of workers out for 8–10 days, they added 9 days’ wages
to each worker’s estimated losses.
11. This includes a 2.3 percent discount rate. Also, in the 1999 Wisconsin study,
Boden and Galizzi imputed changes in the employment rates of uninjured workers over time as they might affect losses. The other studies did not do this, so, for
sake of comparison, we omitted this step.
12. Determining the true losses of individual workers is virtually impossible because,
at the individual level, we cannot know what factors caused changes in earnings.
Only by estimating losses of large groups of workers can we apply statistical
techniques that “average out” the noninjury causes of changes in earnings.
13. The relatively low replacement for the group under 15 days is caused by the fact
that this group is not paid beneﬁts for the ﬁrst 3 days off work. Once 15 days is
reached, the ﬁrst 3 days’ beneﬁts are paid.
14. Initial match quality was judged by how well earnings of injured and matched
uninjured workers tracked each other in the prematch period. Match quality was
excellent in New Mexico and insured ﬁrms, but less so in the other three states
and self-insured ﬁrms in California. To improve match quality in these cases,
uninjured workers were matched by employee tenure in addition to employer
and preinjury wages.
15. In Washington, on the basis of the average over the last 4 quarters observed
(quarters 11–15), we project a 1.9 percent quarterly decline in wage losses after the last quarter observed. In California, we project a 1 percent decline after
the last quarter observed, which is also based on the last quarters observed. In
Wisconsin, almost 10 years of postinjury earnings are directly observable. In
Oregon, the data suggest that no decline in wage losses is occurring at the end of
the observed period.
16. Because New Mexico has a seven-day waiting period and the other states have
three-day waiting periods, we do not include it in this comparison.
17. California permanent disability recipients have the longest temporary disability durations. Using deciles instead of actual durations controls for differences
across workers’ compensation systems that might extend or reduce the durations
of temporary disability, such as the level of beneﬁts or control over medical

Roberts.indb 65

6/7/2005 9:27:54 AM

66 Boden, Reville, and Biddle
care or levels of litigation. If true severity were the only determining factor of
temporary disability durations across states, because California has the highest
durations, this approach (using deciles instead of durations) would overstate the
fraction that would receive permanent disability beneﬁts if they had been injured
in California. On the other hand, California may not award permanent disability
randomly within long-duration temporary disability groups. Rather, permanent
disability may be awarded to workers within these groups likely to have the largest lost earnings. In this case, our method would underestimate the losses among
workers in other states who would have received permanent disability beneﬁts
in California because we randomly chose workers within temporary disability
groups.
18. Several of these questions are adapted from another agenda for research on
workers’ compensation adequacy published in an appendix to Hunt (2004).
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4
Permanent Partial
Disability Beneﬁts
John F. Burton, Jr.
Rutgers University

Permanent partial disability (PPD) cash beneﬁts constitute the most
expensive and complex type of beneﬁt provided by workers’ compensation programs.1 PPD beneﬁts are paid to workers whose workplace injuries have consequences that are permanent but not totally disabling.2
This chapter provides an overview of the previous research on PPD
beneﬁts, with particular emphasis on the contributions of Terry Thomason, and indicates the topics for which additional research is needed.
INTRODUCTION TO PPD BENEFITS
The importance of PPD beneﬁts in the U.S. workers’ compensation
program and the variability among states in the relative importance of
PPD beneﬁts are shown in 1999 data on incurred cash beneﬁts (Blum
and Burton 2003). Nationally, temporary total disability (TTD) beneﬁts
are more common than PPD beneﬁts (Figure 4.1), and permanent total
disability (PTD) beneﬁts and fatal beneﬁts are much more expensive
per case than PPD beneﬁts (Figure 4.2). However, the total expenditures on PPD beneﬁts per 100,000 workers account for over 70 percent
of all cash beneﬁts nationally (Figure 4.3). Blum and Burton (2003)
also report that nationally PPD cash beneﬁts increased from $14.4 million per 100,000 workers in 1996 to $17.2 million in 1999.
There are signiﬁcant differences among states in these measures
of incurred PPD beneﬁts, as shown in the lowest, ﬁrst quartile, mean,
median, third quartile, and highest values for the 46 jurisdictions with
data. The frequency of PPD claims per 100,000 workers varies from

69

Roberts.indb 69

6/7/2005 9:27:55 AM

70 Burton
Figure 4.1 Frequency per 100,000 Workers in 1999, National Averages
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1,221 in California to 128 in the District of Columbia, almost a tenfold
difference (Figure 4.4). The average cost of cash beneﬁts per PPD case
varies from $86,872 in Michigan to $13,909 in Indiana, a more than
sixfold difference (Figure 4.5). As measured by total expenditures on
PPD cash beneﬁts per 100,000 workers, the $43.3 million in California
is more than 10 times the $4.1 million in Utah (Figure 4.6).
One research task is to explain the interstate and intertemporal differences in these measures of incurred PPD beneﬁts. One logical determinant of the amount of incurred cash beneﬁts in a state is the generosity of the beneﬁts prescribed by the state’s workers’ compensation
statute. Another obvious candidate for a variable that would explain
interstate differences in incurred beneﬁts is the state’s injury rate.3
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING PPD
BENEFITS
Permanent Consequences of Workplace Injuries and Diseases:
Terminology and Concepts
There are signiﬁcant differences among the states and provinces in
their approaches to compensating permanent disabilities. Furthermore,
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Figure 4.2 Average Cash Beneﬁts per Case in 1999, National Averages ($)
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Figure 4.3 Cash Beneﬁts per 100,000 Workers in 1999, National
Averages (in Millions $)
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Figure 4.4 Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts Frequency per 100,000
Workers in 1999, Variations among States
1,400
1,200

1,221

1,000
800

561

600

534
399

400

302
128

200
-

California

Texas

National
average
(mean)

North Carolina
(median)

Louisiana

District of
Columbia

among jurisdictions using the same approach, the terminology used to
describe the same approach may differ. Thus, a common set of terms
is a practical necessity for effective interjurisdictional comparisons regarding PPD beneﬁts.
Three time periods
As shown in Figure 4.7, three time periods are pertinent in compensating a worker with an injury serious enough to result in PPD beneﬁts. The preinjury period is relevant because inter alia the employee’s
average wage is used in calculating the cash beneﬁts after the worker
is injured. The temporary disability period refers to the time from the
onset of the injury or disease until the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) has been reached; the permanent disability period
refers to the period following MMI. The distinction between the temporary and permanent disability periods is important because workers’
compensation programs provide different types of cash beneﬁts in the
two periods.
What are the permanent consequences?
Most workers injured on the job fully recover by the date of MMI
and thus sustain no permanent consequences from the injury. For those
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Figure 4.5 Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts, Average Cash Beneﬁts
per Case in 1999, Variations among States
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Figure 4.6 Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts, Cash Beneﬁts per
100,000 Workers in 1999, Variations among States
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Figure G – Three Time Periods in a Workers’ Compensation Case Where
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workers with relatively serious injuries, several permanent consequences are possible. There may be a persistence of pain and suffering and a
continuing need for medical care and rehabilitation. Of particular interest are the other permanent consequences (shown in Figure 4.8) because they are the focus of most of the debate concerning the optimal
design of PPD beneﬁts.4
A permanent impairment is any anatomic or functional abnormality
or loss that remains after MMI has been achieved. Amputated limbs or
enervated muscles are examples of permanent impairments. The impairment probably causes the worker to experience functional limitations.
Physical performance may be limited in such activities as walking,
climbing, reaching, and hearing; furthermore, the worker’s emotional
and mental performance may be adversely affected or limited.
Functional limitations, in turn, are likely to result in a disability,
of which there are two types: work disability and nonwork disability.
Work disability can be conceptualized as having two phases: the loss of
earning capacity, which results in actual wage loss. In a strict sense,
these two aspects of work disability must accompany one another. An
actual loss of earnings only occurs if there is loss of earning capacity.
Nevertheless, the distinction is important because (as discussed later)
some types of workers’ compensation beneﬁts are based solely on a
determination of a presumed loss of earning capacity, while other types
of beneﬁts require demonstration of actual wage loss.
Nonwork disability includes the loss of the capacities for other aspects of life, such as recreation and the performance of household tasks,
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Figure H – Permanent Consequences of an Injury or Disease

Figure 4.8 Permanent Consequences of an Injury or Disease
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and can be conceptualized as having two phases: the loss of capacity for
nonwork activities which results in actual noneconomic loss. Again, in
a strict sense, these two aspects of nonwork disability must accompany
one another, but at least conceptually they can be measured separately.
Factors that affect the magnitudes of the permanent
consequences
The relationships shown in Figure 4.8 indicate chains of causation
that begin with the worker’s injury, which in turn results in permanent
impairment, functional limitations, work disability, and nonwork disability. However, the chains of causation are neither automatic nor are
they immutable because they are the result of factors that are uncontrollable after the date of injury. Rather, as shown in Table 4.1, in each
stage in the chains of causation there are also factors controllable by the
worker, or by participants in the delivery system for workers’ compensation beneﬁts, or by public policy.5
Stage 1—the movement from the injury or disease to the permanent
impairment—will be affected by such controllable factors as the quality
of the medical care received by the worker and by such uncontrollable
factors as the worker’s previous health status. Stage 2—the movement
from the permanent impairment to the functional limitations—is also
affected by controllable factors (such as the quality of medical rehabilitation) and uncontrollable factors (such as the worker’s prior physical condition). Likewise, stage 3A—the progression from functional
limitations to loss of earning capacity—will be inﬂuenced by control-
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Table 4.1 Factors That Affect the Extent of the Permanent Consequences
Stage 1

Stage 2

Injury to Permanent Impairment
Controllable factors include

Medical care

Uncontrollable factors include

Prior health status

Permanent Impairment to Functional Limitations
Controllable factors include

Medical rehabilitation

Uncontrollable factors include

Prior physical condition

Stage 3A Functional Limitations to Loss of Earning Capacity
Controllable factors include

Vocational rehabilitation

Uncontrollable factors include

Age, prior education, prior work
experience

Stage 4A Loss of Earning Capacity to Actual Wage Loss
Controllable factors include

Employer return-to-work policies,
reasonable accommodations at work
site; design of beneﬁts (affecting
incentive to return to work)

Uncontrollable factors include

General state of the labor market

Stage 3B Functional Limitations to Loss of Capacity for Nonwork Activities
Controllable factors include

Rehabilitation (such as training to
operate modiﬁed automobile)

Uncontrollable factors include

Age, prior experience

Stage 4B Loss of Capacity for Nonwork Activities to Actual Noneconomic Loss
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lable factors (the quality of vocational rehabilitation, for example) and
uncontrollable factors (such as the worker’s age and prior work experience). Finally, in stage 4A—the actual wage loss resulting from the loss
of earning capacity—other factors will inﬂuence the outcome, such as
the employer’s return-to-work policies (controllable) and the general
state of the labor market (uncontrollable for a particular employer or
worker). Table 4.1 also catalogues several controllable and uncontrollable factors that affect the extent of loss of capacity for nonwork activity
resulting from functional limitations (stage 3B) and the amount of actual noneconomic loss resulting from the loss of capacity for nonwork
activity (stage 4B).
The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable factors in
Table 4.1 is not meant to provide a rigid classiﬁcation scheme, nor is
the list of factors meant to be exhaustive. One purpose of the table is
to suggest that some factors that affect the chains of causation between
the initial injury or disease and the ultimate work or nonwork disability can be inﬂuenced by workers, employers, physicians, rehabilitation
providers, and others in the workers’ compensation delivery system, or
by policymakers who design the workers’ compensation PPD beneﬁts
system; however, other factors can not be inﬂuenced.
Another purpose of Table 4.1 is to emphasize that there are numerous factors that affect all of the stages in the chains of causation. As a
result, knowing the extent of a worker’s loss for any of the intermediary
consequences shown in Figure 4.8 may not provide a good prediction
of the extent of the loss for a subsequent consequence. The accuracy
of predictions of actual wage losses from the ratings of loss of earning
capacity, and other such purported relationships among the various permanent consequences of work-related injuries or diseases, including the
efﬁcacy of intervention at various stages of the disability determination
process, are empirical issues that deserve further research.
The Effect of Work Injuries on Earnings
The loss of earnings resulting from a work-related injury or disease
that has permanent consequences is illustrated by Figure 4.9. Prior to
the injury, the wages increased through time from A to B, reﬂecting the
worker’s increasing productivity as well as general inﬂation. At point
B, the worker experienced a work-related injury that permanently re-
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Figure 4.9 Actual Loss of Earnings for a Worker with a Permanent
Disability
Figure 4.9
– Actual Loss of Earnings for a Workers with a Permanent Disability
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duced his earnings. Had he not been injured, his earnings would have
continued to grow along the line BC. Although these potential earnings cannot be observed for the injured worker, they can be estimated
from information on what happened after point B to earnings of similar
workers who were not injured.
The injured worker’s actual earnings in this example dropped from
B to D and continued at this zero earnings level until point E, when the
worker returned to work at wage level F. Thereafter, actual earnings
grew along the line FG. This example assumes that the worker’s actual
earnings never return to the potential earnings (line BC) that he would
have earned if he had never been injured. The worker’s “true” wage
loss due to the injury is equal to the worker’s potential earnings after the
date of injury (BC) minus the worker’s actual earnings after the date of
injury (BDEFG).6
Of course, not all workers with permanent impairments resulting
from their work injuries have wage histories that correspond to the example in Figure 4.9. Some may return to their old jobs at the wage they
would have earned if they had never been injured; others may experience a total loss of earnings from their injuries. The example shown
illustrates an intermediate case, in which the worker has a partial but
not total loss of earnings.
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There are a myriad of issues that must be resolved in order to measure the actual loss of earnings resulting from work-related injuries and
the workers’ compensation beneﬁts actually received by workers as a
result of those injuries. These issues and a catalogue of research topics
are presented in Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005).7
WHICH PERMANENT CONSEQUENCES SHOULD BE
COMPENSABLE?
The taxonomy of the permanent consequences of workplace injuries
provided in the previous section serves as a basis for the design of a PPD
beneﬁts system. One policy issue that implicitly or explicitly has to be
resolved in any jurisdiction in order to design this system pertains to the
purpose of the PPD beneﬁts.8
The obligation of the workers’ compensation program to provide
medical care and rehabilitation services is generally accepted (although
in some jurisdictions, there is disagreement about the extent of vocational
rehabilitation services to which the worker is entitled). Conversely, in
most jurisdictions there is general agreement that the worker is not entitled to beneﬁts because of pain and suffering.9 The rationale often given
is that the original design of workers’ compensation involved a trade-off,
in which the employee is eligible for beneﬁts without demonstrating employer fault and the employer’s liability is limited to certain consequences
of the injury, which not did encompass pain and suffering.
Most of the recent controversy over which of the permanent consequences of a work-related injury deserve compensation involves arguments concerning the four permanent consequences shown in Figure
4.8. Because the four consequences are sequential and interdependent,
a particular consequence may be endorsed as a basis for compensation
because it serves as a convenient proxy for other consequences of primary
concern.
Thus, one may argue that the amount of the PPD beneﬁts should operationally be based on the extent of the worker’s impairment when the
real concern is for the work disability caused by the impairment. This
indirect route to compensating work disability may be chosen because
impairment may be easier to measure than work disability. Unfortunately,
those who favor payment when the worker suffers an impairment do not
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always make clear whether this payment is meant to compensate for the
existence of the impairment by itself or is meant to compensate for the
work disability (or some other consequence) that is expected to result
from the impairment.
To the extent that the rationale for beneﬁts is discernable, however,
two schools of thought can be identiﬁed. One view considers lost wages
due to the injury (work disability) as the sole justiﬁcation for workers’
compensation beneﬁts. Supporters of this position recognize that some
jurisdictions pay beneﬁts on the basis of an evaluation of the extent of
impairment or of some of the other permanent consequences in Figure 4.8
prior to actual wage loss, but argue that when such evaluations are made,
wage loss is conclusively presumed. The jurisdiction, in short, compensates on the basis of one of these intermediate consequences because it
serves as a proxy for wage loss.
An alternative view of the rationale for beneﬁts for workers with
permanent consequences of their injuries accepts work disability as the
primary basis for beneﬁts, but argues that there is a secondary role for
beneﬁts paid for nonwork disability. Arguments for these “impairment
beneﬁts” indicate that the purpose is not only to compensate impairment
per se but to also use permanent impairment as a convenient proxy for the
functional limitations and nonwork disability that result from the impairment. A variant on this alternative view is to argue that nonwork disability
merits compensation, and that the degree of permanent impairment serves
as a proxy for the extent of nonwork disability.10
The dominant view probably is that the only permanent consequences that warrant beneﬁts in a workers’ compensation program are
medical care, rehabilitation, and work disability. There are, however,
several jurisdictions that explicitly adopted beneﬁts for nonwork disability, including Florida (which paid what were termed “permanent
impairment” beneﬁts from 1979 to 1993) and most Canadian provinces,
such as Ontario (which pays noneconomic loss beneﬁts). One provocative research question is why Canadian provinces are much more receptive to paying noneconomic loss beneﬁts than U.S. states?
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THE THREE BASIC OPERATIONAL APPROACHES TO PPD
BENEFITS
Among those states in which work disability is the sole reason why
PPD beneﬁts are paid, most jurisdictions use another of the permanent
consequences shown in Figure 4.8 as a proxy or predictor of the extent of work disability. This section provides an overview of the basic
operational approaches for PPD beneﬁts found in U.S. and Canadian
jurisdictions.11
Three Basic Operational Approaches for Work Disability Beneﬁts
Three basic operational approaches for work disability beneﬁts,
plus variants of each of the three basic approaches, are shown in Table
4.2.12 The operational approaches represent the building blocks for PPD
beneﬁts systems. The difference among the three basic operational approaches depends on which of the permanent consequences shown in
Figure 4.8 is used as a proxy for or measurement of work disability.
Operational Approach I: The permanent impairment
approach
The ﬁrst basic operational approach, the permanent impairment approach, evaluates the seriousness of the worker’s permanent impairment and/or functional limitations resulting from the work-related injury.13 An impairment rating is made, which is used to determine the
amount of the PPD beneﬁts.
The ﬁrst variant of the permanent impairment approach is the
“pure” permanent impairment approach (Operational Approach I.A).
As indicated in Table 4.2, the only worker-speciﬁc factor that affects
the amount of PPD beneﬁts in this approach is the size of the permanent
impairment rating. This presumably provides a very rough proxy for the
worker’s actual loss of wages, but a few jurisdictions nonetheless rely
on this approach for work disability beneﬁts.
The second variant of the permanent impairment approach is the
permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach (Operational Approach I.B). This approach multiplies the permanent impairment rating
by a weekly beneﬁt that is largely determined by the worker’s weekly
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Table 4.2 Operational Approaches for Permanent Disability Beneﬁts
Operational Approach I: The Permanent Impairment Approach
Operational Approach IA: The “Pure” Permanent Impairment Approach
1. The worker is given a permanent impairment rating based on the extent of the
workers’ permanent impairment/functional limitations.
2. The worker’s permanent partial disability (PPD) beneﬁts are determined by
multiplying the rating by a dollar amount per point that does not vary among
individuals on the basis of their preinjury wages.
Operational Approach IB: The Permanent Impairment and Preinjury
Wage Approach
1. The worker is given a permanent impairment rating based on the extent of the
workers’ permanent impairment/functional limitations.
2. The duration of the PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the rating times
a duration speciﬁed in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
3. The weekly PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to
minimum and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.a
Operational Approach II: The Loss of Earning Capacity (LEC) Approach
Operational Approach IIA: The Ad Hoc Loss of Earning Capacity
Approach
1. The worker is given an LEC rating based on the facts of the particular case,
which includes the worker’s permanent impairment rating and other factors,
such as the worker’s age, occupation, education, and prior work experience.
2. The duration of the PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the LEC rating
times a duration speciﬁed in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
3. The weekly PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to
minimum and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.b
Operational Approach IIB: The Loss of Earning Capacity by Formula
Approach
1. The worker is given a loss of earning capacity rating based on a formula,
which considers the worker’s permanent impairment rating and other factors,
such as the worker’s age, occupation, and education.
2. The duration of the PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the rating times
a duration speciﬁed in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
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3. The weekly PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to
minimum and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.
Operational Approach IIC: The “Pure” Loss of Earning Capacity Approach
1. The worker is given a loss of earning capacity rating based on the facts of the
case or based on a formula.
2. The rating is used to determine the amount of PPD beneﬁts using a formula
that does not vary among workers on the basis of their preinjury wages.
III. Operational Approach III: The Actual Wage Loss Approach
Operational Approach IIIA: The “Pure” Actual Wage Loss Approach
1. The worker’s actual wage loss is (a) the worker’s projected wages in the
permanent disability periodc and (b) the worker’s actual earnings in the
permanent disability period.
2. The worker must demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the effects
of the permanent impairment and was not because of other factors, such as the
worker’s voluntarily retiring or withdrawing from the labor force, or refusing
a legitimate job offer, or general economic conditions.
3. If the worker’s actual wage loss is zero (or a negative number), there are no
PPD beneﬁts.
4. The duration of the PPD beneﬁt depends on the duration of the worker’s
actual wage loss (subject to a statutory maximum on duration).
5. The weekly PPD is determined by multiplying the actual wage loss by a
percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to minimum and/
or maximum weekly beneﬁts.
Operational Approach IIIB: The Limited Actual Wage Loss Approach
1. The worker’s actual wage loss is (a) the worker’s projected wages in the
permanent disability periodd and (b) the worker’s actual earnings in the
permanent disability period.
2. The worker must demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the effects
of the permanent impairment and was not because of other factors, such as the
worker’s voluntarily retiring or withdrawing from the labor force, or refusing
a legitimate job offer, or general economic conditions.
3. The worker’s maximum compensable wage loss is the workers’ projected
wages in the permanent disability period times either (c) the worker’s loss of
earning capacity rating or (d) the worker’s permanent impairment rating;
and/or the worker’s maximum compensable wage loss is the actual wage loss
in excess of a threshold that is a percent of the worker’s preinjury wage.e
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4. The worker’s compensable wage loss is the lesser of the worker’s actual wage
loss or the worker’s maximum compensable wage loss.
5. If the worker’s compensable wage is zero (or a negative number), there are no
PPD beneﬁts.
6. The duration of the PPD beneﬁt depends on the duration of the worker’s
compensable wage loss (subject to a statutory maximum on duration).
7. The weekly PPD is determined by multiplying the compensable wage loss by
a percentage (e.g., 66 ⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to minimum
and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.
In a few jurisdictions, the duration of the PPD beneﬁts is ﬁxed and the rating is used
to help determine the weekly PPD beneﬁt.
b
In a few jurisdictions, the duration of the PPD beneﬁts is ﬁxed and the rating is used
to help determine the weekly PPD beneﬁt.
c
In most workers’ compensation programs, the worker’s projected wages in the
permanent disability period are the same as the worker’s preinjury wages.
d
In most workers’ compensation programs, the worker’s projected wages in the
permanent disability period are the same as the worker’s preinjury wages.
e
The choice among the worker’s loss of earning capacity rating or the worker’s
permanent impairment rating or the threshold linked to preinjury wages varies
among jurisdictions.
a
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wage prior to the workplace injury. This variant is more closely aligned
with the idea that the purpose of PPD beneﬁts is to compensate for work
disability.
Operational Approach II: The loss of earning capacity
approach
The loss of earning capacity approach considers the seriousness of
the worker’s permanent impairment and functional limitations, as well
as other factors that may affect the loss of the worker’s earning capacity
resulting from the injury. These factors may include the worker’s age,
prior education, and prior work experience. In addition, factors such
as the job opportunities in a given location may be considered. After
all the factors relied on in the particular jurisdiction are considered, a
rating of the worker’s loss of earning capacity due to the work-related
injury or disease is produced. In turn, that rating is used to determine
the duration (or, in some jurisdictions, the weekly amount) of the PPD
beneﬁts. Loss of earning capacity is presumably used as a proxy for the
actual wage loss that is expected to result.
The ﬁrst variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the ad
hoc loss of earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II.A in
Table 4.2). The extent of the loss of earning capacity is decided on the
facts of the case, which may vary from case to case in the same jurisdiction depending on the predilections of the parties (including the administrative law judge) involved in the case. This approach multiplies
the loss of earning capacity rating by a maximum duration speciﬁed in
the statute to determine the duration of the worker’s PPD beneﬁts. The
weekly beneﬁt is largely determined by the worker’s weekly wage prior
to the workplace injury.
The second variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the
loss of earning capacity by formula approach (Operational Approach
II.B in Table 4.2). The worker’s permanent impairment rating is modiﬁed by a formula that considers factors such as the worker’s age or
occupation in order to determine the loss of earning capacity. The third
variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the “pure” loss of
earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II.C in Table 4.2).
The worker’s loss of earning capacity is determined based either on the
facts of the particular case or on a formula. The loss of earning capacity rating is then used to determine the amount of PPD beneﬁts based
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on factors such as the extent of the loss of earning capacity. However,
the beneﬁt does not vary among workers on the basis of their preinjury
wages.14
Operational Approach III: The actual wage loss approach
The actual wage loss approach determines the actual wage loss due
to the work-related injury by comparing the worker’s earnings in the period after the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) with the
worker’s earnings before the date of injury. The duration and amount
of PPD beneﬁts are then related to the duration and amount of actual
wage loss.
The ﬁrst variant of the actual wage loss approach is the “pure” actual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.A). As explicated
in Table 4.2, this approach deﬁnes actual wage loss as the difference
between the worker’s projected earnings in the permanent disability
period and the worker’s actual earnings in that period. If the worker
can demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the workplace
injury or disease, the weekly PPD beneﬁt is calculated as a percent of
the actual wage and is paid for the duration of the wage loss (subject to
statutory limits on the duration).
The second variant of the actual wage loss approach is the limited
actual wage loss approach. The details of the approach are shown in Table 4.2. The distinguishing feature of this approach is that the worker’s
compensable wage loss is limited by the extent of the worker’s loss of
earning capacity, or by the extent of the worker’s permanent impairment, or by the amount of actual wage loss above a threshold that is
a percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, or by a combination of the
limiting factors. For example, if the worker’s actual earnings in the permanent disability period are 75 percent below the projected earnings,
but the worker is considered to have only lost 25 percent of preinjury
earning capacity, then the PPD beneﬁts will be based on the 25 percent
ﬁgure. Another example is that if the worker had preinjury wages of
$500 per week and has actual wage loss of $100 per week in the permanent disability period, but the state limits compensable wage loss to the
amount in excess of 15 percent of the worker’s preinjury wages, then
the compensable wage loss is only $25 per week.
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The essential attributes of the actual wage loss approach
There is a critical distinction between the ﬁrst two operational approaches—the permanent impairment operational approach and the
loss of earning capacity approach—and the actual wage loss approach.
The states that rely on the actual wage loss approach require the worker
1) to demonstrate that a work-related injury has produced a permanent
impairment and/or loss of earning capacity15 and 2) to demonstrate that
he or she has experienced an actual loss of earnings because of the
work-related injury or disease. In contrast, the impairment and loss of
earning capacity approaches will pay PPD beneﬁts even if there is no
actual loss of earnings so long as the worker can demonstrate that the
work injury caused a diminution in one of the proxies for actual wage
loss.
The elusive nature of the actual wage loss approach
As discussed in more detail later, the actual wage loss approach—
which requires that cases be kept open for extended periods—can easily
be transformed in practice into the loss of earning capacity approach
through the use of compromise and release agreements.
The Operational Approach for Nonwork Disability Beneﬁts
As previously indicated, a few jurisdictions, in addition to compensating for work disability, also provide injured workers with an additional
beneﬁt that is designed to compensate for noneconomic loss (or nonwork
disability). For example, permanent impairment beneﬁts were available
in Florida from 1979 to 1993, while noneconomic loss beneﬁts have been
paid in Ontario since 1990. The operational basis for the noneconomic
loss beneﬁts in both Florida and Ontario corresponds to the “pure” permanent impairment approach (Operational Approach I.A) shown in Table
4.2.16
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HOW STATES DESIGN SYSTEMS OF PPD BENEFITS
Common Distinctions within States for PPD Beneﬁts
All jurisdictions have different PPD beneﬁts (measured by weekly
amount or potential duration) for different categories of injuries and
diseases, and some jurisdictions use different operational approaches
for different categories of injuries. The most common distinctions involve three factors.
1) Distinctions between diseases and injuries. Several states provide more restrictive PPD beneﬁts for diseases than for injuries.17 Montana, for example, does not provide compensation for partial disability
resulting from a disease.
2) Distinctions between different types of injuries. Most states treat
scheduled injuries differently than nonscheduled injuries. Unfortunately, these terms are not used in a uniform and unambiguous fashion. The
workers’ compensation statutes in most states contain a schedule that
lists the number of weeks or the dollar amounts of compensation beneﬁts to be paid for the physical loss or (in most jurisdictions) the loss
of use of speciﬁed parts of the body. A scheduled injury is any injury
that is speciﬁcally enumerated in the workers’ compensation statute and
typically involves injuries to the upper and lower extremities (arms,
legs, hands, feet, ﬁngers, and toes).18 Injuries to the trunk, back, internal
organs (such as heart or lungs), nervous system, and other body systems
usually are not included in the list of injuries found in the statutes; these
are nonscheduled injuries (or unscheduled injuries). I describe these
states as the “scheduled/nonscheduled distinction states.”
A signiﬁcant minority of states do not distinguish between scheduled injuries and nonscheduled injuries in the sense I use those terms:
the former are speciﬁcally listed in the workers’ compensation statute
and the latter are not. These unitary rating system states treat all injuries
the same way in the workers’ compensation statute, either by specifying
that a particular rating system should be used for all injuries or by authorizing the workers’ compensation agency to adopt a comprehensive
rating system.19
3) Distinctions between injuries with different degrees of severity.
Within the category of PPD beneﬁts, many jurisdictions provide more
generous beneﬁts (in terms of weekly amount and/or potential duration)

Roberts.indb 88

6/7/2005 9:28:53 AM

Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts 89

for more serious injuries than for less serious injuries. Some states also
distinguish between injuries that result in amputations of a body member and injuries that involve permanent loss of use of the body member.
The former may be entitled to PPD beneﬁts, while the latter may not.
A Taxonomy of State Systems of PPD Beneﬁts
I am aware of three attempts to systematically classify states in
terms of their approaches to PPD beneﬁts relying on the three basic
operational approaches discussed in the previous section and the distinctions among injuries just discussed. Berkowitz and Burton (1987)
examined 10 states based on ﬁeldwork and a literature review. The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI 1995) classiﬁed all
50 states plus the District of Columbia based on a questionnaire. The
latest taxonomy of the 51 U.S. jurisdictions, on which the balance of
this section is largely based, was prepared by Barth and Niss (1999).
The states and provinces in North America utilize the three operational approaches to work disability beneﬁts and the one operational
approach to nonwork disability beneﬁts in a variety of systems of PPD
beneﬁts. Each jurisdiction has a system of PPD beneﬁts because without exception each jurisdiction makes some distinction among the types
of injuries or diseases that affects either the operational approach for the
beneﬁts or the amount or duration of those beneﬁts. This section brieﬂy
describes six systems of PPD beneﬁts, each used in at least one North
American jurisdiction. A more extended discussion, with examples of
speciﬁc states, is included in Reville et al. (2005, Appendix A1). Some
states do not neatly ﬁt into the six systems, but I believe the taxonomy
provides a good representation of the most important or interesting systems of PPD beneﬁts.20 I begin with three systems of PPD beneﬁts used
in scheduled/nonscheduled distinction states.
System I PPD beneﬁts: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction
states that rely on the permanent impairment approach
for nonscheduled injuries
Most states have PPD beneﬁt systems that distinguish between
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries. In about a dozen states that rely
on this distinction, including New Jersey, both scheduled and nonsched-
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uled injuries receive PPD beneﬁts based on the extent of permanent
impairment.
System II PPD beneﬁts: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction
states that rely on the loss of earning capacity approach for
nonscheduled injuries
The System II design for PPD beneﬁts draws a distinction between
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries similar to that found in System
I. Also, similar to System I, the scheduled injuries in System II are
compensated on the basis of the permanent impairment. The distinctive
feature of System II is that the nonscheduled beneﬁts are based on the
loss of earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II).
An interesting variant of System II is Wisconsin, which relies on
Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury
wage approach) for scheduled injuries.21 For nonscheduled injuries,
there are two possibilities. If the worker has returned to work and is
earning at least 85 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, the workers’
permanent impairment is rated. The duration of PPD beneﬁts for such
a worker is determined by multiplying the PI rating times 1,000 weeks.
Thus, the Wisconsin PPD beneﬁts for the worker who has returned to
work and is earning at least 85 percent of preinjury wages are based
on Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury
wage approach).
If the worker with the nonscheduled injury has not returned to work
and is earning at least 85 percent of the preinjury wage, the worker’s
loss of earning capacity is determined. The evaluation of the LEC takes
into account the seriousness of the worker’s permanent impairment,
plus such factors as the worker’s age, education, and prior work experience. The evaluation produces a rating indicating the percentage loss
in earning capacity due to the injury, and the rating is multiplied by
1,000 weeks to determine the duration of the PPD beneﬁts. Thus, the
nonscheduled PPD beneﬁts for Wisconsin workers who are not back to
work earning at least 85 percent of preinjury wages is based on Operational Approach II.A (the ad hoc loss of earning capacity approach).
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System III PPD beneﬁts: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction
states that rely on the actual wage loss approach for
nonscheduled injuries
The System III design for PPD beneﬁts draws a distinction between
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries similar to that found in Systems I
and II. Also, similar to Systems I and II, the scheduled injuries in System III are compensated on the basis of the permanent impairment. The
distinctive feature of System III is that the nonscheduled beneﬁts are
based on the actual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III).
New York is an example of a state relying on System III. The ﬁrst
step in New York in determining the applicable beneﬁts for an injury
with permanent consequences is to determine whether the injury is
scheduled or unscheduled. The distinction is similar to that used in New
Jersey and Wisconsin, where injuries to arms, legs, and other bodily
extremities are classiﬁed as scheduled, and injuries to internal organs
and the back are deﬁned as unscheduled.22 In New York, the operational
basis for scheduled PPD beneﬁts is the permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach (Operational Approach I.B).
New York’s system relies on the actual wage loss approach for nonscheduled beneﬁts, which has several traits. One trait is that, unless
the worker has actual earnings after the date of MMI that are less than
the worker’s preinjury earnings, no beneﬁts are paid even if the work
injury has resulted in a permanent impairment or loss of earning capacity.23 Another characteristic of the wage loss approach is that the total
duration of the PPD beneﬁts is not determined shortly after the date of
MMI, as in the permanent impairment or loss of earning capacity approaches. Instead, the duration of beneﬁts depends on the length of time
the worker experiences actual losses of earnings due to the work injury.
In New York, this duration can range from zero weeks (for those cases
closed with no present wage loss) to the balance of the worker’s life.
There are three outcomes possible for nonscheduled injuries in New
York. First, if, at the time the case is initially classiﬁed as a nonscheduled PPD, the worker has returned to work and is experiencing no wage
loss, the worker receives no PPD beneﬁts and the case is closed.24
Second, if, at the time the case is initially classiﬁed as a nonscheduled PPD, the worker experiences a wage loss, beneﬁts commence. The
duration these beneﬁts will continue is unknown because the duration
of subsequent wage loss is unknown.25
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In New York, there is a third outcome for a nonscheduled PPD case,
namely a lump-sum settlement. The lump-sum settlement in New York
is essentially a compromise and release agreement, in which the parties
reach a compromise concerning the amount of beneﬁts to be paid, the
worker receives a lump-sum payment, and the employer is released from
any further liability for the particular injury.26
System IV PPD beneﬁts: Unitary rating system states with a
single operational approach for PPD beneﬁts
California is an example of a jurisdiction providing System IV PPD
beneﬁts in which all injuries are rated using the same approach. California relies on a formula to combine the impairment ratings with the age
and occupational factors in order to produce a disability rating, which
is Operational Approach II.B, the loss of earning capacity approach by
formula approach. The California PPD system uses the disability rating
to determine the duration of PPD beneﬁts, using a formula that provides
more weeks per percent rating for more serious injuries than for less
serious injuries.27
System V PPD Beneﬁts: Unitary rating system states
with multiple operational approaches for PPD beneﬁts
(the hybrid approach)
The ﬁfth system of PPD beneﬁts is the hybrid approach, which
potentially pays two types of PPD beneﬁts on a sequential basis. The
approach is used in Connecticut and Texas, and was used in Florida
between 1994 and 2003.28
In Texas, the initial phase of PPD beneﬁts is based on Operational
Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach).
Once the worker reached the date of MMI, the extent of permanent impairment for all injuries with permanent consequences is rated using
the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Three weeks of impairment beneﬁts are then paid
for each 1 percent impairment rating. The weekly beneﬁt is 70 percent
of the worker’s preinjury wage, subject to a maximum beneﬁt that is 70
percent of the state’s average weekly wage.
Those workers who have a permanent impairment rating of at least
15 percent have an opportunity to qualify for wage loss beneﬁts (known
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as “supplemental income beneﬁts” in Texas) after the impairment beneﬁts expire (i.e., at least 45 weeks after the initial eligibility date for
impairment beneﬁts). The wage loss beneﬁts are paid to workers who
experienced at least a 20 percent drop in wages between the preinjury
period and the period of permanent disability; 80 percent of the wage
loss in excess of the 20 percent threshold is compensated (again subject
to a maximum week beneﬁt that is 70 percent of the state’s average
weekly wage). The wage loss beneﬁts in Texas are an example of the
Operational Approach III.B (the limited actual wage loss approach).
System VI PPD beneﬁts: The dual beneﬁts approach
(nonwork disability beneﬁts and/or work disability beneﬁts),
depending on the type of injury
A few jurisdictions have explicitly paid nonwork disability (or
noneconomic loss) beneﬁts in addition to work disability beneﬁts. The
System VI variant of dual PPD beneﬁts was used in Florida from 1979
until 1993, although some signiﬁcant modiﬁcations were made in 1990
prior to the total abandonment of the approach in 1993.
The Florida program had two types of beneﬁts—impairment beneﬁts and wage loss beneﬁts—and an injured worker with permanent
consequences of his or her injury could qualify for either, both,29 or
neither of the beneﬁts, depending on the facts in the case.
Impairment beneﬁts were paid to workers with certain types of permanent impairments, including amputations, loss of 80 percent or more
of vision, or serious head or facial disﬁgurements. Other types of permanent impairments, such as total or partial loss of use of a body member without amputation, did not qualify for the beneﬁts. The purpose of
these “impairment beneﬁts” was to compensate the worker for nonwork
disability. The impairment beneﬁts were paid using Operational Approach I.A (the “pure” permanent impairment approach).
The wage loss beneﬁts contained in the 1979 Florida legislation
required the worker to have at least a 1 percent permanent impairment
rating. In addition, the worker had to experience at least a 15 percent
decline between the wages in the preinjury period and the wages in the
permanent disability period. The wage loss beneﬁts then replaced 85
percent of the actual wage loss in excess of the 15 percent threshold.
This description of the dual beneﬁts approach in Florida is simplistic and does not capture the initial acclaim and eventual disillusionment
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with the approach, especially the wage loss component, which ultimately led to the abandonment of the dual beneﬁts approach in Florida
after 1993. This overview of North American systems of PPD beneﬁts
would be remiss, however, if we did not mention that the dual beneﬁts
approach is still alive and apparently operating well in several Canadian
provinces, including Ontario and Saskatchewan.
Observations
This section has identiﬁed six different systems of PPD beneﬁts,
and others are possible. Several observations seem warranted, drawing
in part on the survey of state PPD programs by Barth and Niss (1999).
First, the most common type appears to be System I, in which both
scheduled and nonscheduled beneﬁts are based on the permanent impairment approach. Barth and Niss (1999) reported that about 13 jurisdictions use this approach.30
Second, Systems III and VI, which contain elements of the actual
wage loss approach that begin for some types of injuries at the date of
MMI, appear to be under threat, at least in the United States. Florida
has abandoned the dual beneﬁts system (System VI), and Pennsylvania,
which has used a variant of System III (in which scheduled beneﬁts are
based on the impairment approach and the nonscheduled beneﬁts based
on the actual wage loss approach)31 has recently added a qualiﬁcation
that beneﬁts can be reduced even if the worker does not have actual
earnings in the permanent disability period so long as the employer
can establish that light-duty work is available within commuting distance.32
Third, use of System V, the hybrid approach, has received some
recent interest. Florida used this approach between 1994 and 2003, and
the current Connecticut and Texas statutes provide impairment beneﬁts
followed by wage loss beneﬁts.
Fourth, I again want to emphasize the critical distinction between 1)
the permanent impairment operational approach and the loss of earning
capacity approach, and 2) the actual wage loss approach. The permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity approaches will pay PPD
beneﬁts even if there is no actual loss of earnings so long as the worker
can demonstrate that the work injury caused a diminution in one of the
proxies for actual wage loss. In contrast, there must be actual losses of
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earnings in the permanent disability period in order for beneﬁts to be
paid in the actual wage loss approach.
Fifth, compromise and release agreements, in which workers release
their claim to future beneﬁts in exchange for a lump-sum settlement,
can turn the actual wage loss approach into the loss of earning capacity
approach. That is, the compromise and release agreement transforms a
case from one relying on the wage loss approach (where the amount of
PPD beneﬁts is unknown until the end of the period of permanent disability or the worker reaches the statutory maximum for such beneﬁts)
into a loss of earning capacity approach (where the amount of PPD
beneﬁts is determined near the beginning of the period of permanent
disability based on an assessment of the extent of loss of earning capacity).
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF PPD BENEFITS
Each North American workers’ compensation program provides
PPD beneﬁts. As previous sections indicate, there are three basic operational approaches for PPD beneﬁts, which have been used to design a variety of systems of PPD beneﬁts. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of the different operational approaches and PPD beneﬁt
systems? This section provides ﬁve criteria that can be used to answer
these questions and attempts some answers. There are several caveats
to this exercise: the criteria are not universally endorsed, there are only
a limited number of studies that use the criteria in the evaluation of
PPD beneﬁts, the application of different criteria sometimes leads to
conﬂicting assessments of the same program, and the existing literature
generally does not compare the performance of the different basic operational approaches or PPD beneﬁt systems. These caveats mean there
are virtually endless opportunities for research in this area.
Adequate Beneﬁts
Deﬁnition of the adequacy criterion
The meaning of the adequacy criterion will only be brieﬂy examined here because the topic is extensively examined in Hunt (2004),
which is the result of a multiyear study by the National Academy of
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Social Insurance (NASI).33 The primary test for adequacy adopted by
NASI can be explained by reference to Figure 4.9. The NASI standard
is that after the date of MMI, PPD beneﬁts should replace two-thirds of
the difference between the worker’s potential earnings (along line BC)
and the worker’s actual earnings (along line FG). Alternatively stated,
beneﬁts are adequate if the replacement rate—the PPD beneﬁts divided
by “true” wage loss—is at least 66⅔ percent.34
Application of the adequacy criterion
The application of the adequacy criterion will also only be brieﬂy
examined here because the topic is examined by Boden, Reville, and
Biddle in Chapter 3 of this volume. The essence of their ﬁndings is
that in the ﬁve jurisdictions they examined (California, New Mexico,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin), PPD beneﬁts replaced between
16 and 26 percent of earnings losses in the 10 years after workers were
injured, which meant the “replacement rates do not approach the twothirds benchmark for adequacy.”
Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005) include a useful list of research
topics concerning the adequacy of PPD beneﬁts. What also needs to be
examined is whether choices among the different operational approaches or PPD beneﬁt systems identiﬁed in this chapter make any difference
in the quest for adequacy? There is no obvious reason why the choices
should make a difference, and there is no obvious pattern between the
extent of adequacy and the design of the PPD beneﬁt systems in the ﬁve
jurisdictions studied by Boden, Reville, and Biddle. However, to the
best of my knowledge, no one has studied this important question.
Another matter concerning adequacy discussed in Hunt (2004) is
worth repeating. The best way to determine whether a state has adequate beneﬁts is to conduct a wage loss study, which examines the
actual earnings losses of and beneﬁts received by a large sample of injured workers. But such studies are expensive and time consuming, and
not all states have the requisite data. The issue is whether there is a measure of a state’s PPD beneﬁts that is relatively easy to calculate (such as
the actuarial assessments of the state’s workers’ compensation statutory
provisions reported by Thomason and Burton [2001]) that provides a
satisfactory proxy for the results of a wage loss study.
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Equitable Beneﬁts
Deﬁnition of the equity criterion
The equity criterion for permanent disability beneﬁts has two dimensions: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires that workers who are equivalent should be treated equally.35 Thus
workers with equal losses of earnings should receive equal beneﬁts.36 A
narrow test of vertical equity requires that workers with different losses
of income should receive beneﬁts proportional to their losses.37 A more
general test for vertical equity only requires that there be a consistent
relationship between losses and beneﬁts. A state may decide, for example, that the proportion of beneﬁts to losses should increase (or decrease) as losses increase.38
The previous paragraph applied the horizontal and vertical equity
tests to the relationships between losses of earnings and beneﬁts (the
replacement rates). However, the equity tests can be applied to other aspects of PPD cases. For example, do workers with the same PPD rating
have the same replacement rates?39 Other aspects of cases to which the
equity tests could be applied include the workers’ characteristics, such
as age, occupation, and sex, the types of injuries experienced by workers, and workers’ compensation system characteristics, such as whether
the case was litigated or not.
Application of the equity criterion
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 341–353) compared earnings
losses, beneﬁts, and replacement rates for California workers injured
in 1968 for workers of different ages, injury types, severity of injuries,
and three types of cases: 1) formal, in which a formal PPD rating was
received from the Disability Evaluation Unit; 2) informal, in which an
informal PPD rating was received; and 3) other. They found signiﬁcant
equity problems with the California PPD beneﬁts as of that time, such
as the lower replacement rates for contested cases with trunk injuries
compared to injuries to other parts of the body. Similar equity problems
were found for the PPD beneﬁts in Wisconsin and Florida.
Reville et al. (forthcoming) examined the equity of the PPD rating system in the California workers’ compensation program and found
large differences among types of injuries in the relationship between
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average disability ratings and average earnings losses. For example,
PPD cases involving injuries to the elbow had a 1.86 ratio between the
disability ratings and average earnings losses, while cases involving the
shoulder had a 0.90 ratio between ratings and losses.
The 2004 amendments to the California workers’ compensation
program will allow the program to adjust the ratings and beneﬁts for
different types of injuries based on empirical evidence of the sort developed by Reville et al. (forthcoming), which should make a major contribution to improving the equity of the California PPD beneﬁt system.
But are there other operational approaches or beneﬁt systems that could
do even a better job of providing PPD beneﬁts that are equitable? One
of the rationales for the adoption of the wage loss approach in Florida
in 1979 was a better ability to provide beneﬁts to workers in proportion
to their earnings losses. But we lack evidence about whether the Florida
wage loss approach (while it lasted) or the variants of wage loss approach used in other states achieved greater equity.40
Delivery System Efﬁciency
Deﬁnition of the delivery system efﬁciency criterion
The beneﬁts and services in workers’ compensation are provided
by a delivery system comprised of employers, carriers, state agencies,
attorneys, doctors, and other participants. Berkowitz and Burton (1987,
pp. 26–28) evaluated the efﬁciency of this delivery system by examining the relationship between two variables. One variable measures the
administrative costs of providing beneﬁts incurred by the participants
in the workers’ compensation delivery system. The other variable measures the quality of the workers’ compensation beneﬁts, where quality
is assessed on the basis of one or more of the other criteria used to
evaluate a PPD beneﬁts system, such as adequacy and equity.
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 27–28) suggest that one meaning
of delivery system efﬁciency, panoramic efﬁciency, is that beneﬁts of a
particular quality are provided at the least possible administrative costs.
Another meaning of delivery system efﬁciency, myopic efﬁciency, is
only concerned with reducing administrative costs without concern for
the quality of the program.
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Application of the delivery system efﬁciency criterion
Evaluation using the delivery system efﬁciency criterion is especially difﬁcult.41 For one thing, data on the expenses of administering
the program that are borne by employers and others in the private sector, plus the amount of attorneys’ fees for both workers and employers,
as well as other types of data relevant to the assessment of the efﬁciency
of the delivery system are scarce. Another reason the delivery system
efﬁciency criterion is hard to apply is that the quality of the beneﬁts and
the administrative costs must be simultaneously considered in order to
evaluate the panoramic efﬁciency of a state’s workers’ compensation
program.
An important aspect of the delivery system efﬁciency test concerns the delivery system model used to provide workers’ compensation beneﬁts. One model relies on an active state agency that makes
many decisions itself, closely supervises the operation of employers
and private carriers, and limits the role for attorneys.42 A considerably
different model relies on the private parties, particularly attorneys, to
make most of the decisions about beneﬁts payments.43 The agency is
essentially passive, although it will resolve disputes brought to it by
the private parties. An intermediate model involves a state agency that
conducts a minimal review of decisions made by the private parties and
that resolves disputes in a relatively high proportion of the cases, but
that nonetheless relies on extensive attorney involvement to make the
delivery system operate.44
How attorneys are used is an important feature differentiating these
three delivery system models. As recounted by many commentators on
the history of workers’ compensation, the original notion was that the
elimination of the fault concept and the prescription of beneﬁts by statute would enable employees to protect their interests without external
assistance. From that standpoint, the substantial reliance on lawyers
suggests at the minimum a lack of myopic efﬁciency. And yet the involvement of attorneys can also be viewed as a prima facie indictment
of the idea that workers’ compensation laws can be self-administering;
attorneys may be in the system because they help achieve the criteria
of adequate and equitable beneﬁts. In other words, the involvement of
attorneys may represent a lack of myopic efﬁciency but not necessarily
a lack of panoramic efﬁciency.
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Whether, in fact, attorneys help achieve the equity and adequacy
of beneﬁts is not clear a priori. On one hand, they receive fees that
generally are subtracted from the workers’ awards, which, in a nominal
sense, reduces the adequacy of the beneﬁts. On the other hand, attorneys may increase the awards in some cases in which they are involved
and possibly have an indirect impact on the amount of beneﬁts in other
cases in which they are not involved. Thus on a priori grounds, the
impact of attorneys on the adequacy of beneﬁts is unclear. Likewise,
the impact of attorneys on the equity of beneﬁts is unclear. They may
take cases in which beneﬁts would otherwise be inappropriately low,
or, alternatively, their involvement may be on a basis unrelated to the
relative under compensation of the case, such as the worker’s membership in a union.
Thomason and Burton (1993) studied the effect of attorney involvement on the outcome of cases paying nonscheduled PPD beneﬁts in
New York, and found that attorneys increase the probability of lumpsum settlements, reduce the amounts of those settlements, and have no
statistically signiﬁcant effect on the size of litigated awards. While this
study is conﬁned to one state, it suggests that assuming the use of attorneys improves the adequacy or equity of PPD beneﬁts is inappropriate
without supporting evidence.
Berkowitz and Burton (1987) compared Florida, California, and
Wisconsin and concluded that Wisconsin had the best record of delivery
system efﬁciency at the time. The Wisconsin beneﬁts were more adequate and equitable than those in California and Florida, while the costs
of the Wisconsin delivery system—including the expenses of operating
the state agency as well as the cost of attorneys’ fees for claimants, employers, and carriers—were lower than those in the other two states.45
I am unaware of any research that systematically considers the possible relationship of delivery system efﬁciency to different operational
approaches to beneﬁts and PPD beneﬁt systems. PPD beneﬁt systems
that rely on the permanent impairment or loss of earnings capacity approaches to beneﬁts are likely to require fewer resources to operate than
beneﬁt systems that incorporate elements of the actual wage loss approach (because the latter approach requires cases to remain open for
extended periods and to be periodically monitored), which means the
wage loss approach is probably less efﬁcient using the myopic meaning
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of efﬁciency. But is the wage loss approach less or more efﬁcient using
the panoramic meaning of efﬁciency?
Prevention, Compensation, and Rehabilitation (PCR) Efﬁciency
Deﬁnition of PCR system efﬁciency
PCR system efﬁciency is concerned with avoiding adverse effects
of the PPD beneﬁts on the fundamental objectives of the workers’ disability system, namely to prevent injuries and diseases; to compensate
disabled workers adequately and equitably; and to rehabilitate workers
and return them to work.46
Applying the PCR system efﬁciency criterion to the prevention
objective
One of the objectives of the PCR system is the prevention of injuries and diseases among workers. Increasing the level of PPD beneﬁts
can have a number of effects on the behavior of employers and employees.47 Because the premiums for the employers of most workers are
experience rated, the higher PPD beneﬁts cause the potential costs of
the workers’ compensation program to increase for employers. These
higher potential workers’ compensation costs should lead to behavioral
changes by employers, which have been labeled the “safety effect.” The
safety effect includes all those safety improvements (including not only
changes in the physical plant, but changes in training, safety monitoring, etc.) that are cost-effective. Although the theory that experience
rating provides safety incentives has been postulated since the ﬁrst state
workers’ compensation program was enacted in Wisconsin in 1911,
there is still a controversy about whether that theory is valid. Thomason
(2003) indicates that most recent studies show that experience rating
does matter for safety, and to the extent this is true, then increasing PPD
beneﬁts has an indirect effect that is desirable.
There are, however, other effects of increasing the level of PPD
beneﬁts. A number of studies during the last 15 years have shown that,
as statutory workers’ compensation beneﬁts rise, both claims frequency and the reported severity of injuries increase. For example, Butler
(1994, I–85) indicates that claims frequency rises from 3 to 8 percent in
response to a 10 percent increase in the real level of beneﬁts.
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Whether the increased frequency and severity are adverse consequences of the higher PPD beneﬁts depends on the nature of the changes in employee behavior that result in these increases. The “true injury
effect” postulates that workers will take less care on the job (and thus
incur more work injuries) because the higher beneﬁts mean they will
have increased income security if they are injured. The “reporting effect” postulates that workers will report claims for injuries that would
not have been reported in the absence of the greater monetary incentives
resulting from the higher potential beneﬁts. The “duration effect” postulates that workers will extend their period of reported disability (and
thus increase the apparent severity) because of the higher beneﬁts.48
If the evidence demonstrating that higher beneﬁts result in increased
frequency and severity of injuries were due to the true injury effect, this
would be considered an unintended and adverse consequence of the
higher beneﬁts. Fortunately, Durbin and Butler (1998) report that most
recent studies argue that the true injury effect is not the major reason
for the positive relationship between beneﬁts and the measures of workplace safety. Instead, the relationships appear to primarily be due to the
reporting effect and the duration effect.
Applying the PCR system efﬁciency test to the rehabilitation
objective
There are circumstances in which workers’ compensation beneﬁts
can be so high as to induce the reporting effect or the duration effect,
and in which greater utilization is an undesirable outcome. The most
egregious example of PPD beneﬁts that were inadvertently designed to
have a serious disincentive for reemployment is the wage loss beneﬁts
enacted by the Florida legislature in 1979.49 The law provided that, once
a worker experienced at least a 15 percent drop in income after the
date of MMI due to the work injury, the PPD beneﬁts would replace
95 percent of the wage loss above that 15 percent threshold. This beneﬁt formula meant that, for a worker who had begun the rehabilitation
process and had already returned to work one-third time, a decision
to increase work to two-thirds time would lead to a reduction in PPD
beneﬁts that would be 103 percent of the increase in net earnings (gross
wages minus taxes) resulting from the additional hours worked. Surely
this disincentive was an unintended and adverse consequence of the
1979 Florida PPD beneﬁts scheme. Disincentives to this extent are not
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inevitable in a wage loss system, but the poor design of these beneﬁts
was one reason why the wage loss approach in Florida has subsequently
been virtually vitiated. In short, the 1979 PPD beneﬁts in Florida failed
to meet the PCR system efﬁciency test because the beneﬁts undermined
the rehabilitation and return-to-work objective.
The wage loss approach appears to be more likely to undermine
PCR efﬁciency than the impairment approach and the loss of earning
capacity approach, since workers’ compensation beneﬁts are reduced
if the worker has increased earnings, while the PPD beneﬁts are not
affected by greater employment after the date of MMI in the other approaches. However, there has been little if any evidence on the magnitudes of the differences between the approaches in their ability to promote or hinder PCR efﬁciency.
Affordability
Affordability is concerned with designing a system of PPD beneﬁts
that employers, workers, and the public can afford without serious adverse consequences, such as loss of jobs.
A historical perspective on affordability
Affordability generally has not been explicitly recognized as a criterion for evaluating workers’ compensation programs in general and a
system of PPD beneﬁts in particular. However, the importance of affordability was recognized in the National Commission Report (National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws 1972, p. 125):
While the facts dictate that no State should hesitate to improve
its workmen’s compensation program for fear of losing employers,
unfortunately this appears to be an area where emotion too often
triumphs over fact . . . whenever a State legislature contemplates
an improvement in workmen’s compensation which will increase
insurance costs, the legislators will hear claims from some employers that the increase in costs will force a business exodus. It
will be virtually impossible for the legislators to know how genuine are these claims . . .
When the sum of these inhibiting factors is considered, it
seems likely that many States have been dissuaded from reform
of their workmen’s compensation statute because of the specter
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of the vanishing employer, even if that apparition is a product of
fancy not fact. A few States have achieved genuine reform, but
most suffer with inadequate laws because of the drag of laws of
competing States.

The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws
offered a solution to the inhibitions to reform caused by potential employer departures. That solution was federal standards for 19 essential
attributes of state workers’ compensation programs pertaining to extent
of coverage and levels of beneﬁts.
While the affordability issue was obviously important 30 years
ago—it likely was the major reason why the commission recommended
federal standards—it has become even more important in recent decades. One ironical reason is the legacy of the commission. While federal standards were never enacted, for a period in the 1970s the threat
of standards was taken seriously and many states improved the levels
of cash beneﬁts in their workers’ compensation programs. One consequence of the higher beneﬁts was higher costs: the average costs nationally peaked at about 2.2 percent of payroll in the early 1990s, almost
double the percentage in the early 1970s. Employers’ costs relative to
payroll have since dropped in response to various factors, including a
declining injury rate and more stringent eligibility rules for workers’
compensation programs (Spieler and Burton 1998). Moreover, the differences in costs of workers’ compensation insurance have probably
widened since 1972,50 which means the specter of the vanishing employer is more credible now than it was when the National Commission
characterized the threat as “a product of fancy not fact.” Compounding
the runaway employer concern in recent years is the substantial loss of
manufacturing jobs in many states and the widely publicized bout with
high workers’ compensation costs in California.
Affordability for whom?
The deﬁnition of the affordability criterion indicated that the purpose is to design a system of PPD beneﬁts that employers, workers, and
the public can afford without serious adverse consequences, such as
loss of jobs. The primary focus in the affordability discussion is usually
on the costs of workers’ compensation to employers in the form of insurance premiums or the equivalent expenditures by self-insuring employers. However, the affordability criteria must be formulated in terms
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of the three possible bearers of the costs of workers’ compensation.51
Employers are likely to bear much of the cost of higher workers’
compensation premiums in the short run in the form of lower proﬁts,
and in the long run are also likely to experience some reduction in profits. Consumers also bear part of the cost of higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts and premiums in the long run in the form of higher prices
and reduced consumption. Workers also bear part of the cost of higher
workers’ compensation beneﬁts and premiums in the long run in the
form of lower wages and less employment. The empirical evidence suggests that workers bear most of the costs of higher beneﬁts in the form
of lower wages. To be sure, workers are also the primary beneﬁciaries of the higher beneﬁts, but those beneﬁts are largely paid for by the
workers in the form of lower wages.
This point is worth emphasizing because the debates over workers’ compensation reform in general, and PPD reform in particular, are
generally cast as a trade-off between adequacy of beneﬁts (which presumably is primarily of interest to workers) and affordability (which
presumably is primarily of interest to employers). In fact, there are positive aspects for employers of more adequate beneﬁts (including higher
morale and greater productivity among workers who feel they are being
treated fairly, as well as the lower wages that eventually will result from
the higher beneﬁts),52 and there are negative aspects for workers from
higher beneﬁts (including loss of jobs and lower wages).
Observations on the Criteria
There is a danger expanding the evaluation criterion from the traditional trinity (adequacy, equity, and efﬁciency) to the ﬁve criteria presented in this chapter. This is particularly true because the criteria often
come into conﬂict in evaluating PPD beneﬁt systems, and the more criteria we use, the greater the number of conﬂicts and trade-offs that must
be considered in the evaluation process.
I am persuaded, however, that the use of all ﬁve criteria serves a
useful purpose. Efﬁciency is a term that has been used by some economists to include both what I term delivery system efﬁciency and prevention compensation, and rehabilitation system efﬁciency, and the explicit
separation should help distinguish between the two meanings of efﬁciency. Affordability has seldom been explicitly mentioned as a crite-
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rion, but has always been an implicit factor lurking in the background.
Indeed, in recent years, affordability may have de facto become the
dominant criterion in the reform of PPD beneﬁts in many states, and explicit recognition of affordability as a criterion may improve the policy
debates associated with efforts to reform PPD beneﬁts.
Researchers and policymakers may ﬁnd my list of ﬁve evaluation
criteria too cumbersome, and I encourage efforts to develop a more
parsimonious set of evaluations standards. Yet there is also the possibility that the list of factors that govern the design of PPD beneﬁt systems
is incomplete. Perhaps a missing criterion that would help explain the
evolution of PPD beneﬁt systems is risk minimization or risk shifting:
how can the system be designed to reduce the overall uncertainty associated with the payment of PPD beneﬁts, or how can the system be
designed to reduce the risks of long-term disability borne by the participants in the workers’ compensation system with the greatest political
inﬂuence?
CONCLUSIONS
I have tried to provide an organized approach to examining PPD beneﬁts, to summarize some of the research literature, and to pose some areas
where additional research is needed. I conclude by posing a few more
questions I hope a new generation of scholars will examine.
One question that warrants contemplation is whether the conceptual
framework presented in the second section is the most useful organizational structure for research and operational purposes? For example,
perhaps the number of consequences can be reduced: the Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment published by the American Medical
Association (2000) do not distinguish between permanent impairments
and functional limitations.
The ﬁfth section provides an overview of how the states design their
systems of PPD beneﬁts. Are the six systems the best way to categorize
the many varieties of state laws? And what explains why different states
have adopted similar or different PPD beneﬁt systems? Moreover, how
do we explain why some states (such as New Jersey) have PPD beneﬁt
systems that have basically been unchanged since the early years of
workers’ compensation in the United States, while other states have
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made major changes in their systems? The most notable example of a
state that has tried a variety of approaches in the last 40 years is Florida.
Is this due to a commendable willingness to learn from weaknesses of
prior approaches, or to impatience, or to unrealistic expectations?
The ﬁnal section offers several criteria for the evaluation of PPD
beneﬁt systems. In addition to the questions I raise about whether the
list of criteria is too long or too short (or just right!), more attention
needs to be devoted to the trade-offs among the criteria. Thomason,
Schmidle, and Burton (2001) present evidence that one of the major
determinants of the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance is the percentage of cases paying PPD beneﬁts. They also devote
a chapter to beneﬁt adequacy versus affordability, and conclude that if
states were to adopt adequate beneﬁts (as prescribed by the Model Act
issued by the Council of State Governments [1974]), the result would
be substantially higher workers’ costs nationally, as well as greater dispersion of costs among states. Whether this trade-off between adequacy
and affordability is accurate deserves scrutiny. The more fundamental
point is that research and policy making would beneﬁt from explicit
consideration of trade-offs among criteria, rather than reforms based on
a single goal, such as reducing employers’ costs.

Notes
1. Workers’ compensation programs provide cash, medical, and rehabilitation beneﬁts to workers disabled by work-related injuries and diseases. This chapter focuses solely on cash beneﬁts.
2. For this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, the term injuries includes both injuries and diseases.
3. Steve Guo, a Rutgers University graduate student, is examining the determinants
of interstate differences in incurred beneﬁts for his Master’s thesis.
4. A more extended discussion of the consequences of injuries is included in
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 5–13).
5. The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable is not as clear as the
text suggests. For example, the quality of vocational rehabilitation is identiﬁed
as a controllable factor in the progression from functional limitations to loss of
earning capacity. However, for a particular worker in a state that does not require
employers to provide vocational rehabilitation, vocational rehabilitation is effectively uncontrollable.
6. Although this deﬁnition of “true” wage loss is appropriate for many purposes, it
is not the measure of wage loss typically encompassed in a workers’ compensa-
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tion statute, which usually measures restricted wage loss. That is, the worker’s
earnings as of the date of injury are projected into the future at that level. Then
the “restricted” wage loss is measured as the difference between the worker’s
preinjury wages and the worker’s actual earnings after the date of injury. In general, “restricted” wage loss is smaller than “true” wage loss.
The issues of measuring wage losses and beneﬁts are also examined in Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 365–389).
An extended discussion of which consequences should be compensable is provided in Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 20–22).
Some jurisdictions do not compensate for pain and suffering per se, but do consider pain and suffering in determining the extent of the loss of earning capacity
resulting from the injury. Thus in the California workers’ compensation program,
Swezey (2003, § 5.40) indicates, “It is important to note that pain and suffering
as such are not ratable. Pain is ratable only to the extent it causes disability.”
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1972,
p. 38) justiﬁed the payment of impairment beneﬁts in terms of a broad set of
consequences: “The argument for impairment beneﬁts is that many workers with
work-related injuries or diseases experience losses which are not reﬂected in lost
remuneration. Permanent impairment involves lifetime effects on the personality
and on normal activity.”
This chapter uses the terms states, provinces, and jurisdictions interchangeably.
This three-category scheme is adapted from the taxonomy in Berkowitz and Burton (1987).
The rating systems for this approach typically contain a mixture of impairment ratings (amputations are given a speciﬁed rating without any requirement
to measure the resulting loss of function) and functional limitations ratings (loss
of use of a limb typically is rated by examining the loss of function caused by the
injury).
Idaho uses the “pure” loss of earning capacity approach for nonscheduled PPD
beneﬁts. The degree of loss of earning capacity is multiplied by 500 weeks to
determine the duration of the beneﬁts. The weekly beneﬁt is 55 percent of the
state average weekly wage for all workers.
States differ on which of the permanent consequences (permanent impairment,
functional limitations, or loss of earning capacity) must be demonstrated, and
differ as well on the extent of these consequences that are required for wage loss
beneﬁts to be paid.
In both Florida and Ontario, the primary basis for assessment has been the AMA
Guides. Research by Sinclair and Burton (1995) on noneconomic loss beneﬁts in
Ontario raises serious doubts about the appropriateness of using the AMA Guides
permanent impairment ratings as a proxy for the extent of noneconomic loss.
Additional examples of programs that distinguish between injuries and diseases
are included in Reville et al. (2005, Appendix A1). The examples are from U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (2003, Chart IV).
In addition, states commonly schedule beneﬁts for the enucleation of an eye and
for hearing and vision loss.
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19. Examples of the “unitary rating system” are the System IV and System V PPD
Beneﬁts discussed in the next subsection.
20. The six systems of PPD beneﬁts are based in part on Burton (1996). In the current study, the states were assigned to the categories largely based on the descriptions of the PPD beneﬁts included in Barth and Niss (1999), who may not agree
with the systems used in this chapter. Some states, e.g., Arizona and New York,
are classiﬁed differently by Barth and Niss than in my taxonomy.
21. The distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled injuries in Wisconsin is
similar to that in New Jersey, with injuries to arms, legs, hands, etc., listed in the
statutory schedule, while injuries to backs and internal organs are nonscheduled
injuries. The scheduled durations in the two jurisdictions differ, however. An
arm, for example, is worth 500 weeks in Wisconsin compared to 330 weeks in
New Jersey.
22. The scheduled durations are, to be sure, different among the states, with the New
York arm worth only 312 weeks.
23. This is a crucial difference between the true wage loss approach and the loss of
earning capacity approach; a worker who experiences a loss of earning capacity
but has no actual loss of earnings is precluded from beneﬁts in the wage loss approach but is not precluded in the loss of earning capacity approach.
24. The worker’s eligibility for nonscheduled beneﬁts, as well as the weekly amount
of those beneﬁts, can change through time in jurisdictions using the wage loss
approach. For example, in New York a worker whose case is initially closed with
no beneﬁts because of no present wage loss can reopen the case for up to 18 years
after the date of injury or 8 years after the last beneﬁt payments. PPD beneﬁts can
commence after the reopening if the work injury is then causing lost earnings.
25. As discussed by Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 244–248) the exact variant
of the actual wage loss approach used for New York workers with at least some
actual wage loss depends on whether the worker has any earnings during the
permanent disability period. If the worker has some earnings, then the “pure” actual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.A) is used. Thus, if a worker
had preinjury wages of $500 per week and returns to employment at $200 per
week, the nonscheduled beneﬁts is two-thirds of the wage loss, which means
the weekly beneﬁt is $200. (The weekly PPD beneﬁt is subject to a maximum
amount, which as of 2004 is $400 per week.) If the worker does not have any
earnings in the permanent disability period, then the limited actual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.B) is used. The worker’s loss of earning capacity is evaluated and serves as a limit on the worker’s wage loss. Thus, if a worker
had preinjury wages of $500, does not return to work and is rated as having a 50
percent loss of earning capacity, the weekly PPD beneﬁt is $166.67.
26. The use of compromise and release agreements in the New York workers’ compensation program was examined in Thomason and Burton (1993).
27. The life pension is a weekly beneﬁt that is 1.5 percent of the worker’s preinjury
wage for each 1 percent of disability over 60 percent (subject to a maximum weekly
beneﬁt) Swezey (2003, Sec. 5.9). The California PPD beneﬁts system draws another distinction among workers depending on the magnitude of the disability
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28.
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30.

31.
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33.
34.
35.

Roberts.indb 110

rating. A disability rating of 100 percent qualiﬁes the worker for permanent total
disability beneﬁts for life. A disability rating between 1 and 69.75 percent qualiﬁes a worker for PPD beneﬁts. For workers with a disability rating between 70
and 99.75, the worker qualiﬁes for PPD beneﬁts using the formula summarized
above, and when those PPD beneﬁts expire, the worker qualiﬁes for a life pension.
Texas and Florida use Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and
preinjury approach) for the initial phase of their PPD beneﬁts and Operational
Approach III.B (the limited actual wage loss approach) for the second phase of
their PPD beneﬁts. Connecticut uses Operational Approach I.B (the permanent
impairment and preinjury approach) for the initial phase of the PPD beneﬁts
and Operational Approach III.A (the “pure” actual wage loss approach) for the
second phase of the PPD beneﬁts.
The possibility that a worker with a single injury could receive both impairment
and wage loss beneﬁts is different than the System I, II, and III PPD beneﬁts,
where a worker with a single injury qualiﬁes for either scheduled or nonscheduled beneﬁts. (There are occasional exceptions to this pronouncement regarding
System I and System II beneﬁts, such as a scheduled injury that has psychological overlays that are nonscheduled.)
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) (1995) indicated that
of the 42 states in which some permanent partial injuries are compensated on a
nonscheduled basis, eight states use the actual wage loss approach, 26 states use
the impairment approach, and 14 states use some other approach (in most cases,
probably the loss of earning capacity approach). As indicated in my review of the
NCCI Inventory (Burton 1995), I think that Arizona is actually a loss of earning
capacity state (not a wage loss state) and that New York is actually a wage loss
state (not an “other” state). However, these misclassiﬁcations should not affect
the textual conclusion that the System I version of PPD beneﬁts, in which the
impairment approach is used for nonscheduled beneﬁts, is the most common
system.
Pennsylvania’s PPD beneﬁts are described in Berkowitz and Burton (1987,
Chapter 8).
A brief report on the recent “reforms” of the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation law is provided at 7 BNA’s Workers’ Compensation Report 319 (June 14,
1996).
Examinations of the adequacy criterion are also found in Berkowitz and Burton
(1987, pp. 365–373) and Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005).
This formulation of the adequacy test assumes that the sole purpose of PPD cash
beneﬁts is to compensate for work disability.
The equity tests can be applied to workers within a state (e.g., do workers in
Idaho with equal losses of earnings receive equal beneﬁts, thus satisfying the
horizontal equity test for that jurisdiction?) as well as to workers in different
states (e.g., do workers in Indiana and Massachusetts with similar losses of wages receive similar beneﬁts, thus satisfying an interstate horizontal equity test?).
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36. If workers A and B both have $1,000 of earnings losses, and worker A receives
$700 of beneﬁts (and thus has a 70 percent replacement rate) and worker B receives $300 of beneﬁts (a 30 percent replacement rate), then the horizontal equity test has been violated.
37. If worker C has $5,000 of earnings losses and received $3,000 of beneﬁts, while
worker D has $10,000 of earnings losses, then the narrow test of vertical equity
requires that worker D receive $6,000 of beneﬁts (so that the replacement rate for
both workers is 60 percent).
38. Although the general formulation of vertical equity is more difﬁcult to translate
into empirical tests than the narrow test, reasonable requirements appear to be 1)
that the ratio of beneﬁts to earnings consistently increase (or decrease) as earnings losses increase, and not ﬂuctuate as losses increase, and 2) that there should
be no abrupt changes in the ratio of beneﬁts to earnings losses as those losses
increase. The more general test of vertical equity would be violated if worker
E had $1,000 of earning losses and received $700 of beneﬁts (for a 70 percent
replacement rate), worker F had $2,000 of earnings losses and received $1,000 of
beneﬁts (for a 50 percent replacement rate), and worker G had $3,000 of earnings
losses and received $2,700 of beneﬁts (for a 90 percent replacement rate).
39. If worker H has a 10 percent PPD rating and a 40 percent replacement rate, while
worker I has a 10 percent PPD rating and a 70 percent replacement rate, there is
a lack of horizontal equity among PPD ratings.
40. It appears likely that the widespread use of compromise and release agreements
in Florida undercut the potential for greater equity from beneﬁts based on the
wage loss approach, but that is mere speculation.
41. Roberts (2003) is one of the few studies that have examined the efﬁciency of
workers’ compensation delivery systems, including the effects of workers’ compensation agency activism on outcomes for employers, employees, and insurance carriers.
42. Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used Wisconsin as an example of this approach.
43. Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used the federally operated Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensate Act as an example of this approach.
44. Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used Florida and California as examples of this
approach when they conducted their study of workers injured in 1968.
45. The positive assessment of the efﬁciency of the Wisconsin workers’ compensation program is based on a study involving injuries that occurred in 1968. Based
on inconsistent and fragmentary information, I am not certain that the current
Wisconsin workers’ compensation program would receive an equally positive
assessment. Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005) found that the PPD beneﬁts in
Wisconsin were less adequate than the PPD beneﬁts in the other four jurisdictions examined in their study. In addition, Berkowitz and Pascale (1995) graded
the annual reports of state workers’ compensation agencies, and Wisconsin was
one of the six jurisdictions that received an F because it had not issued an annual
report. However, in a more recent evaluation of workers’ compensation agency
websites, Berkowitz (2001) assigned Wisconsin (and 12 other jurisdictions) an A
grade.
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46. The prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation system includes an array of
programs. The prevention components of the workers’ compensation program
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act; the cash beneﬁts provided by public
programs (such as workers’ compensation and the disability insurance component of the Social Security system), and by employers (such as long-term disability beneﬁts); the health care provided by public programs (such as workers’
compensation and Medicaid) and by employers (such as group health plans);
and the rehabilitation provided by workers’ compensation programs and by state
vocational rehabilitation agencies are examples of these programs.
47. These behavioral effects are discussed in Butler (1994) and Burton and Chelius
(1997).
48. The threefold distinction among the true injury effect, the reporting effect, and
the duration effect is an extension of the twofold distinction used by Butler
(1994).
49. This provision of the Florida law is examined in more detail in Burton (1983, pp.
40–49).
50. Burton and Schmidle (1992, Table 8, pp. 1–15) indicate that the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for average insurance rates for 44 insurance
classes for weighted observations from 42 states were 0.772 (0.273) in 1972
and 0.996 (0.339) in 1975. Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, Table C.18,
p. 376) report that the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the
average insurance rates for 71 insurance classes for weighted observations for
42 states were 0.910 (0.377) in 1975 and 2.929 (0.823) in 1995. The standard deviation is a statistical measure of the dispersion among the observations (in this
case, states) and thus the data indicate the dispersion among states in the costs
of workers’ compensation insurance roughly tripled between 1972 and 1995.
Although more recent data using a consistent measure or workers’ compensation
insurance rates are not available, it seems unlikely that the interstate differences
in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance have narrowed appreciably
since 1995.
51. This discussion of the incidence of the costs of the workers’ compensation program is based on Chelius and Burton (1992, 1994), which are reprinted in Burton and Schmidle (1995). Their approach is summarized in Leigh et al. (2000,
p. 178) who assert “Chelius and Burton (1994) conclude that all premiums are
passed down to workers in the form of lower wages. They acknowledge that
their conclusion is ‘radical’ (25).” More precisely, Chelius and Burton (1994,
pp. 24–25) summarized the research of Moore and Viscusi (1990) as “radical”
in this passage: “The conclusion that may be inferred from the ﬁnding of this
study—that higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts, from the employer’s perspective, more than pay for themselves in the form of lower wages—is a radical
one that undoubtedly will be sharply contested by many members of the workers’
compensation community.” Chelius and Burton’s own views were more modest
(1994, p. 26): “We have a reasonable degree of conﬁdence that social science
research has indeed provided an answer to our question of who actually pays for
workers’ compensation: a substantial proportion of workers’ compensation costs
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(and even, according to some estimates, all of the costs) are shifted onto workers.” (Italics in the original.)
52. If the costs of higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts are largely paid for by employees in the form of lower wages and reduced employment, then why do employers place so much emphasis on the affordability criterion when reforms of
PPD beneﬁts are undertaken? First, many employers are unaware of the economic
analysis that suggests that workers bear much of the costs of improved beneﬁts in
the form of lower wages. Or, if they are aware of the argument, they are not persuaded by the logic or supporting evidence. Second, in the short run, the costs of
higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts are largely borne by employers in the form
of lower proﬁts until prices and wages can be adjusted to reﬂect these higher costs.
Third, the affordability issue does not just involve employers and workers
in the U.S. workers’ compensation programs, but also involves private carriers.
Much of the zeal for reform of PPD beneﬁts in the early 1990s can be traced to
the signiﬁcant underwriting losses that workers’ compensation carriers experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whatever advantages may accrue to
employers from more adequate beneﬁts, much of the cost of the workers’ compensation program was being borne by carriers for whom higher workers’ compensation insurance rates were harder to obtain from employers and regulators
than were lower insurance rates resulting from legislative reforms that reduced
beneﬁts.
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5
Issues in Workers’ Compensation
Appeals System Reform
Douglas E. Hyatt
University of Toronto

The workers’ compensation system in North America is a result of
discontent with tort litigation, an earlier mechanism used to resolve disputes between workers and their employers over workplace injuries and
diseases. Legislators and other policymakers in the United States and
Canada concluded that tort suits favored the “propertied class” by placing a number of legal barriers in front of workers who sought restitution
for workplace injuries. While legislative interventions began to erode
traditional common law defenses of employers, it was still a widely
held belief that, in the interests of societal peace, a more automatic approach to compensating injured workers needed to evolve outside of
the courts.1
Workers’ compensation statutes sought to create a set of rules that
would be applied to the assessment of work injury claims for cash and
medical beneﬁts. The result was a program that determined eligibility and beneﬁt amounts based not on fault but on whether the injury
was related to work, and on an assignment of cash beneﬁts based on
a schedule. This statutory approach was designed to reduce the cost,
time, uncertainty, and adversarial proceedings that were hallmarks of
tort compensation. One goal was to effectively remove litigation from
the process.
Over time, however, litigation has been reintroduced into workers’
compensation, which, to some observers, has resulted in a replication of
the woes of the tort system that workers’ compensation replaced. Discontent with the processes and, especially in Canada, with the outcomes
of workers’ compensation appeals—which I will argue are often the
result of other upheavals in the primary adjudication rather than prob-
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lems with the appeals process itself—have resulted in calls for reform
to which policymakers have responded.
This chapter is written at a time when discontent with appeals systems in workers’ compensation is at an ebb. This is partially due to
the slow pace in Canada of fundamental reforms in the way injured
workers’ are compensated, and therefore confusion and uncertainty
are reduced. It is also the case that there are fewer injuries, or at least
workers’ compensation claims, than there were in the past. However,
there are always new compensation issues brewing, and if history is any
guide, the current calm is unlikely to last.
When discontent does ﬂare in Canadian provinces, a common response is the formation of a commission to investigate the problems
and make recommendations for improvement. I have been involved
in several such commissions, including directing the research for two,
and beneﬁted from the good counsel of my friend and colleague Terry
Thomason in both instances. Often, the membership of the commission consists of people who have not been directly involved in workers’
compensation. There are two results: First, the commissioners quickly
begin to appreciate the complexity of workers’ compensation, especially the interrelatedness of policies and procedures in various aspects of
the program. It becomes evident very quickly that decisions taken to resolve one problem may very well undermine the foundation under other
policies and procedures. The second reaction is that, given the obvious
and serious failings in the jurisdiction’s program, every other workers’ compensation system “must be dealing with the vexatious issues
better than we are!” The commissioners soon discover, however, that
there are very few twenty dollar bills lying on the sidewalk of workers’
compensation.
This chapter draws together the experiences of two commissions of
inquiry into workers’ compensation in Canada—one in Ontario in 1995
and the other in British Columbia in 1998. There are two main goals
for the chapter: 1) to review what I believe emerged as the central drivers of the reintroduction of litigation into the workers’ compensation
system, and 2) to set out some central policy issues in workers’ compensation appeals for which there has been little research. These policy
issues were common to both inquiries and, as we discovered through
our research, common to those confronted by workers’ compensation
authorities around the globe.2
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REINTRODUCING LITIGATION TO WORK INJURY
COMPENSATION
At its essence, a good workers’ compensation system delivers 1) a
reasonably fair method of collecting funds for the purpose of providing
medical and ﬁnancial support to injured workers, and 2) a reasonably
fair method of distributing those funds. Discontent with the workers’
compensation system arises when the “fairness” in either of these elements is breached. An initial expectation for the workers’ compensation
system was that it would deliver fairness to workers and employers in a
way that the courts could not—on a timely, cost-effective basis. Workers’ compensation claims adjudicators, armed with legislation, regulation, and operational policy, would make decisions based on the merits
of each claim, without undue regard to precedence and with no regard
to fault.
However, as the nature of work evolved over the last 100 years,
and the nature and relative importance of various work injuries and diseases were transformed, the workers’ compensation system was slow
to adapt. Discontent among the stakeholders with adjudication decisions grew with the perceptions that some decisions were being made
with little consultation between the adjudicators and the stakeholders,
and that accountability for explaining the basis of decisions was absent.
In this section, I argue that the increasing complexity of work-related
injuries, the stakeholder demands for due process that have resulted in
the introduction and expansion of appeal rights, and the inconsistencies in the claims adjudication process brought to light by worker and
employer appeals that give “economic value” to appeals, are intimately
related to the growth of litigation involving work injury compensation.
The Growing Complexity of Workplace Injuries
As has been well-documented, the deﬁnitions of a worker, the workplace and an injury or a disease, as well as the guidelines that workers’ compensation claims adjudicators have at their disposal to guide
them in determining whether an injury or disease arose out of, or in the
course of, employment have become more ambiguous as the nature of
work and employment relationships have evolved. Thomason, Hyatt,
and Roberts (1998, pp. 269–270) summarized these developments:

Roberts.indb 119

6/7/2005 9:29:01 AM

120 Hyatt
. . . workers’ compensation programs have become increasingly
litigious, adding substantially to costs. In part, these perceptions
have been fueled by an expansion of the deﬁnition of disability.
The scope of compensable conditions has broadened to include
soft tissue injuries, repetitive strain syndromes, psychological disorders, and a variety of occupational diseases. Accurate diagnosis
of these conditions is problematic so that it is difﬁcult to establish
the extent of disability. For soft tissue injuries, repetitive trauma
syndromes, and psychological ailments, diagnosis is primarily
based on subjective symptoms. For all these conditions, it is also
difﬁcult to determine whether or not and to what extent the condition is work-related.

The traditional model of a worker employed in a manufacturing
facility or on a construction site has represented fewer workers in each
decade dating back to the advent of workers’ compensation. Workers
are now more likely to suffer disabilities that did not have an immediate
onset, such as repetitive strain and other soft-tissue injuries. Increasingly, injuries and disease occur for which work may have been only
one of many contributing factors. And, workers are now more likely
to work outside of a traditional workplace, such as in their homes or
out of their vehicles. Indeed, it may even be the case that some of the
changes in the workplace (for example, hiring independent contractors
for whom the employer may not be responsible for providing workers’
compensation coverage) have been driven to a degree by the costs to the
employer of workers’ compensation.
Workers’ compensation legislation and policy have lagged behind
the evolution of work and work-related injuries. To a large extent, the
statutory language and legal doctrines used to determine which workers
are covered and which injuries and diseases are work-related are remnants of the early twentieth century.
Policy vacuums in workers’ compensation often result in denials of
claims that are unfamiliar, which then draws appeals from the injured
workers, or by the acceptance of unfamiliar claims, which then draws
appeals by employers (particularly experience-rated employers). Until
the 1970s, access to appeals bodies was largely missing from Canadian
workers’ compensation programs.
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The “Due Process Revolution”
Appeals bodies are relatively recent additions to Canadian workers’ compensation systems. While formal appeals processes had been
sought by injured workers and employers almost since the inception
of workers’ compensation, such demands were resisted and rejected
by workers’ compensation administrators, commissions of inquiry, and
legislators. This changed most dramatically in the 1970s during what
Law (2000) has termed the “due process revolution” in workers’ compensation.
It seems odd that workers’ compensation was largely without serious appeals mechanisms, given that the system has now become so
used to them, and in fact come to rely upon them. The central reason
for the absence of an appeals structure during the pre-1970s period was
that it ran contrary to what workers’ compensation was supposed to
be—a purely administrative decision-making process in which the facts
are collected, eligibility determined, and compensation paid based on
legislations, policies, and procedures. As the Sloan Commission (1942)
in British Columbia, Canada, concluded, opening up avenues for appeal would impair the system’s delivery of “quick, summary and ﬁnal
decisions.”3
When workers’ compensation authorities began to consider the
structure of the appeals process, they were confronted with the same
questions that are faced by policymakers today. How many levels of
appeals should there be? Should higher levels of appeal be restricted to
reviewing previous decisions and evidence, or should they be de novo
hearings? In addition to the increasing complexity of claims resulting
from changes in the workplace, the appeals structure brought a new
level of procedural complexity, which required specialized knowledge
in order to process claims.
Many Canadian workers’ compensation authorities responded in
part to the need for specialized knowledge by introducing representation into the workers’ compensation system. The innovation this time
(compared to the use of attorneys in tort suits prior to the introduction of
workers’ compensation) was that the representation was largely free of
charge. “Worker advisors” and “employer advisors” became common
forms of representation provided by workers’ compensation systems to
assist with the claims process and to provide representation at appeals
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proceedings. Hyatt and Kralj (2000) found empirical support for what
many participants in the Ontario workers’ compensation system conjectured to be the case—that worker advisors were good at what they did.
Hyatt and Kralj found that representation from the worker advisors not
only increased the likelihood that workers’ appeals were granted, but
worker advisors also achieved better results for injured workers than
lawyers, union representatives, or any other form of representation.
The inﬂuence of worker and employer representation is not felt just
at the stage of appealing an adjudicator’s decision. Indeed, advocacy
can start from square one, the ﬁling of a claim. Anecdotal evidence
from claims adjudicators in Canada suggests that both worker and employer advocates have become more active in trying to inﬂuence decisions at the primary adjudication level. This can take the form of calling
adjudicators to follow up on claims, and ensuring that adjudicators have
all relevant information to adjudicate the claim.
To the extent that this more aggressive form of advocacy puts useful
information in the hands of the adjudicator, it can be enormously helpful, and may even further the timeliness of the process, if the adjudicator
is not required to gather the information on his or her own. However, it
was common in the commissions of inquiries in which I have participated to hear concerns that in many cases an advocate puts pressure on an
adjudicator to expedite the decision process. Furthermore, an advocate
may suggest that a decision contrary to the result he or she is advancing
will result in complaints to the adjudicator’s supervisor or an appeal of
the decision, and that these pressures and suggestions may cause the adjudicator to pay the claim (or not), and leave it to the appeals structure
to mop up the mess left by a misadjudicated claim.
The due process revolution gave employers and workers recourse
for adjudicative decisions that were either faulty or perceived as faulty.
Further, the outcomes of the appeals process illuminated shortcomings
in policy and adjudication processes that needed to be addressed by
workers’ compensation authorities, including the need for remedial action on previously mishandled claims. The availability of advocates
well-versed in workers’ compensation matters gave the parties the necessary expertise to realize the “economic value” of uncertainty that had
been growing in the workers’ compensation system.
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The Impact of Inconsistencies in Adjudication and Appeals
Outcomes
The due process revolution resulted in appeals bodies, which, like
most other administrative law tribunals in Canada, are independent in
the sense that panels of the tribunal are not bound by precedence and
are mandated to decide appeals based on the merits of the case. Coupled
with the changing nature of workers’ compensation claims (the uncertainty with respect to beneﬁt entitlement—“no” does not necessarily
mean “no” and “yes” does not necessarily mean “yes” when initial decisions can be appealed) the stakes to the parties of disputing adjudicators’ decisions were raised.
The absence of policy and legislation in the face of a changing compensation environment means that primary claims adjudicators are often on their own in the claims decision process when claims involving
unfamiliar fact patterns are ﬁled. A consequence is that different adjudicators may reach very different results on whether similar claims should
be accepted for payment, as well as the type and duration of the awards.
This variability in claims adjudication and appeals outcomes creates an
“economic value” to contesting decisions. Variations in the outcomes
of otherwise similar claims are rapidly disseminated in the worker and
employer communities, and encourage appeals, in contrast to the absence of economic value of appealing a decision that is consistent with
legislation, policy, and previous decisions so that an appeal is certain to
be denied. Empirical evidence of the inﬂuence of uncertainty on appeals
has been advanced by Thomason (1991), Roberts (1992), and Thomason and Burton (1993). These studies demonstrated that measures of
award variability and the time between the date of the injury and receipt
of payment (a proxy for uncertainty) were associated with an increased
likelihood of a dispute (or a decrease in the likelihood of a settlement).
Uncertainty that encourages claims and appeals from initial decisions can also arise from attention, or lack of attention, to cost considerations. As described by Spieler and Burton (1998), recent decades have
been characterized by a pendulum of workers’ compensation reform
efforts in North America which have swung between an emphasis on
adequacy of beneﬁts at one end and affordability at the other. From the
perspective of the incentive to appeal, the issue is not whether it is inappropriate to make adjustments in the relative importance of adequacy
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and affordability, but rather that these types of pendulum swings simply
cannot help but encourage appeals.
Spieler and Burton (1998, p. 236) describe the focus on workers’
compensation costs and affordability that emerged in the 1990s.
The combination of rapidly increasing costs to employers and
unproﬁtability for carriers beginning in the mid-1980s resulted
in a backlash: affordability became the dominating criterion for
reform during the 1990s. Employers and insurers mounted successful political campaigns to reduce costs. We have documented
the consequences in terms of cutbacks in beneﬁts, tougher eligibility standards, and new approaches to medical care and disability
management.

Spieler and Burton (1998, p. 238) put the 1990s into a broader historical context that highlights the pendulum swings in workers’ compensation legislation and policy, as follows:4
The history of the workers’ compensation program since 1960, in
terms of achieving the compensation goal, has shown variation
through time in the relative importance of the adequacy and affordability criteria. Adequacy received the most attention in the
1970s, and concerns for adequacy and affordability were roughly
in balance during most of the 1980s. The 1990s have been dominated by efforts to achieve affordability.

In recent times, the ability of workers’ compensation administrators
to respond quickly to changes in ﬁnancial performance of the system
was furthered with technology. The use of broadcast voicemail and electronic mail has made it very easy to transmit subtle changes to policy
that may be induced by ﬁnancial considerations. Electronic monitoring
of adjudicator decisions, and the ability to produce up-to-the-minute
ﬁnancial reporting, means that pressure to more carefully consider certain types of claims at some times, or ease up at other times, is more
easily implemented within shorter time frames than in the past.5
Experience Rating and the Economic Value of Employer Appeals
A factor that has encouraged increased appeals volumes in Canadian
workers’ compensation has been the broader application of experience
rating, which increases or decreases the workers’ compensation premiums paid by employers on the basis of the beneﬁts paid to injured work-
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ers.6 Canadian workers’ compensation jurisdictions were much slower
to embrace experience rating than were their American counterparts.
While experience rating furthers the role of the workers’ compensation
system as a reasonably fair method of collecting funds from employers
to be distributed among injured workers by ensuring that employers
responsible for the highest beneﬁt payments pay the highest rates, it
focuses employer attention on claims costs, especially relative to those
of industry competitors.
Experience rating raises the economic value (or marginal costs) of
workers’ compensation claims outcomes to individual employers. Costs
can be controlled by reducing the incidence and severity of workplace
injuries and diseases, but also by claims management practices, which
includes efforts to limit the number of claims that are approved by adjudicators and appeals bodies. This is not to suggest that employer monitoring of workers’ compensation claims induced by experience rating
is necessarily inappropriate. In fact, experience rating may induce vigilance on the part of employers that improve the long-run viability of the
workers’ compensation system. Hyatt and Kralj (1995) show, using data
from the province of Ontario, Canada, that experience-rated employers
are more likely to appeal workers’ compensation claims, and that the
likelihood of employer appeals increases with the size of the experience
rating incentive. A recent study by Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) also
found that high-wage ﬁrms were also more likely than low-wage ﬁrms
to respond to experience rating by increasing their accident prevention
efforts relative to their claims management efforts.
The Importance of an Efﬁcient Appeals Structure
As the appeals apparatus has grown and become more widely used,
and while those in workers’ compensation advocacy roles have reportedly become more aggressive at intervening at the primary adjudication
level, the stakes to adjudicators of making faulty decisions have diminished. An efﬁcient appeals structure will ﬁx any errors. This reliance on
the appeals structure allows busy claims adjudicators the opportunity to
pass along difﬁcult ﬁles to the appeals system, especially those requiring time-consuming investigation.7 The Royal Commission on Workers’ Compensation in British Columbia (1999, p. 20) observed
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The commission is deeply concerned that the current appeal system appears to have become a substitute for quality decision making at the claims adjudication level. Rather than ensuring that all
the relevant information is gathered and that the resulting claims
adjudication decision is correct, accurate and fair, the current appeal system appears to provide the board with an opportunity to
make insufﬁciently informed, inaccurate or incorrect decisions in
the expectation that eventually the right decision will be made.

This observation highlights an important reality—what seems to be
a problem with the appeals system may be reﬂecting a fundamental
problem upstream in the adjudication process.
Summary
Law (2000, p. 304) provides a summary of the factors that have
contributed to the litigiousness of work injury compensation.
Yet any observer of North American workers’ compensation today knows that the non-litigious adjudicative model is at best a
‘ﬁrst step’ in the life of a workers’ compensation claim. What has
happened? In short, the following: workers enter a host of claims
never envisioned at the outset of the twentieth century; employers
vigourously defend the insurance funds against claims; insurers,
public and private, have developed elaborate multi-stage decisionmaking systems that include formal hearings. The result is a litigation-laden web of adjudicative and tribunal-based decision-making, with radically reduced degrees of certainty and predictability
in conjunction with increasing administration and party costs.

Uncertainty is a key factor that drives appeals. The causes of uncertainty in the workers’ compensation system are legion but are frequently driven by inconsistencies in the adjudication process, the absence of
policy with respect to “nontraditional” injuries or diseases, and major
legislative or policy reforms that are not well understood by the parties
or the adjudicators. The result is inconsistent adjudicator decisions. The
potential to exploit this inconsistency gives economic value to appeals,
and the use of representation by the parties—lawyers, advisors, and
consultants (some of which may be paid for by the workers’ compensation system itself)—give the parties an informed advocate to capture
this economic value. The result is an overwhelmed appeals system and
the appearance that the problem is with the appeals structure.
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However, the problems with the appeals structure may often be
more appropriately cast as reﬂecting problems throughout the adjudication process. Looking at the kinds of appeals and the issues raised therein provides a snapshot of the problems the system is facing as a whole,
and the volume of appeals at a point in time is a good indicator of the
magnitude of the problems in the system. Neither of these, however, is
a particularly instructive indicator of the health of the appeals process
itself. Indeed, paradoxically, an efﬁcient appeals structure may well reduce the incentives provided by the adjudicative process to reform in
the basic design of the workers’ compensation program if mistakes or
gaps in policy are efﬁciently handled through the appeals process.
CENTRAL ISSUES STILL FACING POLICYMAKERS:
A RESEARCH AGENDA
Even though my view is that problems in primary adjudication
caused by faults in the basic design of the workers’ compensation program are the key source of deﬁciencies in the appeals system, nonetheless there are many direct changes that can be made to improve the appeals process. Of course, answers to what constitutes “improving” the
appeals process, like so many issues in workers’ compensation, depend
on whom one asks the questions.
One starting point is to offer a model of what a workers’ compensation appeals system should deliver. After extensive consultation with
stakeholders, literature reviews, and deliberations, the Royal Commission on Workers’ Compensation in British Columbia concluded that an
independent appeals structure should have ﬁve “intimately connected”
features. The appeals process must
1) apply legislation, rules and policy in a fair and equitable fashion;
2) make decisions based on all the relevant information, including
new information only recently discovered or determined to be
important;
3) be an active participant in making inquiries and not the passive
recipient of information;
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4) have the capacity to revoke or vary an adjudication decision and
substitute a new decision; and
5) be able to monitor the implementation of its decisions and not be
limited to simply referring the matter back with instructions.
The question that faced the Royal Commission, and which faces all
workers’ compensation policymakers, is what design features should be
built into the appeals process that would best ensure that these features
will be present? While there has been considerable research on many
aspects of the workers’ compensation appeals, there remain a number
of gaps in the research. Some of the key questions necessary to address
include: How many steps should there be in the appeals structure? What
is the role of appeals jurisprudence in decision making? What is the
role of alternative dispute resolution in workers’ compensation? And, is
there a role for the courts?
How Many Steps Are Required in the Appeals Process?
Workers’ compensation must, as it has always done, balance the
costs and the beneﬁts of providing due process. A central question is,
how many levels of appeal are necessary to deliver due process but still
be timely and cost efﬁcient?
To many of the policymakers who designed the ﬁrst of workers’
compensation programs, an elaborate appeals structure was believed
not to be warranted. While some adjudication decisions, and the communication of the decisions and their justiﬁcations, were considered
necessary, the prescribed “minimalist” solution involved a two-pronged
response: require that written decisions be given to the parties that adequately delineate how the decisions were reached, and provide a means
by which ﬁles could be reviewed by someone whose only responsibility was to conduct such reviews (preferably by someone who was not
involved in the original decision).
On its face, there is no obvious reason why this relatively simple approach to appeals could not deliver the “intimately connected” elements
of an effective appeals system as outlined by the British Columbia
Royal Commission. Lind et al. (1993) showed that workers who perceive the process as fair are less likely to pursue appeals, independent
of the outcome of the process. Roberts (1996) found that when injured
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workers felt that the information decision makers had about their claims
was accurate, they are also less likely to appeal. Clearly, however, this
relatively simple approach failed to satisfy the perceptions of workers’
compensation system stakeholders of the procedural rules needed to
assure fairness and justice, and has given way to more elaborate multitiered appeals apparatus. It merits emphasis that, with all that researchers have learned about procedural justice, what has yet to ﬂow from that
research is any speciﬁcity on the optimal number of steps in an appeals
process, and the degree of separation from the original decision makers
necessary to achieve independence.
The Royal Commission on Workers’ Compensation in British Columbia recommended a two-step appeals structure. The ﬁrst step, the
“internal review process,” would consist of a readjudication of the
workers’ compensation claim to take into account any new information.
The term internal means that the review would be conducted by workers’ compensation board staff. The decision arising from the internal
review could then be appealed to an independent appeals tribunal. In
recommending a two-step appeals process, the Royal Commission on
Workers’ Compensation in British Columbia (1999, p. 27) concluded
that “. . . fewer appeals levels could reduce jurisdictional disputes (between the various appeals bodies), enhance the speed and consistency
of decision making, and eliminate administrative duplication.”
An ancillary issue that arises as the number of levels of appeal
grows is the relationship between the levels of appeal themselves. To
what extent should lower levels of appeal be bound to the decisions
of higher levels of appeal? This is part of a broader issue, which is the
extent to which appeals systems should have the latitude to set policy
where it is absent, and in so doing open or close access to beneﬁts, or to
ﬁnd workers’ compensation legislation or policy to be illegal.
What Is the Role of Appeals Jurisprudence in Decision Making?
A common feature of Canadian legal systems involving administrative agencies, like workers’ compensation, is that decision makers
are not bound by precedence, but rather should consider each case on
its merits. While this approach asserts the independence of the decision maker, it can be a source of frustration to workers’ compensation
system stakeholders when this freedom from precedence causes deci-
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sions to look less like they were independent and more like they are
inconsistent.
That workers’ compensation appeals structures should not be bound
by precedence has led to problems, not only between levels of the appeals structure, but also back to the primary adjudication process. If,
at the appeals level, an adjudicator’s decision was found to be, for example, a faulty interpretation of policy, it has frequently been the case
that while the adjudicator’s decision might be overturned in that speciﬁc instance, the adjudicator may feel free to make the same faulty
(in the eyes of the appellate structure) decision again. In other words,
the jurisprudence that arises from appeals may have no impact on the
adjudication of future claims with similar fact situations. What is left,
then, is for the worker or employer to appeal in every instance of the
same type of claim.
The Royal Commission on Workers’ Compensation (1999, p. 41)
expressed a concern they frequently heard from stakeholders: “(t)his
freedom from precedent has tended to promote inconsistent decisions
throughout the claims adjudication and appeal process with the result
that it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to predict how decisions will be
made in the future or to use prior decisions to assert that subsequent
decisions are unfair.”
Workers’ compensation systems in Canada have struggled to ﬁnd
some sort of middle ground on the issue of precedence. An inﬂuential decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Consolidated-Bathurst
Packaging Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of America, Local 2-69,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 282, concluded that while administrative bodies may
not be bound to slavishly follow precedence and should therefore remain independent, they must ﬁnd acceptable ways of achieving consistency. To balance independence and consistency, the court proposed
a three-pronged model for administrative law bodies in which 1) the
decision-making panel must be free of outside interference; 2) while
legal and policy issues can be discussed within the tribunal, the decision in a speciﬁc case must be entirely in the hands of the panel that
heard the evidence and can assess the facts; and 3) a clear distinction
must be made between discussions on legal and policy matters within a
tribunal and discussions of factual matters in a particular case. Discussions within the tribunal on legal and policy matters are not to be used
to decide the appeals, but rather to delineate and assess standards which
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could be adopted by the panel members hearing the matter. While reasonable on the face of it, the approach suggested by the Supreme Court
of Canada has not been followed by all workers’ compensation appeals
bodies. One reason for this is the practical problem that consultative
meetings between members of different panels of an appeals tribunal
proposed by the Supreme Court are difﬁcult to schedule, especially in
an environment of growing case loads.
As a consequence, alternative approaches have been adopted or
proposed to deal with the issue of precedence. These include requiring
panels to give reasons for decisions that depart from earlier decisions
involving similar matters; having leading cases decided by panels made
up of neutral members (that is, none of the members is a worker or
employer representative) whose decision would set out the key considerations for subsequent decisions to follow; and having a member
of the appeals tribunal who did not hear the matter review a panel’s
preliminary decision, and if appropriate, outline in writing where the
panel has diverged from previous decisions (the panel would still ultimately make the ﬁnal decision). Another approach encouraging the reliance on precedence is to require that all decisions be published and/or
all appeals hearings are open to the public. This latter approach adds
transparency, but at the potential cost of compromising the privacy of
injured workers and employers. Many of these approaches are being
employed, providing useful variation necessary for fertile research on
which approach achieves more consistent decision making, while maintaining independence.
The issue of the independence of workers’ compensation appeals
bodies extends further. A question with which policymakers constantly
grapple is the role of the appeals body in reﬁning, or redeﬁning, workers’ compensation policy. It is usually the case that legislation gives
the provincial workers’ compensation agency the authority to determine
policy for which it is, in turn, accountable. Appeals bodies are supposed
to interpret policy and determine whether it has been applied properly.
However, appeals bodies may also determine that a policy adopted by
the agency is illegal because it is inconsistent with the provincial workers’ compensation statute. The central issue is whether the appeals bodies should be able to reject and replace workers’ compensation board
policies that may be legal under the provincial statute but considered
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inappropriate by the appeals board, or to create new policy where none
exists?
This issue exposes an important paradox in workers’ compensation.
Appeals bodies frequently assert that their decisions should be binding,
not only on lower level appeals bodies, but also on primary adjudication process. Yet, because the decisions of the appeals bodies, which
are supposed to be based on the merits of individual cases and are not
supposed to be overly burdened by precedence, are by deﬁnition case
speciﬁc, workers’ compensation authorities rarely wish to be bound by
the decisions of appeals bodies. Moreover, workers’ compensation administrators believe their authority is enshrined in legislation, and it is
to the legislature that they are accountable, not to appeals bodies.
The tensions that arise as appeals bodies breach the border between
policy interpretation and policy making have caused policymakers to
try to more clearly deﬁne the roles of the workers’ compensation authority and the appeals bodies. Approaches that have been followed
include altering workers’ compensation legislation to reinforce the primacy of the workers’ compensation authority to develop policy (and the
role of the appeals bodies to interpret policy and assess its application in
speciﬁc instances); where an appeals body has determined that a policy
is illegal, the policy must be reviewed by the workers’ compensation
board on a timely basis in consultation with stakeholders, and a revised
policy substituted (or the initial policy reissued); and referring questions of law to the court.
What Is the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Purely
Adjudicative System?
It is hard to argue there is no room in workers’ compensation for
processes, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), that seek to
help parties understand the nature of their disputes and resolve them.
Surely in workers’ compensation, where there are many opportunities
for disputes, particularly after periods of signiﬁcant reform, when the
actors are uncertain about the new rules and how they apply to their
matter, ADR techniques have a natural home.
ADR has become more popular, both because the primary adjudication has become more complicated and the appeals process has become
more accessible (and complicated). As a consequence, dealing with dis-
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putes takes a probably increasing share of real resources (though this is
difﬁcult to measure). To the extent that ADR can reduce dispute costs
and satisfy the parties, its attractiveness is obvious.
However, the proper place of ADR in workers’ compensation is not
so straightforward. ADR evolved from situations where adversarial parties owned a dispute and had conﬂicting interests in how the dispute
was ultimately resolved. As Law (1998, p. 4) points out, this was not the
situation envisioned for workers’ compensation, in which, “(t)he object
of workers’ compensation was to lift the matter of injury compensation
out of the lives of master and servant, converting what was a private
dispute (before the advent of workers’ compensation) into a public service.” Canadian law contends that workers and employers are not “parties” to workers’ compensation disputes at all, and have no ownership
of the adjudicative decision (although clearly they are not disinterested
parties in the outcome). That is, workers’ compensation did not envision empowering employers and workers to substitute even a mutually
agreed upon alternative outcome to the adjudicators’ decision, which
was arrived upon by an application of legislation and established policy
to the facts of the case.
Law (1998) identiﬁes four classes of alternative dispute resolution
approaches within workers’ compensation. The ﬁrst class, case management, characterizes ADR as a way of expediting the collection of
information to ensure timely decision making based on all of the information relevant for the matter at hand. Law (pp. 24–25) describes this
approach as, “. . . at once a ‘customer service’ initiative (the case moves
faster through the system) and an ‘administrative beneﬁt’ (if it reduces
the number of transactions and or resources required to be applied to
the matter).”
The second class of ADR procedures is the “ﬂexibility for the decision maker” approach, in which the limited discretion an adjudicator
normally has is supplemented by other remedies that are consistent with
the facts. Law gives the example of an injured worker who is receiving temporary total disability beneﬁts, but for whom the weight of the
evidence suggests that the worker is not mitigating his or her losses
through sufﬁcient participation in vocational rehabilitation initiatives.
In this instance, the prescribed outcome of adjudication would be to
discontinue beneﬁts. However, the worker is likely to disagree with the
adjudicator’s assessment of the mitigation efforts. An alternative ap-
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proach might be to set out the evidence for the parties, and instead offer a solution which is to reduce the beneﬁt over the period where the
extent of mitigation was in question. In such an instance, the solution
arrived at by the parties is consistent with the evidence (and gives the
worker the beneﬁt of the doubt) and may be preferable to the “normal”
decision of terminating beneﬁts, if that decision would have only have
dragged the parties into extended costly proceedings.
A third ADR approach, decision endorsement, allows the parties
(worker and employer) to make a decision within a range of speciﬁed
outcomes, but the agreement reached by the parties must be approved
by the adjudicator. The fourth approach goes one step further, empowering the parties to make decisions themselves on eligibility for and the
quantum of beneﬁts, with no supervisory review.
If ADR procedures offer the opportunity to achieve outcomes that
more closely reﬂect the needs and wishes of the parties, then they merit
consideration. If they instead weaken the parties’ ability to obtain the
results promised by statute, then ADR serves only to undue one of the
advantages, relative to tort proceedings, that workers’ compensation
promised—predictable beneﬁts for workers and predictable costs for
employers.
Canadian and American workers’ compensation programs have
come to different conclusions about which of the alternative dispute
resolution approaches are appropriate in workers’ compensation. In
reviewing ADR procedures in Washington State (which, like all Canadian workers’ compensation provinces, operates a monopoly fund),
Law (1998, p. 21) aptly captures a ﬂavor of the contrasting approaches
and philosophies.
This is the fundamental distinction between the Washington State
and Canadian systems—in Canada the statutorily prescribed beneﬁt is technically the only beneﬁt payable to the worker, and waivers or adjustments to that are prohibited. In the United States (and
Washington speciﬁcally) the parties treat the insurance system as
more of a menu, with a maximum number of choices.

The implication of this distinction is that ADR has a greater potential role in the U.S. because there are more opportunities to fashion solutions that do not precisely adhere to statutory prescriptions. This is a
little studied point of departure in U.S. and Canadian workers’ compensation programs, and one that merits additional comparative research.
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Is There a Role for the Courts?
As the nature of workplace injuries evolved and attribution to work
or the workplace became, in some instance, much more difﬁcult, some
policymakers chose to simply exclude certain injuries and diseases
from coverage,8 rather than to modify legal rules to accept such claims
into workers’ compensation or apportion beneﬁts based on the degree
to which work contributed to the workers’ condition. In some instances,
excluding injuries and diseases from coverage was at least partially motivated by the cost implications of doing otherwise (Spieler and Burton
1998; Hyatt 2001). However, precluding coverage for certain conditions under workers’ compensation threw open the question of whether
workers could now sue their employers if they could establish that their
excluded condition was linked to the workplace. Hyatt (2001) found
that the courts in both Canada and the United States have generally been
loath to disrupt the exclusive remedy doctrine of workers’ compensation, and have not granted workers and employers broad rights to sue.
One exception is Oregon, where the Supreme Court held in Smothers
v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001) that an effort by the
Oregon legislature to preclude a worker from obtaining workers’ compensation beneﬁts because the workplace injury was not the major contributing cause of the worker’s disability while also denying the worker
the right to sue the employer in a tort suit was unconstitutional.9
The “historical compromise” that workers’ compensation represents, in which workers gave up the right to sue their employer in return
for beneﬁts paid with certainty and on a timely basis, came after ruinous
tort litigation. Over time, employers, workers, and legislators were able
to fashion some considerable degree of consensus for a major change in
the legal remedies available for workplace injuries because the failure
to compromise put at risk the sustainability of the industrial revolution
(Hyatt and Law 2000).
The beneﬁts of the workers’ compensation system compared to the
tort approach are many. Those frequently cited among the most valued include timeliness of the adjudication process; reduced costs, due
fundamentally to the elimination of the burden of adjudication in the
regular court system to determine fault and to the reduction in legal
and other related costs of pursuing a claim; relatively nonadversarial
procedures, again due to the no-fault nature of workers’ compensation;
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and decision making that, because it is based on legislation and policy
and administered by professional adjudicators who specialize in work
injuries and diseases, generates predictable compensation and costs.
In the instances where workers are denied access to the workers’
compensation for certain injuries/diseases/conditions, and are also denied access to the courts, potentially work-related injury claims are
simply suppressed. This is not a situation that can persist in the long
run, as the emergence of workers’ compensation some 100 years ago
demonstrated.
While the virtues of the tort system are sometimes overlooked as
a way of resolving some workplace disputes, such as charges that employers are discriminating against workers on the basis of race or gender, a return to the tort system to provide the remedy for workplace
injuries and diseases is rarely seriously considered. However, the court
may be a useful forum to adjudicate matters for which policy moves
too slowly.
Although frequently maligned because of cost, lack of timeliness,
and adversarial nature, the courts and the process of tort litigation remain good mechanisms for eliciting the best evidence available and
making decisions on that evidence. This is partly because resources are
devoted to providing evidence, and the process is adversarial and is not
rushed. It should be emphasized that legislators have also been slow
to react to an evolving workplace environment for workplace safety
and health. While the workers’ compensation system is likely faster
and cheaper for dealing with routine work injury matters, it cannot be
said that legislators are necessarily faster than the courts for addressing
emerging issues, such as the proliferating evidence on the relationships
between workplace exposures to toxic substances and the diseases affecting workers.
It would appear, however, that given the general reluctance of courts
to loosen the bar on tort suits for workplace injuries and diseases, legislators would have to enact legislation allowing workers to sue their
employers in instances where their conditions have been excluded from
workers’ compensation coverage. Litigation raises the stakes to all of
the parties. Perhaps even the “threat” of loosening the tort bar may be
enough to encourage modern workers and employers to update the historical compromise to better reﬂect modern conditions.
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CONCLUSION
The due process revolution that introduced litigation into Canadian
workers’ compensation programs reﬂects recognition that there can be
legitimate differences of interpretation of the facts before a claims adjudicator and that mistakes can be made. Principles of natural justice
require that a forum be available, even within an administrative law
regime, to address these situations. Perhaps more importantly, attention
to due process is an acknowledgment that some ﬂexibility needed to be
built into the workers’ compensation system to allow more timely reaction to constantly evolving environment of work and work injuries than
is afforded by legislative and policy reform processes.
However, to the extent that workers’ compensation appeals increasingly becomes a substitute for quality decision making at the claims
adjudication level, then the faith of injured workers and employers in
the primary adjudication process will be compromised. Claims adjudicators and administrators reported to the provincial commissions of
inquiry, referred to earlier, of instances in which employers and workers
ﬁle the documentation to initiate an appeal of the adjudicator’s decision
at the same time that the claim is ﬁled (and before the adjudicator had
made any decisions). If workers and employers believe in sufﬁcient
numbers that the only way to get the “right” decision is to appeal, then
the advantages of workers’ compensation over tort are clearly diminished.
Policymakers, then, must continue to ensure that primary adjudication is maintained at a level such that the economic value of appeals is
diminished, while still allowing an effective forum for legitimate difference to be considered and mistakes to be corrected.

Notes
1. Burton and Mitchell (2003, pp. 178–180) provide a brief history of the origins of
workers’ compensation in the United States. Chaykowski and Thomason (1995,
pp. 2–6) provide a similar introduction to the historical development of workers’
compensation in Canada.
2. This chapter does not provide a systematic review of past research on workers
compensation appeals. Such reviews can be found in Thomason, Hyatt, and Roberts (1998), Law (2000), and Hyatt (2001).
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3. For an excellent review of the history of appeals system, with particular reference to British Columbia, see Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia (1997).
4. Law (2000) provides a description of a similar pattern in the Canadian context.
5. Even more worrisome is that economic considerations may affect the claims
of some workers differently from others. Thomason (1994, p.76) found that,
“. . . decisions concerning both liability and compensation are partially based on
economic considerations,” and that “insurers are more likely to adjust the claims
of those most vulnerable to ﬁnancial pressure: non-English speakers and claimants who are not represented by legal counsel.”
6. Thomason (2003) provides a recent survey of studies of the effects of experience
rating.
7. The problems associated with decisions based on inadequate investigation of the
claims at the primary adjudication level are compounded when those decisions
are not appealed.
8. Workers’ compensation policymakers have not warmed to trying to assess the
relative contributions of work and nonwork factors, and provide partial beneﬁts
based on the work contribution. Shainblum, Sullivan, and Frank (2000) provide
a review of the issues involved, the feasibility of instituting such an approach, as
well as alternatives.
9. The issue of whether a state can preclude a worker from having any remedy
against an employer for a workplace injury or disease is examined in Willborn,
Schwab, and Burton (2002, pp. 978–985).
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Performance Measurement in
Workers’ Compensation Systems
H. Allan Hunt
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Interest in performance measurement and performance management has expanded remarkably in the past 25 years. This interest has
spawned many initiatives, both private and public. One of the most
ubiquitous has been the “balanced scorecard.” This initiative developed
out of the work of two professors at the Harvard Business School in
the early 1990s (Kaplan and Norton 1992), and was based on the fundamental concept that there are (or should be) multiple objectives and
thus multiple dimensions for performance measurement. Kaplan and
Norton urged that the ﬁnancial perspective should be complemented by
a customer perspective, an internal process perspective, and an organizational learning and growth perspective. Only then could performance
measurement fully serve the strategic objectives of the modern enterprise (Kaplan and Norton 2001).
While the balanced scorecard was ﬁnding application in private
business, nonproﬁts, and local government entities, the federal government was conducting a National Performance Review, under the leadership of Vice President Al Gore (1993). This gave a boost to a pending
piece of legislation that was enacted under the title of the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, or GPRA. This act is the latest in
a series of government attempts at “performance budgeting,” including
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System of 1965, Management
by Objectives of 1973, and Zero-Base Budgeting of 1977 (U.S. General
Accounting Ofﬁce 1997).
However, GPRA differs from those earlier efforts in that it also
imposes a planning and evaluation process designed to inﬂuence program effectiveness and budgeting decisions. Five-year strategic plans
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are required from all federal agencies (with revision every three years)
together with an annual performance plan that has credible outcomebased goals. Further, these “good intentions” are enforced by the Ofﬁce
of Management and Budget (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART), which is being applied across all federal government agencies and programs on a ﬁve-year cycle. In fact, OMB conducted PART
evaluations on 234 federal programs during ﬁscal year 2002–2003 and
plans to complete 411 during ﬁscal year 2003–2004.
PART rates programs as “effective, moderately effective, adequate,
results not demonstrated, or ineffective” based on four criteria. Twenty
percent of the evaluation is based on management, 20 percent on program purpose and design, 10 percent on planning, and 50 percent on
program results (U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce 2004). While it is too
early to judge the success of PART and GPRA, these efforts certainly
represent a manifestation of the growing interest in program effectiveness and program evaluation in the federal government and elsewhere.
(See U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce 2004 for a critical view.)
There are many other illustrations of the interest in performance
measurement in public programs. The International City/County Management Association was an early advocate for more effective performance measurement and management (see Morley, Bryant, and Hatry
2001). Today the CPM Consortium project includes well over 100 participating cities and counties who are seeking to improve their own performance, partly through benchmarking to other similar entities.1 The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
published an occasional paper on performance measurement in 1994,
which combined a “how-to” manual with speciﬁc examples of efforts in
various countries. Paralleling the balanced scorecard approach, OECD
listed the following “dimensions” of functional performance measurement: economy measures, efﬁciency measures, effectiveness measures,
service quality measures, and ﬁnancial performance measures (OECD
1994).
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HISTORY OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Workers’ compensation systems have not historically been leaders
in the adoption of performance measurement or performance management techniques. In fact, one could argue that these programs have
been somewhat of a backwater for performance measurement. Workers’ compensation systems tend to be iconoclastic, with relatively little
comparability across jurisdictions (see U.S. Department of Labor 2002
for what can be easily compared). This is because such systems are the
result of a complex interplay of statutory language, legal interpretation,
and administrative practice, all of which are speciﬁc to each jurisdiction. It is little wonder that the situation can be characterized as “a tower
of babel.”
The lack of comparable performance measures among workers’
compensation systems also meant that it was difﬁcult to tell which
policy initiatives worked across jurisdictions. Workers’ compensation
reform was characterized by veering to one side or the other, depending upon whether the friends of labor or the friends of employers were
in political control. It was frustration with this situation that led to the
establishment of the Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI)
in 1983.
The Workers Compensation Research Institute is an independent,
not-for-proﬁt research organization providing high-quality, objective
information about public policy issues involving workers’ compensation systems. It is funded by memberships with annual dues set according to the size and type of organization. Membership includes workers’
compensation insurers, large employers, and employer associations.
Associate members include many state and provincial workers’ compensation administrative agencies in the United States, Australia, and
Canada as well as a handful of labor organizations.
One of the earliest research programs at WCRI was the “administrative inventory” series. According to the ﬁrst of these, “This is the ﬁrst
of a series of Administrative Inventories of state workers’ compensation
systems. The purpose of the series is to describe and offer convenient
data on how the different systems function, to allow interstate comparison” (Barth 1987, p. 3).
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Administrative inventories have now been performed in some 24
U.S. jurisdictions, several of them more than once (see WCRI 2003).
While they may not have been as effective in allowing interstate comparisons as originally thought, they have gone a long way toward facilitating communication across systems and increasing general understanding of different workers’ compensation systems.
Another objective of WCRI was to determine “best practice”
among workers’ compensation systems, which of necessity implies a
comparative perspective. The motivation for this is to provide guidance for reform; one has to know what works if one is to improve the
performance of a workers’ compensation system. “Our past research
has shown that public ofﬁcials and stakeholders in a particular state
generally understand how their own system performs, but their ability to make meaningful and credible comparisons between their system
and those of other states is severely limited” (Telles, Wang, and Tanabe
2004, p. 3).
The earliest work that included explicit interstate comparisons at
WCRI involved a review of medical cost trends in 43 jurisdictions
(Boden and Fleischman 1989). This was followed by a study of cost
drivers in six state systems (Victor et al. 1992). The development of
a multistate database for the express purpose of making comparisons
among state systems followed logically from these efforts and the ﬁrst
CompScope™ multistate comparison study appeared in 2000 (Fox,
Casteris, and Telles 2000).
Recently the fourth edition of this reference work was released
(Telles et al. 2004). It provides detail on nearly 60 performance measures
for 12 states over the period 1996–2001. Comparable deﬁnitions have
been used and the data have been standardized for wage levels, industry
employment, injury mix, and beneﬁt waiting period. Thus, the emphasis of this effort is on comparing “apples to apples” even if that causes
some tension with unadjusted system statistics that may be published
elsewhere. As the fourth edition puts it, “The annual benchmarks of system performance collected here enable policymakers and stakeholders
to better manage and continuously improve their systems and avoid the
historic cycles of crisis-reform-crisis that have frequently characterized
workers’ compensation systems” (Telles et al. 2004, p. 3).
Most recently, WCRI has initiated a new series of comparative studies of self-reported outcomes for injured workers (Victor, Barth, and
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Liu 2003). These telephone surveys of injured workers in four states
compare critical outcome dimensions, including physical recovery; satisfaction with, access to, and quality of medical care; and durability of
return-to-work results. We look forward to the expansion of this series
to additional states in the future.
Predating WCRI was the series of workers’ compensation employer
cost studies conducted by John F. Burton, Jr. and various collaborators
over the years. These studies began with Burton’s Ph.D. dissertation at
the University of Michigan in 1965, partly sponsored by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. The most thorough description of the methods used in this research is in Thomason, Schmidle, and
Burton (2001). Burton and his coauthors have replicated and reﬁned
this study over the years to provide a more or less continuous record
of employers’ cost of workers’ compensation coverage over several decades.
Burton’s measures are developed from National Council on Compensation Insurance data that are used for rate-making for workers’
compensation insurance policies written by private insurers in approximately 40 states, and supplemented by comparable data in other
states with available information. An expanded version that includes
data from public funds, self-insured employers, federal workers’ compensation programs, and including adjustments for additional technical
problems (like large deductibles) is published annually by the National
Academy of Social Insurance (NASI); the most recent version is Workers’ Compensation: Beneﬁts, Coverage, and Costs, 2001 (NASI 2003).
Another workers’ compensation cost study, the Oregon Workers’
Compensation Premium Rate Ranking study, is performed biannually
by the Oregon Department of Consumer & Business Services. It provides explicit comparisons of premium levels for the 50 largest workers’ compensation classiﬁcations in Oregon across all 51 states. This
study was developed to track Oregon premium rates relative to other
states, and therefore qualiﬁes as an aggregate performance measure.
Finally, there is a “workers’ compensation report card” developed
and promoted by the Work Loss Data Institute.2 It is composed of data
elements from Occupational Safety and Health Administration log
reports, and awards letter grades to state workers’ compensation systems depending upon the state’s performance on the aggregate injury
incidence rate, the percentage of injuries that involve lost workdays,
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the median duration of disability, the proportion that are long duration
cases, and state experience with low back strain and carpal tunnel injuries.
So there is the beginning of a performance measurement movement
in workers’ compensation. While not all these workers’ compensation
measures were developed with performance management in mind, they
do constitute performance measurement for some purpose. The distinction is between measures that are or may be under the control of some
entity, as opposed to those that seem to simply express the outcome
of some process without a speciﬁc controlling entity. For instance, it
would be difﬁcult to hold some particular individual or organization
responsible for the level of workers’ compensation costs in a jurisdiction. But it would be reasonable to hold a claims administration agent
responsible for the timely payment of wage replacement beneﬁts. Let
us turn our attention now to collective efforts at measuring the performance of workers’ compensation systems that are presumably designed
to improve that performance.
BENCHMARKING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
Canadian Benchmarking
The Canadian workers’ compensation boards have led the way
in developing system benchmarks and making them available to the
general public. The Association of Workers’ Compensation Boards of
Canada (AWCBC) maintains a Web site where anyone can view some
24 performance measures and 6 “indicator ratios” for each of the 12 Canadian provincial systems.3 The chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers of the Canadian
boards have developed a common set of deﬁnitions for key statistical
measures (KSMs) and indicator ratios which can be used to describe
the workers’ compensation insurance systems in Canada, and to provide
comparisons across jurisdictions. This effort dates to the mid-1990s and
has been gradually reﬁned over the past decade.
The KSMs are published in both tabular and graphical format, with
extensive explanatory detail. The AWCBC data also include self-insured
employers, which are reported separately. While the measures reported
may have a ﬁnancial bias, there are also measures of incidence, time-

Roberts.indb 146

6/7/2005 9:29:07 AM

Performance Measurement in Workers’ Compensation Systems 147

liness of payment, duration, and severity. Furthermore, the consistent
reporting of these measures across jurisdictions and across time means
that judgments can rather easily be made about relative performance.
This is demonstrated in Figure 6.1, which shows the injury frequency rate by province. It shows that injury frequency is relatively high in
Manitoba and low in New Brunswick and Ontario. Further, the three
years of trend data demonstrate that the overall Canadian injury frequency was declining from 2000 through 2002. This was also true for
most, but not all, provincial systems.
Figure 6.2, however, indicates that the severity of injury was relatively high in New Brunswick, with more than 10 percent of claims
receiving impairment beneﬁts, compared to Manitoba, where less than
2 percent of all claims did. So it seems that Manitoba has many minor
injuries, which accounts for its higher overall injury frequency. This
observation might lead one to look at the differences in beneﬁts from
a policy perspective. Are these two provincial systems trying to do the
same thing, or something different?
Figure 6.2 shows that the percentage of claims receiving impairment beneﬁts was also relatively high in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Furthermore, the proportion of claims that received impairment beneﬁts
was rising for the median province, i.e., injuries appear to be growing
more severe, even as their number is being reduced.
Figure 6.3 indicates that the cost of workers’ compensation coverage for Canadian employers hovered around C$2 for the period from
2000 to 2002, ending at C$1.95 in 2002. Costs were higher than average in the Maritime provinces and lower than average in Alberta, Manitoba, Northwest Territory, Saskatchewan, and Yukon Territory. In the
population centers of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, workers’
compensation costs were close to the weighted average.
Figure 6.4 refers to the timeliness of payment by the workers’ compensation board in Canadian workers’ compensation systems. It shows
the average calendar days from the date of injury to the date of the ﬁrst
payment for all jurisdictions except Quebec. There are clear differences
among the systems, with Alberta and British Columbia being on the
quicker side with performance in the 20- to 25-day range; Ontario and
Prince Edward Island are on the slower side at about 40 to 45 days.
There are obviously many more performance measures available
from this source. Taken together, they convey a fairly detailed picture of
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Figure 6.1 Injury Frequency (per 100 workers of assessable payrolls)
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Figure 6.2 Percentage of Claims Awarded Impairment Beneﬁts, 2000–2002
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Figure 6.3 Actual Average Assessment Rate for Assessable Employers, 2000–2002
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Figure 6.4 Average Calendar Days from Injury to First Payment Issued, 2000–2002
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the performance of Canadian workers’ compensation systems. Because
the deﬁnitions have been developed jointly, we can also be relatively
conﬁdent that they are comparable, although there are always qualiﬁcations that reﬂect unique system aspects.
AUSTRALIAN BENCHMARKING
In Australia, the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (representing Workplace Relations Ministers from each state) publishes a Comparative Performance Monitoring report for the occupational health and
safety and workers’ compensation schemes in Australia and New Zealand. See Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (2003) for the ﬁfth
such report.
There are 103 ﬁgures presented and classiﬁed under the categories
of occupational health and safety (25 ﬁgures), workers’ compensation
(21 ﬁgures), return to work (9 ﬁgures), and industry-speciﬁc indicators
(48 ﬁgures). The presentation is particularly thorough, with multiple
views of the same or similar information displayed in several different
ways.
Australia has exclusive fund states (Queensland), traditional private insurance jurisdictions (Western Australia, Tasmania, and Northern Territory), and three states (New South Wales, South Australia,
and Victoria) have mixed systems of public-sector underwriting and
private-sector claims administration that have been dubbed “the third
way” (see Barth et al. 2000). Because of this institutional variety, there
has been a great deal of national interest in comparing the performance
of the different jurisdictions.
Figure 6.5 shows the unadjusted incidence of compensated injuries
and diseases that resulted in at least one week off work for seven Australian jurisdictions.4 It appears that the Northern Territory, Victoria,
and Western Australia had relatively low workers’ compensation claims
incidence in 2001–2002. New South Wales and South Australia had
higher claims incidence than the Australian average.
Australian jurisdictions do not report severity in a comparable way
to Canadian systems, but Figure 6.6 shows the incidence of claims involving at least 26 weeks off work. These would be serious injuries,
and certainly a much more restrictive deﬁnition than used for Canadian

Roberts.indb 152

6/7/2005 9:29:10 AM

Performance Measurement in Workers’ Compensation Systems 153
Figure 6.5 Incidence Rate of Compensated Injuries and Diseases, by
Jurisdiction, 2000–2002
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Figure 6.6 Incidence of Claims with 26 Weeks or More off Work,
by Jurisdiction, 2000–2001
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Figure 6.7 Average Standardized Premium Rates, by Jurisdiction,
2000–2002
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jurisdictions in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.6 shows a twofold variation in the
incidence of claims with 26 weeks or more of wage loss. Queensland
and Tasmania are low, while New South Wales reports 3.3 claims per
1,000 employees. The Australian average was 2.6 claims per 1,000 employees in 2000–2001.
The cost of workers’ compensation coverage in Australia is presented in Figure 6.7. It shows the average premium rate for the latest
three years, standardized for variation in industry mix, pension coverage, employer excess, and coverage of self-insurers in some jurisdictions. Costs demonstrate a twofold variation between the lowest in
Queensland and the highest in New South Wales. The Australian average premium level rose from A$2.39 per 100 in 1999–2000 to A$2.47
per 100 in 2001–2002.
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U.S. BENCHMARKING
As discussed earlier, in the United States there has not been the
same degree of national interest in benchmarking workers’ compensation systems as in Australia or Canada. However, the Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) has developed a series of detailed
benchmark measures for a subset of 12 large U.S. states that represent
more than 50 percent of the nation’s workers’ compensation beneﬁt
payments.
The major reason for this lack of interest may be that in most U.S.
jurisdictions, the majority of workers’ compensation policies are written by private insurance companies. These companies compete vigorously with each other and do not welcome the opportunity to “tell their
secrets” to the competition, or even to admit that they are doing well or
poorly, since this could affect marketing results. Given the competitive
atmosphere, even the public funds that compete with private insurers
are loath to reveal their operating results. Yet, historically the workers’
compensation insurance industry has been regulated by public entities.
The net effect of this environment was a data reporting system that
was narrowly construed to enable public regulation without conveying
much information.
The CompScope™ effort of WCRI is a welcome break from this
tradition. However, the CompScope™ measures themselves reveal a
different bias. They are designed to compare the operation of workers’
compensation systems, but tend to focus on claims administration issues
rather than overview measures. For instance, CompScope™ includes
measures of average medical cost containment expenses per claim, but
does not include the incidence of claims for the system as a whole.
Figure 6.8 shows the proportion of all claims with more than seven
days of lost time that involve 26 weeks of disability or more. This measure is presented to maximize comparability with the Australian ﬁgures
reported earlier. Among these 12 states, Wisconsin and Indiana have
the lowest proportion of extended duration claims, closely followed
by Tennessee and Illinois. California, Texas, and Louisiana have the
highest proportion of extended duration claims, each at 25 percent or
more of all wage-loss claims. For the 12 states, the median is 18 percent
of wage-loss claims that extend for 26 weeks or more. Although the
numbers were presented as incidence rates for Australian jurisdictions,
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an average of 14 percent of claims involved extended wage loss. So,
American injuries appear to be comparable at least for this sample of
12 states.
Analogous to the data presented on Canadian systems in Figure 6.2
would be the proportion of wage-loss claims that receive permanent
partial disability (PPD) payments in U.S. jurisdictions. These numbers
are presented in Figure 6.9. It shows that 14 to 38 percent of wage-loss
claims receive PPD payments, with a 12-state median of 23 percent.
States with a low proportion of PPD payments include Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, Louisiana, Connecticut, and Indiana. High PPD proportions are found in Texas, California, and Florida. Thus, the proportion
of claims receiving PPD payments in U.S. jurisdictions appears to substantially exceed the proportion receiving impairment beneﬁts in Canadian provinces.
Unfortunately, there is not a source of state workers’ compensation
cost data that compares directly to the Canadian and Australian ﬁgures
presented earlier. Figure 6.10 shows the average workers’ compensation beneﬁts paid per $100 in covered wages for 2001 reported by the
National Academy of Social Insurance. High beneﬁt–cost states were
California, Pennsylvania, and Florida. Low beneﬁt–cost states were
Massachusetts and Indiana. The median beneﬁt–cost for the 12 states
listed was $0.91 per $100 of covered payroll.
Finally, Figure 6.11 shows the timeliness of ﬁrst indemnity payment
for the selected U.S. jurisdictions. These data from the CompScope™
database indicate that the median state needs 63 days from the date of
injury to the ﬁrst indemnity payment. This is signiﬁcantly slower than
the Canadian average at 35 days from injury to ﬁrst payment in 2002.
Massachusetts was the quickest at 50 days, and North Carolina was the
slowest at 77 days.
Benchmarking of workers’ compensation systems has come a long
way in the past decade. None of these measures was available 10 years
ago. And some very preliminary judgments can be made about comparative system performance. However, there is still a great deal of
haze surrounding system performance assessment as represented in the
benchmarking efforts. Let us turn now to the state of the art in performance measurement in individual workers’ compensation systems.
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Figure 6.9 Proportion of Wage-Loss Claims that Receive PPD Payments for Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
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Figure 6.10 Workers’ Compensation Beneﬁts Paid Per $100 of Covered
Wages for Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
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STATE-OF-THE-ART PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
As discussed earlier, workers’ compensation systems have not been
among the leaders in developing performance measurement tools. However, many jurisdictions now appear to be catching up and are able to
take advantage of the experience that has accumulated in other types of
organizations. Workers’ compensation is a “data rich” environment, and
that has been the source of many problems. In the old paper processing
systems, the sheer volume of paper documents was simply overwhelming. But with modern scanning and character recognition technologies,
it has become possible to compile data more expediently and more economically.
The International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and
Commissions (IAIABC), the professional association for administrators of workers’ compensation systems, began encouraging consistency
in electronic data collection in the early 1980s. As many workers’ com-

Roberts.indb 159

6/7/2005 9:29:13 AM

Roberts.indb 160

160

Figure 6.11 Time from Date of Injury to First Indemnity Payment, Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
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pensation systems began investigating the possibility of migration from
paper to electronic record keeping, the electronic data interchange standards of IAIABC provided guidance and reassurance. However, as of
September 2002 (latest available statistics), only 24 states were using
the claims reporting standards (since revised twice) and 5 more were
planning to use them. That left 21 states that were not yet using the
standard format after nearly two decades of experience.
There are, however, a number of impressive performance measurement systems currently in place throughout the workers’ compensation
world. These performance measurement systems are speciﬁcally designed to support the management of the workers’ compensation function. They include targets or goals, with an accountability standard that
deﬁnes acceptable levels of performance. They also are measured with
greater frequency, to support operational requirements. Let’s begin with
the IAIABC Information Product Award winner in 2003 for “program
improvement.”
NOVA SCOTIA WCB
The Nova Scotia WCB Performance Measurement and Management System (PMMS) emphasizes empowering WCB employees by
giving them the necessary information to align their personal work goals
with organizational objectives. This is illustrated by Figure 6.12, which
shows the performance model underlying the PMMS. It indicates that
the goals of the organization are deﬁned from the top down, but performance is measured from the bottom up. Individual performances add up
to team performance, which in turn cumulates to unit and then department performance. All departments taken together constitute corporate
outcomes.
The PMMS system uses performance bands to deﬁne expected performance norms based on past experience. These “dashboard indicators” deﬁne adequate (green), marginal (yellow), and unacceptable (red)
performance for each performance measure and at each organizational
level. In this way, individuals or teams with performance problems can
be identiﬁed and targeted for additional training or assistance as determined by management.
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The primary performance indicators are
• timeliness,
• return-to-work outcomes,
• claim durations,
• claim costs,
• staff availability, and
• stakeholder satisfaction.
The system is a proprietary, Web-based application designed so that
each user is assigned an appropriate level of access as well as the necessary performance level indicators. Thus, individual caseworkers may
access their own monthly performance results, as well as their team,
unit, and department performance results, but they cannot access anoth-
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er individual’s results. Similarly, a team manager has access to results
for her/his department, unit, and team, plus the individuals in the team,
but not for other teams or individuals. There are seven distinct levels of
security access built into this system.
For each performance area, the software permits “drill-thru” to
more reﬁned or speciﬁc measures. For example, the corporate timeliness of payment measure allows drill-thru to the ﬁve different client
service units, which are organized geographically. Data (and dashboard
indicators) are displayed for the current month and the previous month,
as well as the threshold levels for green, yellow, and red indicators. A
human contact for more information is also listed. Additional drill-thru
to teams and individuals on this measure is also available. When you
get to the individual worker level, data are displayed for the last eight
measurements (typically months). This permits easy identiﬁcation of
performance problems and enables quick intervention for remedial efforts or workload rebalancing.
The PMMS system also delivers management information reporting
that supports day-to-day operational management. For instance, there
is a “Medium High Caseload Report,” which identiﬁes units, teams,
or individuals with relatively high caseloads. The report assigns each
claim a status and weight, based on speciﬁc activities happening with
the claim. The system is designed to represent the amount of effort that
would typically be required for a case of that status. Management can
then work with this list to maintain more equitable ﬁle distribution and
resultant work effort.
The WCB of Nova Scotia reports that users indicate that the software tool is “intuitive and relevant to their work.” Eighty-ﬁve percent
of staff surveyed in 2002 indicated that they understood how they could
meet their personal performance targets. The board of directors has also
expressed a high level of satisfaction with the information they receive
monthly from the PMMS. The bottom line is that timeliness for ﬁrst
payment improved from 60.5 percent in May 2002 to 81.5 percent in
May 2003.
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WCB OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Another state-of-the-art performance measurement system is that
of the WCB of British Columbia. Their Web-based system is called
“Decision NET,” which was developed as a balanced scorecard system
operating through ordinary Web browsers. The Decision NET system
reports at the corporate level (complete with dashboard indicators) and
the divisional level, which in British Columbia includes assessments,
compensation, and prevention. This performance measurement system
follows more of a “top down” approach than that in Nova Scotia. In
fact, it was developed partly from an earlier key performance indicator
(KPI) system used by management at the WCB of British Columbia.
There are 15 performance measures included at the corporate executive view, with dashboard indicators for ﬁnancial, human resources,
operations, and customer perspectives. There are three indicators to
represent the ﬁnancial perspective, ﬁve indicators for the human resources perspective, four indicators for the operational perspective, and
three indicators for the customer perspective. Of course, one can drill
down for more detail within each broad area.
For example, in the ﬁnancial perspectives domain there are three
performance measures: 1) the unﬁnalled claims liability index, 2) administration expenses, and 3) surplus (deﬁcit) from operations. In
late 2003, two of these dashboard indicators were at acceptable levels
(green) and one was unacceptable (red). Against a budgeted deﬁcit of
$405.5 million year to date, actual performance was a deﬁcit of only
$13.9 million, resulting in a green dashboard indicator. A caption explains that if either the operating surplus (deﬁcit) or actual fund balance
are below budget for the year to date, the entire indicator is negative.
The fund balance showed an actual deﬁcit of $420.6 million against
a budgeted level of $812.2 million, so both measures were better than
budgeted and the dashboard indicator is green. The ﬁgure for last period
(previous year to date in this instance) is also reported for comparison
purposes. This provides a sense of the trend in the performance measure
which may be important in interpreting the indicator.
An unfavorable (red) dashboard indicator was shown for unﬁnalled
claims liability. As explained in a caption, claims costs were unfavorable due to higher incidence and older long-term disability claims than
planned. Older claims generally result in larger “catch-up” payments
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and, hence, higher average current costs for LTD claims. This unfavorable trend was not sufﬁciently offset by favorable trends in short-term
disability, health care, and vocational rehabilitation costs.
There are similar displays for the other performance measures in
the Decision NET system. Most indicators are reset monthly, but on different schedules according to the reporting cycle of the underlying data.
Thus, the entire reporting system is renewed monthly, but is not held
hostage to one late reporting number or one data veriﬁcation problem.
There are other performance measurement systems in the workers’
compensation universe that have very good reputations. These include
those of the New York WCB and the State Accident Insurance Fund of
Oregon. No doubt, private sector insurers have some sophisticated performance measurement systems as well. However, these two Canadian
systems illustrate the state of the art of performance measurement that
is possible today.
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
There is one additional measure that should be cited. The Ofﬁce of
Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) in the U.S. Department of
Labor has developed what may be the ultimate single outcome measure for a workers’ compensation agency. In response to the pressures
generated by the Government Performance and Results Act discussed
earlier, OWCP decided to measure production days lost due to workers’
compensation claims in the federal employing agencies, and to evaluate
OWCP performance in terms of reduction in average lost production
days.5
Lost production days may be the ultimate performance measure for
a workers’ compensation agency, because it represents both the incidence of claims and their duration. A reduction in lost production days
is clearly a good thing for both workers and employers.
This system was implemented originally as a way to track performance under the Quality Case Management program, a nurse case
management system designed to return long-term Federal Employees’
Compensation Act (FECA) claimants to employment. The average reduction in lost production days has been nearly 20 percent from 1997
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to 2004. Using this measurement to manage performance over time appears to have been very productive for those involved in the program.
This is demonstrated in the fact that the lost production day (LPD) measure was extended to the entire FECA program in ﬁscal year 2001. It
has subsequently been adopted under the President’s Safety, Health and
Return-to-Employment initiative for all federal employees for 2004–
2006. OWCP reports results on this and other performance measures by
agency on their Web site (http://www.dol-esa.gov/share/).
CONCLUSIONS
Performance measurement has clearly gained at least a tenuous
foothold within some workers’ compensation systems in North America. One gets the impression that the “state of the art” is better in Canada
than in the United States. But that impression could be mistaken; perhaps it results from the more competitive workers’ compensation environment in the United States, which leads insurers to think of performance measurement systems as a part of their competitive advantage.
This could lead in turn to a more secretive approach to these issues.
The performance measurement systems in Nova Scotia and British
Columbia are impressive. They incorporate multiple dimensions and
show considerable innovation in measuring very complex outcomes.
Nova Scotia’s PMMS seems particularly well suited to their objective
of bringing corporate goals into play at each worker’s desk. We look
forward to seeing how performance measurement might translate into
performance management over the next several years.
The benchmarking efforts in Australia, Canada, and the United
States also seem promising. The measures are generally appropriate
and cover many of the most important dimensions of workers’ compensation system performance. Benchmarking may represent an approach
that is closer to “the least common denominator” than to “state of the
art.” But one can certainly see how the knowledge that a system is lagging in performance behind its peers could be politically embarrassing.
It remains to be seen whether laggard performers will mount an effective effort to improve. This may depend more upon stakeholders’ attitudes than on the benchmarking results, but at least the benchmarking
can provide some impetus for change.
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On the other hand, there are also limits to the role of performance
measurement in workers’ compensation systems. First must come the
dictum that “what gets measured gets done.” To a large degree this is
true, especially if compensation or other personal beneﬁts are tied to
achievement of measured results. However, another question is, “what
is not measured?” It seems clear that concentration on achieving one
goal of complex systems like these will likely come at the expense of
other goals. It may not be evident immediately, but the time and energy
that goes into achieving the stated goal will be diverted from some activity with an unstated goal. This may or may not be a problem, but the
issue should be carefully examined to make sure that the net result is
not unintended.
Recent accounting scandals in private industry (Enron, Global
Crossing, etc.) show another danger of performance measurement.
Sometimes people cheat to make sure they achieve the goals. Measurement systems are only as good as the underlying data, and if anyone
has the incentive and the opportunity to inﬂate performance data for
personal advantage, it is a serious threat. The surprising aspect of recent
scandals is how few people it apparently takes to successfully corrupt a
performance measurement system.
The other question is, “what happens when things go bad?” The
savvy executive knows that is the time to change the performance measurement system. On the other hand, corporate and public governance
systems should be capable of dealing with this issue. Performance goals
must be realistic and achievable, or they will not motivate performance.
But this means they must reﬂect the underlying reality, and that reality
may change rapidly. So performance goals must also be ﬂexible.
Since forces like economic conditions, demographic trends, policy
changes, etc., are outside the control of workers’ compensation administrators, it is unfair to expect that their inﬂuence should be controlled
by management. Thus, it seems critical that some agreed upon process
for setting and modifying system goals be established. Otherwise, the
performance measurement system may come to be seen as simply an
apologist for management.
Finally, observers ask whether performance measurement is just
“the ﬂavor of the month?” This seems unlikely, since it is part of a much
broader trend in government, education, and private enterprise. But ultimately, performance measurement must be adopted by stakeholders
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as an important part of system management and governance if it is to
truly reach its promising potential. It is still early in the history of performance measurement in workers’ compensation; it remains to be seen
how much performance management it will lead to. We look forward to
watching this process unfold over the next several years.

Notes
Many thanks to Tim Schmidle, Karen Roberts, and Terry Bogyo for reading and critiquing an earlier draft of this paper. All errors remaining are the responsibility of the
author.
1.
2.
3.
4.

See http://www2.icma.org/CPMParticipants/ for current list.
See http://www.worklossdata.com.
See http://www.awcbc.org/english/board_data.asp.
The published version of the report also includes New Zealand, the Australian
Capital Territory (ACT) system, the Seacare system, and the Comcare system for
Australian government employees.
5. It should be noted that OWCP maintains a number of other performance measures that are not covered here. See U.S. Department of Labor (2004).
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7
The Structure of and
Incentives from Workers’
Compensation Pricing
Karen Roberts
Michigan State University

Workers’ compensation was originally designed to deal with an aspect of the employment relationship, that of work-related illness and
injury. As such, it is viewed as a transaction between two primary stakeholders, the employer and the employee. Examination of the pricing of
workers’ compensation requires a shift in orientation. In addition to the
employee–employer interaction, the transaction in pricing is also between the employer and the insurer. As is the case in the employee–employer relationship, the two parties have somewhat different interests
with respect to the purchase of insurance. Unlike the literature that examines the injury, beneﬁt, and return to work, where the interests of the
employer and insurer are treated as coinciding, examination of workers’
compensation pricing is often modeled as a principal–agent problem
where information imperfections distort behavioral incentives (Dionne
and Harrington 1992).1 Principal–agent refers to conditions when one
party, the principal, either because of a lack of skills or for reasons of
cost, contracts with another party, the agent, to perform a particular
function. The principal–agent problem arises because the principal is
unable, due to costs or other factors, to perfectly monitor the agent.
The problem facing the principal is how to structure incentives for the
agent to perform the function in the absence of complete monitoring
(Sappington 1991).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how workers’ compensation prices are determined, the incentives embedded in that pricing
process, in what ways the employer and insurer perspectives coincide
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and where they diverge, and the policy implications of the different
perspectives.
Much of the literature about workers’ compensation pricing is
framed in terms of its effect on workplace safety. The theoretical framework is based on commonly made economic assumptions about rationality and utility maximization (Thomason 2003). As is the case with
most positive economic models, actor behavior can be understood in
terms of a response to beneﬁts and costs (Ehrenberg and Smith 2003).
Workers’ compensation is sometimes described as a payroll tax. Employers are seen as trading off between the cost of providing safety and
the cost of insurance in the form of workers’ compensation premium.
Similar to unemployment insurance, the cost of workers’ compensation
insurance is designed to vary with the employer’s use of the insurance,
and can thus be seen as lowering the relative cost of safety and providing an incentive to maintain a safer workplace. Employers are therefore
seen as engaging in a cost-minimization strategy.
In contrast to unemployment insurance, however, the actor that generates the safety incentive is a proﬁt-maximizing insurer rather than a
welfare-maximizing government. Examination of the incentives to insurers shows that the loss-minimizing strategy insurers use is designed
to minimize uncertainty around losses rather than minimizing the losses
themselves. Economic theory suggests that the workers’ compensation
bargain is voluntarily entered into and results in a mutually welfare enhancing arrangement (McCluskey 1998). One question raised in this
chapter is whether that is true given the nature of the objective functions
of employers and insurers.
The next section of this chapter includes a brief description of how
workers’ compensation prices are determined. Subsequent sections discuss the incentives embedded in the price determination process and
the research that examines the effectiveness of those behavioral incentives.
PREMIUM DETERMINATION IN WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
Premium determination in workers’ compensation is a several-step
process, and states vary in the degree to which they regulate the various
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steps. Up until the early 1980s, most states used what is called administered pricing to determine workers’ compensation rates. Under administered pricing, states fully regulate prices by issuing basic rates
and allowable adjustments that all carriers in the state must use, including the state fund if there is one. Over the past 20 years, many states
have deregulated the pricing process to varying degrees (Thomason,
Schmidle, and Burton 2001, pp. 39–41). Some states permit carriers to
deviate from the basic rates, although these deviations must be applied
uniformly across policyholders, and some states permit carriers to set
their basic rates independently rather than as a deviation from the state
issued rates. Additionally, various states permit carriers to use schedule
credits (or debits), which are percentage adjustments to premium that
can be applied to individual insurance purchasers and do not have to be
offered to all customers. At a minimum, all states require that carriers
ﬁle their rating plans with the state insurance bureau, but some differ in
their policies on whether a carrier must wait for state approval before
using their ﬁled rates. For example, ﬁle-and-use states permit carriers to
use rates as soon as they have been ﬁled with the state bureau, whereas
use-and-ﬁle states permit carriers to use rates prior to ﬁling. Others require a waiting period to permit the bureau to review the rating plan.
All production activity in the workplace is divided into rating classiﬁcations (McGavin 2001). Most states use the classiﬁcation system
devised by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI),
which includes over 600 categories. These categories or class codes are
a mix of industry and occupation that are intended to be homogenous
with respect to risk. Employers are assigned to these class codes based
on their payroll. Class assignment is proportional to payroll distribution.
In each state, a base rate is associated with each of these class codes,
expressed in terms of dollars per hundred dollars of payroll. These base
rates are developed by rating organizations that collect loss and expense
data from insurers, incorporate trend estimates (possibly including a
claim adjustment expense factor) and generate rates that are meant to
equal expected losses across the state in each of these rating categories
(Parry and Math 1993). Workers’ compensation is unique among insurance lines in that all insurers in a state are required to be members
of the rating organization (Carroll and Kaestner 1995). There is variation across states in what is included in these base rates. These rates
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are referred to as pure premium if they reﬂect only expected losses. In
some states, factors to include loss adjustment expenses are added in
to generate what are called loss cost rates. In other states, a proﬁt loading is applied that includes underwriting expenses, commissions and
proﬁts, creating what are termed advisory rates (Thomason, Schmidle,
and Burton 2001, p. 61). These can be thought of as fully developed
manual rates.
In regulated states, the rating organization submits these rates to an
insurance bureau or other state agency responsible for insurance industry regulation for approval. This can be a politically charged process
as the insurance bureaus are responsible for assuring both statewide
insurance industry solvency and employer access to insurance, and may
fail to approve rates which the rating organization views as adequate on
behalf of its members (Danzon and Harrington 1998). In administered
pricing states, once these base rates are approved they become the manual rates all carriers in the state are required to use, with the exception
of some states where carriers may apply for approval of an across-theboard deviation. In open competition states, the rating organization is
responsible for generating pure premium, loss cost, or advisory rates for
insurance commissioner approval. Once approved, these rates become
the basis for carriers to independently develop their own manual rates.
In open competition states, manual rates are an aspect of price on which
carriers can compete for business. Each employer’s manual premium
is equal to the manual rate for the class code multiplied by employer
payroll in that class code divided by 100.
The next step in the pricing process is experience rating. There are
two prevailing descriptions of the purpose of experience rating. One
that comes primarily from the insurer perspective is that it is “a procedure that utilizes the individual risk’s past loss experience to forecast future losses. It is an effort to modify the ratemaking process by
recognizing an individual risk’s potential for incurring claims” (Parry
and Math 1993, p. 658). The other description is framed in terms of
providing safety incentives to employers where employers are viewed
as responding to an economic incentive to operate a safe workplace:
“To the extent that a ﬁrm’s own injury experience is reﬂected in its
premium, there is an induced incentive for it to consider investing in
safety. If its injuries fall, so will its workers’ compensation premium”
(Smith 1993, p. I-152). The distinction between the two descriptions

Roberts.indb 174

6/7/2005 9:29:17 AM

Workers’ Compensation Pricing 175

is that one emphasizes accurate prediction of future losses in order to
collect sufﬁcient premium, while the other emphasizes safety-related
behavior incentives.
Most states use a standard formula developed by NCCI, although
some states permit carriers to develop their own. The basic formula for
the experience modiﬁcation factor is (Chelius and Smith 1993):
Xj = (Apj + Wj Aej + (1 − Wj ) Eej + Bj) / (Ei + Bj) ,
where Apj = ﬁrm j’s actual primary losses; Aej = ﬁrm j’s actual excess
losses; Eej = expected excess losses for a ﬁrm of j’s payroll size in industry i; Ei = the total expected losses for a ﬁrm of j’s payroll size in
industry i (is equal to the sum of expected primary losses and expected
excess losses); and Wj = is a weighting factor theoretically ranging between 0 and 1 that determines how much weight to give to a ﬁrm’s own
losses (Gillam 1995). The smaller the ﬁrm, the smaller Wj is. Bj = ballast
factor that moves inversely with Wj .
Actual and expected losses are calculated over a three-year period.
It is frequently noted that the experience modiﬁcation formula gives
more weight to frequency than severity of injury and that the smaller
the ﬁrm, the less self-rated it is. The weighting of frequency above severity is accomplished by the separation of losses into actual primary
and excess losses. Actual primary losses are equal to actual losses but
capped at $5,000. Losses over that amount are included but weighted
by ﬁrm size. The addition of a ballast factor in both the numerator and
denominator reduces the effect of experience rating for smaller ﬁrms
such that they tend to pay as though they had experienced losses equal
to the industry average. Larger ﬁrms, on the other hand, face a premium
that is adjusted to more closely reﬂect their true loss experience. The
W factor is termed ﬁrm credibility and refers to the degree to which a
ﬁrm’s loss history can be relied upon to predict future losses. Loss histories of larger ﬁrms have greater predictive value than smaller ﬁrms so
W varies with payroll (Parry and Math 1993). There have been several
revisions to the experience rating formula that truncated the true range
for W. For example, in Michigan, the possible range for W is between
0.04 to 0.8 (Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan 2004).
The experience modiﬁcation factor, Xj, is multiplied by the manual pre-
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mium to calculate the ﬁrm’s modiﬁed, or standard earned, premium
(McGavin 2001).
There are several other adjustments that can be made to premium.
The most common include premium discounts, schedule credits (or
debits), and allowance for deductibles. Actual premium may also be
adjusted by dividend payments after the close of the policy period;
however, in states that permit ex ante adjustments, evidence suggests
that the use of dividends is declining (Yates and Burton 2003, p. 3).
Premium discounts are essentially volume discounts and depend on the
level of premium generated. In most states, carriers that offer premium
discounts are required to apply them uniformly across policyholders.
Schedule credits (debits) are percentage reductions (increases) applied to modiﬁed premium. These are considered an underwriting tool
in that they allow carriers to adjust premium based on information
about expected losses that they do not believe is captured by modiﬁed premium. In particular, schedule credits or debits give insurers a
mechanism for rewarding employers for improved safety or penalizing
for deteriorating safety conditions more rapidly than experience rating
permits. Their use also acts as a mechanism for carriers to compete for
business on the basis of price.
There are two types of deductible programs, small and large deductible policies. Their use varies by state but nearly all states allow for
the use of one or both types of policy. Both types of deductible policy
can be seen as a form of “co-insurance” in that they involve explicit
sharing of the risk of injury between the insurer and employer (Arrow
1971). Under small deductible policies, employers pay an initial $500 to
$2,500 per claim. States vary as to whether they include the deductible
amounts in a ﬁrm’s loss history. Large deductibles range from between
$100,000 to $5 million per accident (Shields, Lu, and Oswalt 1999).
INCENTIVES TO EMPLOYERS
The basic framework for understanding incentives to employers begins with the production cost-minimization framework. Injuries impose
production costs in the form of lost productivity and perhaps lost human
capital investment. Injury costs can be reduced by employer investment
in safety, and employers use the efﬁciency condition such that they
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invest in safety up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt equals the
marginal cost. The beneﬁt of safety is foregone injury and the cost is an
investment cost in equipment, training, or other safety measures. Workers’ compensation beneﬁts are seen as increasing the costs of injuries to
employers and thus decreasing the relative cost of safety (Boden 1995).
To the extent that employers bear the costs of those workers’ compensation beneﬁts, they will be motivated to invest in safety. The next section
discusses the incentives to employers embedded in the various components of workers’ compensation premium determination.
Manual Rates
Arguably there are safety incentives for employers embedded in
the determination of manual rates (Burton and Chelius 1997). Those
rates are determined by the losses experienced by the state’s employers.
Better statewide loss histories result in lower manual rates. The use of
manual rates as a safety incentive is diluted, however, by free-rider effects, where safer employers subsidize more risky ones who enjoy the
lower manual rates without incurring safety costs (Burton and Chelius
1997). Further, it is unlikely that employers understand the possible
link between their individual safety records and statewide manual rates
(Roberts 2003). There is little research on the effect of manual rates on
employer safety behavior. Durbin and Butler (1998) perform national
and state-level analyses that separate the effects of manual rates, experience rating, small and large deductibles and OSHA on fatality rates.
Using national data, they report that a 10 percent increase in manual
rates would lead to a 0.6 percent decrease in fatalities, suggesting that
poor understanding and/or issues of cross subsidies undermine potential manual rate safety incentives.
Firm-Level Experience Rating
There is a considerable research literature on the effects of experience rating on employer behavior. Existing studies fall into two broad
categories: 1) those that use ﬁrm size as a proxy for degree of experience rating, and 2) those that examine the effect of experience rating on
fatalities.
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Firm size–beneﬁt interaction studies
The theory underlying the ﬁrm-size studies is based on moral hazard that arises due to information asymmetries in workers’ compensation. Two sorts are considered in the literature: 1) ex ante “risk-bearing”
moral hazard, where employees reduce their safety efforts because the
cost of injury has decreased due to workers’ compensation beneﬁts; and
2) ex post “reporting” moral hazard, where employees know the true
nature of their injuries, such as whether the injury is truly work-related, how serious it is, and/or whether it genuinely is preventing return
to work, but employers do not (Bolduc et al. 2001; Durbin and Butler 1998). As a result, as beneﬁt levels increase, workers’ compensation claims and/or duration will rise due to both types of moral hazard
(Krueger 1990). For the ﬁrm, therefore, beneﬁt increases raise the marginal savings from injury prevention efforts as long as costs are passed
back to ﬁrms in a form such as experience rating (Chelius and Smith
1983). The ﬁrm size–beneﬁt studies make use of the feature of the experience rating formula that increases the degree of sensitivity to the
ﬁrm’s own loss experience directly with payroll. Therefore, ﬁrm size is
treated as a proxy measure for the level of experience rating.
Other than one of the earliest studies by Chelius and Smith (1983)
that failed to ﬁnd support for an experience-rating effect using the beneﬁt–ﬁrm size interaction, most studies using this approach do ﬁnd support for experience rating as a mechanism for reducing claims rates.
Ruser (1985) uses data from 25 three-digit manufacturing industries
over the 1972–1979 period to test for the beneﬁt-ﬁrm size interaction
on both frequency and severity of injury. His evidence supports the experience rating effect on the frequency of injury but not for severity. In
a later study using establishment data, Ruser (1991) ﬁnds strong statistical support for the ﬁrm-size effect on injury rates that is robust to
several different estimation approaches.
Worrall and Butler (1988) also examine the effect of beneﬁt increases framed as result of two countervailing forces: 1) the employee effect,
where higher beneﬁts raise claims costs; and 2) the employer effect,
where employers invest in safety to reduce claim costs. They note that
if ﬁrms were perfectly experience rated, workers would be indifferent
between buying their own insurance and a wage adjustment that reﬂects
the compensating wage differential but that reality is plagued with in-
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formation failures. Using two-stage least-squares estimation, they estimate the effects wages (result of stage one regression), expected beneﬁt
levels, ﬁrm size, beneﬁts and ﬁrm size squared and the interaction of the
two on permanent partial, temporary total, and all indemnity claims.2
The sign on the ﬁrm size–beneﬁt interaction is negative as they expected, but is not statistically signiﬁcant in the temporary total beneﬁt claim
regression. In a separate study (Butler and Worrall 1988), they examine
the effect of experience rating on claim duration using ﬁrm size as their
indicator of experience rating. Estimating hazard rates, they ﬁnd that
the ﬁrm size coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant, but when used to calculate elasticity, they ﬁnd that the elasticity of duration with respect to
experience rating is substantively small.
Chelius and Smith (1993) take advantage of a unique feature of the
Washington State workers’ compensation system, which in addition to
conventional experience rating also offers small ﬁrms a supplemental
experience-rating credit if there are no compensable losses during the
rating period. Their prediction is that if experience rating is providing
safety behavior incentives, small ﬁrms in Washington will have lower
injury rates than small ﬁrms in other states. The experience rating credit was measured using a dummy variable for the state of Washington.
Their results did not support their hypothesis. Arguably, their measure
of small ﬁrm credit was too imprecise and captured countervailing effects.
Fatality Rate Studies
As noted above, one of the difﬁculties in measuring the effect of
experience rating on employer safety behavior is the countervailing
effect of beneﬁts on employee claim propensities. The use of fatality
rates as an indicator of safety efforts is thought to be free of the effect
of both types of moral hazard (Moore and Viscusi 1989). For the most
part, studies using this approach ﬁnd support for a safety effect from
experience rating. Moore and Viscusi (1989) use data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics and the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health to estimate the effect of workers’ compensation beneﬁts on fatality rates. They use the ﬁrm size–beneﬁt generosity measure
of experience rating described in the studies above. They ﬁnd a large
negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect of their measure of experi-
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ence rating on fatality rates. Using the same data, they also investigate
the extent to which premium costs are passed back to employees in
the form of lower wages. They ﬁnd evidence of positive compensating wage differentials but also that higher wage workers are somewhat
more likely to pay for the costs of their beneﬁts. These results indicate
that employers enjoy a substantial savings in labor costs by improving
safety because much of the cost of safety improvement is ﬁnanced by
employees in the form of lower wages.
Taking advantage of natural experiment presented by the introduction of experience rating in Ontario, Bruce and Atkins (1993) examine
the effect of experience rating on fatality rates over a 10-year period.
Experience rating is measured by a dummy variable, and industry was
the unit of observation. Their results suggest that experience rating in
the forestry and construction industries (those subject to experience rating under the Ontario system) led to a permanent (that is, long-run equilibrium) decrease in fatalities in those industries. Further, they found
that the magnitude reduced the fatality rate by 20–40 percent.
After providing descriptive evidence that workplace safety was improving despite increases in workers’ compensation costs, Durbin and
Butler (1998) examine the effect of several features of insurance pricing on fatalities. They ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant effect of experience
rating on the national fatality rate: a 10 percent increase in the cost of
experience rating will lead to a 12.3 percent reduction in the number of
fatalities.
Potential Weaknesses of the Experience-Rating Studies
There are several potential difﬁculties with the ﬁrm size–beneﬁt interaction approach. One is that the countervailing effect of increased
employee claiming may overwhelm empirical evidence of experiencerating effects (Lanoie 1992). The strength of the empirical results suggests that employee efforts may reduce estimates of experience-rating
effects, but they do not eliminate them, thus complicating efforts to
estimate the magnitude of the effect of experience rating on safety.
A related difﬁculty is the application of the prevailing assumption
about the functioning of reporting moral hazard—that is, that workers’ claiming rates increase with beneﬁt levels. More recent evidence
suggests that there is signiﬁcant underclaiming on the part of injured
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workers and that the replacement rate is weakly related to claim behavior (Biddle and Roberts 2003; Shannon and Lowe 2002). This research
suggests that there may be countervailing effects other than safety that
mitigate against reporting moral hazard.
A third difﬁculty is determining the true employer safety behaviors in response to experience rating. While the evidence suggests that
claims rates do decrease with experience rating, claims rates may decrease due to increased safety investments by employers or by claims
management (Thomason 2003). While claims management may entail
positive strategies for keeping an injured worker able to work, such as
accommodation or rehabilitation, there is also potential for less positive behaviors, such as retaliation for claiming or disputing legitimate
claims (Thomason 2003). There is some evidence that experience-rated
employers are more likely to dispute claims, though without the ability
to measure claim legitimacy, it is not clear that employers are engaging
in that behavior (Hyatt and Kralj 1995). In a study of employer response
to experience rating, Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) investigate the
extent to which employers engage in safety investment and/or positive
claims management (accommodation, rehabilitation, and monitoring
worker recovery). They ﬁnd that experience rating leads to more of
both safety investment and claims management but that larger ﬁrms are
more likely to use safety over claims management.
A fourth difﬁculty arises out of the complexity of the experiencerating formula itself. Arguably, it is sufﬁciently complex that few employers truly understand the incentives embedded within it (Kralj 1994;
Roberts 2003; Spieler 1994). Evidence suggests that the better the ﬁrm
understands the experience-rating formula, the more likely there will be
a safety response, and that understanding increases with ﬁrm size (Kralj
1994). This suggests that understanding may be a mediator between
experience rating and safety.
Another difﬁculty is speciﬁc to the fatality approach. While the evidence from the fatality rate studies is compelling, the question remains
as to whether those results can be safely generalized to the ability of
experience rating to reduce the likelihood of nonfatal injuries. These
studies appear to implicitly assume that the probability distribution underlying fatal injuries is the same as that for nonfatal. While this may
be true in some workplaces, 46.1 percent of lost-time claims in 1999
were sprains, strains, or repetitive motion injuries (U.S. Bureau of La-
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bor Statistics 2001), injury types that are unlikely to ever result in death
in the extreme. This suggests that results from the fatality studies might
be generalizeable to prevention of traumatic injuries such as cuts and
lacerations but not to injury rates in general.
Finally, none of these studies actually include a direct measure of
the experience-rating modiﬁcation factor and have to rely on proxies
for it, either a ﬁrm-size measure or a dummy variable. It is quite possible that those measures are capturing other, unobserved factors that
affect injury rates and severity.
Other Adjustments
The preponderance of the research on incentives to employers has
revolved around experience rating, however; two studies examine the
role of deductibles. After a period of rapid growth in workers’ compensation costs during the 1980s, use of large deductible policies increased
beginning in the early 1990s (Danzon and Harrington 1998). One study
examined the question of whether the use of large deductibles generated incentives for employers to prevent injuries. Taking advantage of
a unique research opportunity in Texas, where the use of large deductibles was permitted a year before self-insurance legislation was enacted,
Shields et al. (1999) used ﬁrm-level data to examine whether permitting
deductibles lowered claims rates and claim costs. Their results showed
an immediate effect on claim costs, which dropped by 12 percent during the ﬁrst year after the introduction of large deductible policies. Decreases in claims rates did not appear until the third year. One possible
weakness in their study, which they mention but do not address, is that
there is likely selection bias due to more risky ﬁrms electing to purchase
large deductible policies. They also do not discuss what effect the availability of self-insurance a year after the start of their observation period
might have had on their sample. However, their results are consistent
with those found by Durbin and Butler (1998), who ﬁnd that small and
large deductibles decrease fatality rates by 3.2 percent and 10 percent,
respectively.
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INSURER PERSPECTIVE
The insurer perspective is commonly modeled as a resource allocation problem, where insurers need to determine the optimal insurance
contract. Under the assumption of insurer risk neutrality, the optimal
contract is adequate to covering a risk if the policy price is set equal
to the expected indemnity plus a loading factor. There are several obstacles to setting this contract, speciﬁcally, moral hazard, adverse selection, and regulation (Dionne and Harrington 1992).
Moral hazard, as is the case in its application to claiming behavior,
is an artifact of information asymmetry. Again, there are two types of
moral hazard, ex ante and ex post. In this context, opportunities for ex
ante moral hazard arises because although the insurer can observe that
an accident occurred, it can not observe what safety efforts were made
to avoid it. The two possible solutions to this are to either provide incomplete coverage against loss or for the insurer to perfectly observe
whether the risk is taking care. Only if the latter condition holds is full
coverage optimal (Shavell 1979).
Ex post moral hazard refers to understanding of the true nature of
the accident once it occurs. In most insurance contracts, it is assumed
that the insured fully understands the extent of the damage but the insurer does not, and, again, it is costly for the insurer to collect that information. In the context of workers’ compensation, this sort of moral
hazard is complicated by the employee’s ability to incompletely disclose the extent of the injury. Adverse selection is also a problem of
imperfect information. Resources are misallocated because the insured
has no incentive to reveal the true extent of risk and it is expensive for
the insurer to observe it (Dionne 1983).
These difﬁculties with setting the optimal insurance contract provide the logic for three structural features of insurance premium: 1) the
creation of risk classes, 2) the use of experience rating, and 3) partial
coverage (or deductibles) (Dionne 1983). Because workers’ compensation insurance pricing is regulated, another aspect of the discussion of
the optimal insurance contract is how regulation prevents optimality
and the unwanted consequences of regulation.
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Features of Premium Adjustment
As noted in the description of how premium is determined, manual
premium is calculated based on how the ﬁrm’s payroll is distributed
across rating classes, that is, categories of work activities. The use of
rate classiﬁcations is one mechanism insurers can use to prevent ex ante
moral hazard: although the insurer may not be able to perfectly observe
safety efforts on the part of the insured, it can approximate risk by classifying the ﬁrm’s activities and use market average risk levels for each
category to estimate expected losses for the future. Using the argument
that to the extent that ﬁrms are less able to engage in ex ante moral
hazard, workplaces will be safer, Lanoie (1992) examined the effect
of the number of risk classes on the frequency and severity of injury.
The coefﬁcients for the number of rating classes were negative but not
statistically signiﬁcant in the frequency models, and positive and signiﬁcant in the severity model. These results failed to support his expectation that greater insurer ex ante ability to observe true risk, as implied
by the ability to assign payroll to detailed rate classes, should reduce
the frequency and severity of claims because it is harder for insureds to
engage in moral hazard.
Experience rating is used to deal with adverse selection, where
ﬁrms know how risky their workplace is but insurers do not (Gal and
Landsberger 1988). From the insurer perspective, experience rating is
functioning well when standard loss ratios (ratio of losses to standard
premium) are the same across a recognized risk group (Harrington
1988). In practical terms, this refers to best predicting a risk’s loss for
the coming policy period (Sherman 1990). This could be accomplished
by manual rates if the risk class were truly homogeneous such that all
employers with payroll within each class code maintained equally safe
workplaces, but in reality ﬁrms are heterogeneous even within rating
classes, necessitating additional adjustments.
This perspective on experience rating puts its emphasis on collecting sufﬁcient premium, not on the provision of safety incentives to employers. From the insurer’s perspective, one of the problems with full
coverage is that the insured has no motivation to avoid loss and thus
will shift all costs of risk to the insurer. For the employer, avoiding loss
translates into implementing safety measures, thus incurring costs of
safety. Assuming that employers want to minimize costs, they will want
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to minimize accidents to the extent that the cost of the losses are passed
back to them. However, for the insurer, the key problem is knowing in
advance (ex ante) how large the loss will be so they can price accordingly. The size of the prospective loss is not the issue for the insurer, but
rather ex ante information about the size of the expected loss. In other
words, employers are motivated to minimize loss in order to minimize
operating costs, whereas insurers want to minimize uncertainty about
the size of the prospective loss.
There are two broad threads in the insurer perspective literature on
experience rating: 1) the development of theoretical models that examine the assumptions and conditions under which experience rating generates an optimal contract, and 2) empirical examination of the ways in
which the application of experience rating is distorted either by features
of the formula itself or through regulation.
The theoretical discussion notes that the way experience rating is
incorporated into insurance contracts is based on the Law of the Iterated Logarithm. When applied to the insurance contract, this law provides an understanding of insurance as a set of multi-period contracts.
Repeated observation over the length of the relationship approximates
perfect observation, thus eliminating the opportunity for moral hazard
(Dionne 1983; Dionne and Harrington 1992).
One model suggests that repeated contracts are not necessary for optimality. According to this model, at the end of each period, the insurer
offers a contract where premium paid at the end of the period depends
on the number of claims submitted until then (Gal and Landsberger
1988). Insureds know that the premium will depend on the number of
claims submitted by the end of the period and so recognize there is some
uncertainty about the premium since they do not know in advance what
their claims rate will be. Thus, uncertainty is shared; but, by paying
premium that reﬂects actual claims made in the last period at the start of
the next period, the contract allows for the eventual coverage of losses.
The model requires the insured to renew the contract and that losses be
accurately reported. The former requirement is probably reasonably accurate for workers’ compensation where insurance is compulsory, but
problems with injury underreporting in workers’ compensation suggest
that the latter assumption cannot be made safely.
The less theoretical work examining the effect of experience rating
examines the accuracy of the formula in adjusting premium so that poli-
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cyholders with equal risk produce equal expected loss ratios (Parry and
Math 1993). Several criticisms have been leveled against the standard
(NCCI) experience rating formula, including 1) a lack of precision in
incorporating the tendency for larger ﬁrms to have lower loss ratios that
result in insufﬁcient manual rates, potentially resulting in availability
problems for small ﬁrms (Harrington 1988); 2) a tendency to obscure
commonality within a risk class (the argument here seems to be that experience rating permits overly heterogeneous risks to be included in one
rating class through the process of off-balancing); and 3) an inability
to adequately handle shifts in ﬁrm ownership that change the underlying riskiness (Parry and Math 1993). Revisions of the standard experience-rating formula in 1993 and again in 1997–1998 along with the
use of additional adjustments such as schedule credits, were designed
to ameliorate these problems (Compensation Advisory Organization of
Michigan 2004; Gillam 1995). In addition, the most recent revision of
the formula reduced the effect of medical-only claims on the experience
modiﬁcation factor (Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan
1998). Again, the reason for this change can be interpreted in two ways.
For the employer, this revision arguably provides an incentive to either
keep injured workers at work or return them before the waiting period
expires. However, for the carrier, a medical-only claim has more predictable future losses, that is, less uncertainty.
THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION
Pricing in the insurance industry is heavily regulated, and because
coverage is required for nearly all employers, workers’ compensation
pricing is more regulated than most other lines (Carroll 1993). Over
the past 20 years, however, pricing in workers’ compensation has undergone signiﬁcant reform so that 37 states have enacted some form
of open competition since the early 1980s (Thomason, Schmidle, and
Burton 2001 p. 42). However, even under open competition, some regulation in the form of rate approval is often required (Hunt, Krueger, and
Burton 1988; Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton 2001). The mandate of
the state insurance bureaus is to assure insurer solvency, rate affordability, rate fairness, and universal access (Carroll and Kaestner 1995).
Typically, workplace safety is not part of the insurance bureau portfo-
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lio unless the claims portion of the state regulatory structure is housed
there. One of the questions investigated with respect to the effects of
regulation in workers’ compensation is the extent to which it creates
cross-subsidies that damage both employer and insurer incentives.
One reason that regulation can be thought of as a barrier to the
optimal insurance contract is due to the regulatory objectives, which
include both a healthy insurance market and affordable rates consistent with a positive economic development climate, and thus require a
balancing of competing interests. If, through regulation, insurance bureaus set rates and permit adjustments that are actuarially fair, then the
optimal contract will be possible (Schmidle 1995). However, political
pressures from employers to lower rates or from insurers to raise them
can distort contract incentives and threaten either of the core regulatory
objectives.
Typically, there are two primary forms of rate regulation: 1) limit
the percentage experience modiﬁcation factors applied to class rates;
and 2) restrict the class rates themselves (Harrington and Danzon 2000).
As described earlier, in every state, the rating organization issues basic
manual rates (e.g., pure premium, loss cost, or advisory rates). In theory, the rating organization is submitting rates that reﬂect state average
expected losses in each rating class and are actuarially fair. In regulated
states, these rates go to the insurance commissioner for approval before
being issued for carrier use. In open competition states, carriers use
these as guidelines but ﬁle their own rates. In principle, each carrier’s
rates reﬂect its own underwriting experience, cost structure, and marketing strategy.
That regulation is beneﬁcial rests on two arguments. One is that
government may possess information either not available to the parties
or that would be inefﬁciently costly for each party to uncover for itself,
such as insurer solvency or workplace safety. Because of the cost of
acquiring that information, data collection and distribution in the form
of rates is treated as a public good. The second is a welfare argument
that insurance access is important, even if its guarantee involves some
inefﬁciencies (Carroll and Kaestner 1995).
There are several reasons, however, why regulation may be undesirable. Because rate regulation is partially a political process, there may
be pressure to suppress overall rates in the name of economic competitiveness. Further, some employers may be more able to inﬂuence
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the regulatory process leading to the suppression of some rates and a
possible compensating inﬂation of others (Carroll and Kaestner 1995).
In addition, it is sometimes argued that the insurance bureau becomes
“captive” of the insurance industry and excessively raises rates (Harrington 1984).
A primary criticism of regulation is its potential for generating inequitable and welfare reducing cross-subsidies (Danzon and Harrington
1998). The research on possible cross-subsidies argues that regulation
results in subsidies from safer to more risky employers, often in the
form of cost shifting from the residual to the voluntary market. The
central premise to the cross-subsidy discussion is that if rate regulation
results in rates that are insufﬁcient relative to claims costs, distortions
will occur that will in fact lead to even greater cost growth (Danzon and
Harrington 1998).
Noting that the insurance market is segmented into two portions,
the voluntary market and the residual market, one premise that underpins this discussion is that the larger the residual market share, the more
troubled the state’s insurance market. All states except those that are
exclusive state funds have a residual, or assigned risk, market. Risks
that fail to meet the underwriting standards of the voluntary market, are
uniquely dangerous, have no loss experience, have had a recent signiﬁcant loss, or have a loss experience that lacks credibility are typically
insured in the residual market. To some extent, the boundary between
the two markets is ﬂuid. To the extent that rates are suppressed below
actual expected losses in the voluntary market, insurers will be unwilling to insure some of the less safe ﬁrms at the margin, forcing them into
the residual market. In most states, a cohort of servicing carriers writes
the policies and pays the claim but does not bear the underwriting risk
in the residual market. Rather, losses incurred in the residual market
are shared out among the voluntary market carriers according to each
carrier’s share of the state’s premium.
It is this sharing out process that creates the most common form of
cross-subsidy (Danzon and Harrington 1998). To the extent that regulation suppresses rates in the residual market in order to assure access to
coverage for those ﬁrms in the assigned risk pool, aggregate residual
market premium will not cover the actual losses along with expenses
and fees, generating an excess loss that needs to be capitalized into
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premium for those insured in the voluntary market (Kwon and Grace
1996).
Regulators have several different tools for manipulating rates in
the residual market, including price differential programs (employers
charged a ﬁxed percentage higher than comparable risks in the voluntary market); risk-adjustment programs (ARAP, or Assigned Risk Adjustment Programs, where employers in the residual market are surcharged up to 49 percent of base premiums); restrict residual market
access (where employers are denied residual market coverage if they
have refused any voluntary market carrier’s legitimate rating plan); removal of premium discount plans (employers in the residual market
cannot receive premium discounts even if they would qualify in the voluntary market); and take-out credit programs (where voluntary insurers
receive credits for offering residual market ﬁrms the same coverage
for at least one policy period). Each of these tools acts as a ceiling on
residual market rates (Kwon and Grace 1996). Additional variations in
the structures of residual market prices include the use of loss-sensitive
rating plans that enhance the effect of the individual employer’s loss
history, and additional surcharges on employers in the pool (Thomason,
Schmidle, and Burton 2001, p. 338).
As residual market losses are passed back to the voluntary market,
costs in the voluntary market are expected to increase, and safety in the
workplace is expected to deteriorate for several reasons. One is that as
premium in the voluntary market increases due to the residual market
losses, the larger and safer ﬁrms in the voluntary market will self-insure, leaving the less safe in the voluntary market where costs will increase (Danzon and Harrington 1998). This can become a vicious circle
if regulation of voluntary market rates does not adjust to take this into
account, leading to the more marginal employers in the voluntary market being forced into the residual market. During the 1980s, the markets
in several states, notably Maine, Rhode Island, and Louisiana, were
caught in this cycle that ended with an inordinately large share of the
workers’ compensation market in the assigned risk pool, creating true
crises for workers’ compensation in their states (Thomason, Schmidle,
and Burton 2001). According to this view of market dynamics, both the
size of the gap between premium and expected losses and uncertainty
about what that will be lead to a reduction in supply of insurance in the
voluntary market, leading to an availability problem and higher rates.
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This cycle not only creates availability problems but also dilutes
safety incentives. Because regulated premium in the residual market
does not correspond to expected losses, those in the residual market
will lose the incentive to invest in safety, increasing their loss rates.
Again, because these costs are passed to the voluntary market, the cycle
described above will be triggered.
Several forms of cross-subsidies are possible, but in all cases, safer
employers are subsidizing riskier ones. If all rate class prices are suppressed, those employers in the residual market will be subsidized by
those in the same rate class in the voluntary market, as described above.
This subsidy will worsen as the higher risk employers are forced into
the residual market and the lowest risk employers go to self-insurance,
leaving the middle risk employers to subsidize the riskiest. If regulation varies across rate classes, those with payroll in the suppressed rate
classes will be subsidized by those in the other classes, whose rates will
have increased so that total premium will, on average, cover total losses
(Danzon and Harrington 1998).
Because cross-subsidization is difﬁcult to observe, the empirical
work examines the broader predictions of these models. Danzon and
Harrington (1988) examine the effect of rate regulation on total and
indemnity loss growth using three measures of regulation: 1) lagged
residual market share, 2) lagged ﬁled to approved rate ratio, and 3)
lagged underwriting margin for the ﬁled to approved rate ratio. Their
results show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
residual market share and loss growth but do not support such a relationship for the other, more direct, measures of regulation. However,
using a different speciﬁcation, they do ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects of the
lagged ﬁled to approved rate ratio on total loss growth (Harrington and
Danzon 2000).
While these results do suggest that regulation adversely affects loss
growth, they do not necessarily indicate the presence of cross-subsidies. As an alternative test for cross-subsidies, Danzon and Harrington
(1998) develop a model of political inﬂuence, which predicts that if
regulation of rates is the outgrowth of political inﬂuence, patterns of
rate suppression should persist over time. Using data from 150 class
codes in seven states, the null hypothesis that they test empirically is
that ﬂuctuation of manual rates should be random over time. Rejection
of the null hypothesis would be viewed as evidence of political inﬂu-
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ence in the regulatory process. They examine several potential sources
of political inﬂuence. They ﬁnd support for persistent cross-subsidies
along three dimensions: 1) between rating classes (larger classes are
subsidized), 2) between low- and high-risk employers (high-risk, lowwage employers are subsidized), and 3) between policyholders and insurers (policyholders are subsidized).
Kwon and Grace (1996) examine the magnitude of the cross-subsidy of low risk to high risk employers by examining the share of residual market assessments carriers can pass on to voluntary market
policyholders. They ﬁnd that operating losses in the residual market do
raise premium in the voluntary market, but that only about 27 percent
of the residual market assessment on carriers is passed on in voluntary
premium. They also ﬁnd that few of the policy measures designed to
reduce the size of the residual market are effective. Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001) cite the importance of the Danzon–Harrington
perspective in that it examines the distributional consequences of regulation and not just the effect on price levels. However, they also cite
the weaknesses of the measures of regulation, in particular, the lack
of differentiation among the different regulatory regimes. In addition,
their empirical test ﬁnds weak support for increased injury rates under
administered pricing (the most regulated scheme) and a lack of support
for a relationship between deregulation and injury (p. 264). Both the
Kwon and Grace study and those by Danzon and Harrington cite the
health of the insurance market as the policy focus, but only Danzon and
Harrington also mention safety implications.
In their study of the effect of differing insurance arrangements on
various workers’ compensation outcomes, Thomason, Schmidle, and
Burton (2001, p. 245) ﬁnd support for full deregulation as being more
efﬁcient at reducing employer costs. However, they qualify for this conclusion because of the difﬁculty of accurately characterizing prederegulation conditions and with evaluating the sustainability of the effects of
deregulation.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provided a description of how workers’ compensation premium is determined and then examined the research literature on pric-
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ing from two perspectives, that of the employer and that of the insurer.
There are some differences between these two perspectives that may
have welfare implications. What becomes evident in the research is that
the focus in the employer-based literature is on safety incentives embedded in workers’ compensation premium, whereas the emphasis in
the insurer-based literature is on generating sufﬁcient premium to cover
losses. The signiﬁcance of this difference is that while the purpose of
the premium setting mechanism may be seen as to promote safety from
one point of view, from the other it is not to minimize injury but rather
to estimate it accurately.
In an unfettered market, this difference in objective functions might
not matter: the invisible hand would keep costs low, promote safety,
and protect insurer solvency. But the evidence on the safety effects of
experience rating (the feature of pricing that has received the most empirical attention) is mixed and potentially quite ﬂawed by the absence
of a direct measure of experience rating. Further, the only research that
directly examines whether employers understand the incentives workers’ compensation is designed to promote suggests that the formula is
not universally well understood (Kralj 1994).
The weaknesses in the experience-rating literature best frame the
directions for future research. One particularly weak aspect of this research is the lack of studies that actually include the experience-rating
modiﬁcation factor as the measure of experience rating. Because the
experience modiﬁcation is observable, this seems a feasible research
direction. A second research area that would beneﬁt from further investigation is the role that employer understanding of the structure of their
insurance premiums plays in safety behavior. With the exception of the
few studies cited above, little survey research of employer understanding of or response to safety incentives in workers’ compensation has
been done.
The important question that this raises is whether it is sound policy
to rely on market forces to the extent that we do to promote safety at
work. It appears that U.S. workplaces are becoming safer (Durbin and
Butler 1998), with the number of nonfatal illnesses and injuries per
10,000 full-time workers dropping from 304.7 in 1992 to 169.1 in 2001
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004). However, the extent to which
improved safety can be attributed to employers responding to the economic incentives from prices has not been established. It may be more
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plausible that employers provide a safe workplace for other reasons,
such as a belief that it is a good investment (Spieler 1994). Failure to
understand the underlying motivational mechanisms will limit effective
policy development should the trend toward lower injury rates change.

Notes
1. The discussion in this chapter describes what is referred to as the voluntary market, where employers purchase workers’ compensation insurance from insurance carriers. Depending on the year, approximately 20–25 percent of workers’
compensation insurance beneﬁts are paid by self-insured, that is, employers who
choose to pay workers’ compensation beneﬁts directly (Mont et al. 2001, p. 9).
The principal-agent framework would not apply to the self-insured portion of the
workers’ compensation market.
2. Two-stage least-square estimation is an econometric method used to address possible problems with endogeneity—where what is being treated as an independent
variable is correlated with the residual and thus is not truly exogenous.
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Terry Thomason’s career was marked by his interest in the economic
consequences of workers’ compensation policies across North America,
including both the observed variations within U.S. states, as well as the
differences that emerged over time between the Canadian and the U.S.
policy contexts. One important difference between these two jurisdictions has been the divergent trends in health care expenditures. Gross
domestic product (GDP) expenditure shares for health care in Canada and the United States began a long-term trend of divergence in the
1970s. This story is now well known to scholars and policymakers who
maintain a weather-eye on comparative trends in national health care
expenditure. In the period 1970–1975, expenditures on medical care
were equivalent in Canada and the United States, at about 7.5 percent
of GDP in both countries. By 1995–2000, GDP share allocated to health
care in Canada had increased to 9.5–10.0 percent. In the United States,
by contrast, total health spending as a share of GDP was 13.0 percent.
These divergent developments occurred in a period in which average
economic growth was stronger in the United States than Canada. Over
the period 1990–2000, GDP per capita grew by 1.7 percent in Canada
and health care spending increased in parallel, with an annual average
growth in health care spending of 1.8 percent. In contrast, over this
period U.S. health care spending increased at an annual rate of 3.2 per-

199

Roberts.indb 199

6/7/2005 9:29:23 AM

200 Mustard and Sinclair

cent, a rate of increase more rapid than the 2.3 percent average growth
in GDP (Anderson et al. 2003).
The divergent Canadian and U.S. trends in health care expenditure
growth is but one area of policy research interest arising from the natural experiment of the very different principles underlying the design of
the two systems. The consequences arising from the differences in the
ﬁnancing and organization of health care services in Canada and the
United States has been the subject of longstanding research attention
(Anderson et al. 2003; Detsky et al. 1990; Evans 1984; Evans, Barer, and Hertzman 1991; Fuchs and Hahn 1990; Redelmeir and Fuchs
1993; Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein 2003). A comparison
of health care systems in Canada and the United States invites observations of the relative efﬁciency of the two systems, one based on markets
and one based on public governance and insurance monopolies. (This
same policy contrast describes the ﬁnance and administration of workers’ compensation insurance in the two countries.) This research tells
an important story about the potential limits of private markets in efﬁciently providing goods of value to the health of populations. Although
less thoroughly studied, the comparison of workers’ compensation systems in Canada and the United States is an important opportunity to
understand the relative performance of private markets versus public
administration in achieving outcomes that are efﬁcient, equitable, and
of the highest possible quality.
Aside from the very substantial differences between the two countries in the ﬁnancing of health care, there are otherwise broad similarities in the organization and delivery of health care services to general
populations. Within this broad similarity of the two health care systems,
there are some useful distinctions to note in the provision of health care
services to injured workers receiving compensation from workers’
compensation programs. In most U.S. states, the employer or insurer
chooses the treating physician and other health care providers for the
treatment of workplace injury or disease compensated by workers’ compensation. Provider reimbursement is provided directly by the employer or the compensation insurance carrier. In Canada, the injured worker
has the right to choose his or her treating physician (who is typically the
regular provider of health care). In most Canadian provinces, the treating physician is reimbursed by the provincial single-payer health care
insurance plan, which in turn bills the workers’ compensation author-
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ity for the reimbursement of the costs of care. Care provided by allied
health professionals, hospital care, and pharmaceuticals are reimbursed
directly by workers’ compensation agencies.
A SUMMARY OF THE THOMASON/BURTON STUDY
Terry Thomason and John Burton collaborated on a study of the
employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance in two Canadian
provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, relative to costs in several
jurisdictions in the United States over the period 1975–1995 (Thomason and Burton 2000). The key ﬁnding from this study suggested that
the costs of workers’ compensation insurance are lower in jurisdictions
with single payer, publicly owned insurance providers (“monopolistic
public funds” in the language of Thomason and Burton). However, the
authors noted very real challenges in accurately adjusting for differences in the design and administration of the Canadian and U.S. programs
and argued for the importance of a more reﬁned study methodology.
Thomason and Burton subsequently revised their methodology to
address some of the limitations they identiﬁed in their earlier study
(Thomason and Burton 2001). Among the more important revisions
included 1) the addition of three U.S. states with exclusive state fund
insurance provision, 2) adjustments to inter-jurisdictional differences
in rate group classiﬁcation and in payroll calculations, 3) adjustments
to more accurately account for unfunded liabilities in the Canadian jurisdictions, and 4) examining in more detail the possibility that health
care costs may be shifted from the workers’ compensation program to
the universal single payer health care insurance programs in Canadian
jurisdictions.
Consistent with the results of their earlier study, the revised Thomason and Burton study reported that Ontario workers’ compensation insurance costs were equal to or lower than the costs in the median cost
jurisdiction in the United States over the time series, and that in recent years, actual Ontario costs were in the lowest quartile of workers’
compensation jurisdictions included in the study sample. While performing as one of the four lowest cost jurisdictions in North America,
the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board in Ontario also achieved a
higher wage replacement rate than most U.S. jurisdictions, experienced
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a lower rate of permanent partial disability awards, and incurred lower
medical care expenditures as a proportion of premium revenue.
Building from the observation that the Ontario workers’ compensation system incurs lower medical care expenditures, the objective of
this chapter is to examine factors that may account for this important
difference in resource allocation between Canadian and U.S. workers’
compensation programs. Among the factors that appear to be responsible for these differences are 1) lower medical care prices in Canada,
2) lower medical care price inﬂation in Canada, and 3) higher intensity of health care services in the United States. We argue three central
points in this chapter. First, contrasting the U.S. model of market-based
health insurance provision with the universal tax-ﬁnanced single-payer
model in Canada suggests the latter is substantially more efﬁcient (both
in general health services and in services purchased to treat compensible work-related injury and disease). Second, the greater intensity of
health care treatment typically provided in the United States does not
appear to result in substantially better health outcomes for U.S. patients
relative to Canadian patients. Third, both the Canadian and U.S. health
care systems have struggled to align incentives to consistently improve
the efﬁciency and the quality of health care.
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED
After 30 years of North American policy experiment and reform in
the ﬁnance and delivery of health services, we have learned a number of
lessons about the efﬁciency of different insurance funding models and
the effectiveness of different health care ﬁnancing models in purchasing quality.
Efﬁciency in the Financing and Funding of Health Care
In their study of workers’ compensation program cost differences
between Canada and the United States, Thomason and Burton (2001)
directly compared prices for 10 common medical procedures used in 39
U.S. state compensation programs and the province of Ontario. In this
comparison, after adjusting for differences in the values of the Canadian and U.S. dollars, they found that the price for medical procedures
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in the United States is substantially greater than the price for similar
procedures in Ontario, with the ratio of the median fee in the United
States to the fee in Ontario ranging from 1.6 to 7.1. Taking a simple
average of fees across the 10 procedures, the average median fee in the
United States was found to be 4.6 times greater than the average fee in
Ontario.
The observation that health care prices are generally higher in the
United States relative to Canada has been extensively reported in the
health services research literature (Detsky et al. 1990; Fuchs and Hahn
1990; Redelmeir and Fuchs 1993). Anderson et al. (2003), for example,
have recently reported ﬁndings from a cross-national comparison of
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
economies, examining evidence for the proposition that the higher U.S.
spending on health care (as a percent of GDP) is primarily due to higher
relative prices for health care goods and services in the United States,
rather than a greater intensity of use of equivalently priced health care
resources. In 2000, the United States spent 13 percent of GDP on health
care, Switzerland 10.7 percent, and Canada 9.1 percent. The OECD
median was 8.0 percent. Paradoxically, however, the United States had
fewer of each of the following than the median OECD country: physicians per 1,000 population, physician visits per capita, acute beds per
capita, hospital admissions per 1,000 population, and acute care days
per capita. Anderson et al. (2003) conclude that higher average prices is
the likely explanation for the paradoxical pattern observed in the United
States of lower aggregate utilization of health care services and higher
per capita expenditures on health care.
Thomason and Burton’s observation of very substantial medical
care price differentials between Ontario and the sample of 44 U.S. states
for a selection of 10 common procedures is based on fee information
at the end of the 20-year observation period of their study. It is important to note that this differential in the price of medical care in the two
countries has emerged over the 20-year period 1975–1995. As shown in
Figure 8.1, in the period 1975–1979, prices for medical care purchased
by workers’ compensation insurance providers were essentially identical in Canada and the United States.
Medical care price inﬂation has been a persistent policy challenge in
the United States. In addition, there is good evidence that medical care
expenditures for the treatment of occupational conditions in the United
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Figure 8.1 Real Medical Beneﬁt Costs, 1975–1995 ($)
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States exceed those for the treatment of similar conditions insured under general health insurance plans (Baker and Krueger 1995; Baldwin,
Johnson, and Marcus 2002; Durbin, Corro, and Helvacian 1996; Johnson et al. 1993; Johnson, Baldwin, and Burton 1996). In contrast, medical care price changes in Canada have been more tightly aligned to the
macroeconomic growth proﬁle of the country. There are a number of
explanations for the difference in medical care price growth between
the two countries. The most prominent explanation is the price-setting
power of the monopoly universal health insurance programs in Canadian provinces relative to the fragmented and competitive structure of
private market health care insurance in the United States (Evans 2000;
Evans, Barer, and Hertzman 1991).
The Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) has
legislated authority to function as a health insurance provider and to
purchase health care services for the treatment of work-related injury
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and disease. This authority predates the establishment of the singlepayer universal health insurance programs in Canada in the period
1960–1970. The federal legislation creating public single-payer health
care insurance agencies in Canadian provinces created insurance monopolies by explicitly prohibiting private insurance carriers from providing health plans that covered services insured by the single payer
plans. Provincial workers’ compensation programs in Canada function
as a parallel health insurance provider. They are, however, a minor purchaser. In the province of Ontario, the WSIB purchases approximately
$350 million of health care services annually in a publicly funded health
care system of $10 billion. The health care costs of work-related injuries range between 2 and 5 percent of total health care costs, although
this proportion is larger when total public health care expenditures are
restricted to working age populations (Association of Workers’ Compensation Boards of Canada 2001). With limited exceptions, workers’
compensation authorities purchase care for injured workers within the
structure of the publicly funded system (Association of Workers’ Compensation Boards of Canada 2001). The workers’ compensation authorities in Canada, by buying within the publicly funded health care system,
have been able to beneﬁt (free-ride) from the price-setting power of the
large universal single-payer health insurance plans.
There appear to be very substantial administration costs associated
with the provision of health care insurance through multiple insurers in
private markets. Woolhander and colleagues have documented a durable pattern of higher administrative expenditures in the U.S. health care
system relative to Canada (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986; Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein 2003; Woolhandler and Himmelstein 1991, 1997). They have estimated that 31 percent of U.S. health
care expenditures in 1999 were allocated to administration functions
($US1,059 per capita) compared to 16.7 percent of Canadian health
care expenditures ($US307 per capita). Between 1969 and 1999, the
share of the U.S. health care labor force engaged in administrative tasks
increased from 18.2 percent to 27.3 percent. During the same period
in Canada, the health care labor force engaged in administration grew
from 16.0 percent to 19.1 percent. Insurance overheads in Canada are
estimated to be 1.9 percent of health care system expenditures. In the
United States, private insurance provider overheads are estimated to be
11.9 percent, Medicare overheads to be 3.6 percent and Medicaid over-
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heads to be 6.8 percent. Clearly, the challenges of technical and allocative efﬁciency decisions within the complexity of contemporary health
care systems require a commitment to intensive and sophisticated management. What remains uncertain is the optimal level of administration
expenditure in a health care system.
Greater medical care price inﬂation and higher administrative costs
in the United States will account for an important fraction of the higher
average U.S. expenditure on health care services in the treatment of
injuries and disease compensated by workers’ compensation insurance.
A number of researchers have noted, in addition, that medical care expenditures for the treatment of occupational conditions exceed those for
the treatment of similar conditions insured under general health insurance plans (Baker and Krueger 1995; Baldwin, Johnson, and Marcus
2002; Durbin, Corro, and Helvacian 1996; Johnson et al. 1993; Johnson, Baldwin, and Burton 1996). By way of explanation, Himmelstein
et al. (1999) note that the coverage of both medical care and wage-loss
beneﬁts distinguishes workers’ compensation insurance from typical
health insurance plans. The dual responsibility for medical care costs
and wage-loss costs creates stronger incentives for insurance providers to select therapeutic options that may expedite earlier recovery and
earlier return to work. As Himmelstein et al. (1999, p. 430) observe,
“Where a traditional insurer or HMO might seek costs savings by delaying or denying medical tests or treatments, workers’ compensation
insurers might seek to accelerate appropriate medical care,” or be receptive to the promise of more intensive medical care. In general, these
incentives can be understood to inﬂuence to a similar degree both single
payer Canadian insurers and U.S. private market insurers. However, as
noted earlier, the Canadian single-payer compensation insurers in general have purchased health care services within the fee schedules of the
publicly funded health care system. There is some evidence that workers’ compensation insurers in the United States have offered more lucrative provider fees in the interests of purchasing expedited care (Baker
and Krueger 1995; Baldwin, Johnson, and Marcus 2002; Durbin, Corro,
and Helvacian 1996; Johnson et al. 1993; Johnson, Baldwin, and Burton 1996).
The theory of neoclassical economics predicts that the private
health care insurance market will be a more efﬁcient instrument than
a public monopoly insurance provider. Market competition will dis-
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cipline insurance prices and the efﬁciency of the insurance function.
However, as suggested by the Thomason and Burton comparison of
Canadian and U.S. workers’ compensation health care expenditures, the
empirical evidence appears to indicate that public single-payer health
insurance may be more efﬁcient than private markets. Robert Evans,
who authored an important early treatise on economic behavior in the
health care industry, has provided a thoughtful analysis of some of the
trade-offs in the design of health insurance (Evans 1984). In particular,
he has emphasized the risks of market failure in private health insurance
markets. These risks arise from economies of scale, adverse selection,
and moral hazard.
The provision of health insurance is subject to economies of scale,
rendering economic advantage to large insurers. In addition, there are
diseconomies arising from private health insurance markets. Health
care providers face compliance costs in dealing with many different insurance providers. Insurance providers face marketing and commission
expenses associated with market competition. A “public utility” insurance model, relying on a monopoly provider, captures the economies of
scale and avoids the costs of compliance, marketing, and proﬁt-making
associated with private markets. There are a number of examples of
insurance market failure in the United States (the numbers of uninsured
citizens and the withdrawal of providers from workers’ compensation
insurance markets in some states), which may be related to the inability
of markets to capture economies of scale.
Adverse selection is a clearly understood phenomena in private insurance markets, where people of different risk statuses are more or
less likely to buy insurance. Segmenting health insurance products by
beneﬁt coverage, copayment conditions, and risk status will result in insurance coverage costs for high-risk groups being more expensive than
insurance provided under a community-rating model. Insurance market
failure occurs when groups or individuals wish to purchase coverage
but are priced out of the market. The moral hazard risk of insurance has
received a great deal of attention from health economists. Moral hazard
in the context of health insurance refers to a risk that the existence of
insurance coverage will increase the probability or intensity of health
care use. Moral hazard appears to be an equivalent risk for health insurance provided by private markets or by public monopolies.
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Efﬁciency in the Organization and Delivery of Health Services
A number of features of the organization and delivery of health
services are frequently contrasted in comparisons of the Canadian and
U.S. health care systems. The Canadian system is often characterized,
for example, as having a more constrained supply of some medical care
services than the United States. One perspective views supply constraints as having large potentially negative effects, arising from unmet medical care needs or in delays in the receipt of effective care. An
alternate perspective notes that a supply-constrained system will more
likely be more efﬁcient in each treatment encounter than a system with
substantial surplus human and physical capital. In this section we consider some of the evidence for efﬁciency differences in the organization
and delivery of health services in the two countries.
The health effects of delays in the provision of care or barriers to
access to care have been a focus of health services research attention
in both the United States and Canada. In the United States, concern
focuses on the health effects arising from barriers to accessing medical care among persons without health care insurance. In the Canadian
system, with universal insurance coverage, concern has focused on the
health effects of delays in the provision of care arising from a less generous supply of health care providers and health care services relative
to the United States.
Research studies designed to compare the structure, process, and
outcome of health care in Canada and the United States can be informative. One example is a study comparing the clinical management
of acute myocardial infarction in a sample of 2,600 U.S. patients and
a group of 400 Canadian patients with very similar clinical and demographic proﬁles (Mark et al. 1994). Patients in both countries were
interviewed by telephone 30 days, six months, and one year after myocardial infarction to determine their use of medical care and quality of
life. The clinical management of Canadian patients was less intensive
than provided to U.S. patients. Canadian patients had a lower rate of
cardiac catheterization (25 percent versus 72 percent), coronary angioplasty (11 percent versus 29 percent) and coronary bypass surgery (3
percent versus 14 percent). At one year, 24 percent of the Canadian patients and 53 percent of the U.S. patients had undergone angioplasty or
bypass surgery at least once. Despite these differences in the intensity
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of invasive procedures, unadjusted survival rates for the U.S. cohort
at 30 days (93.2 percent) and one year (90.7 percent) were equivalent
to survival rates in the Canadian cohort (92.4 percent at 30 days and
90.3 percent at one year). While there were no important differences in
functional status at 30 days between two patient cohorts, the study did
report marginally better average quality of life among U.S. patients at
one year compared to Canadian patients. Although this study did not
report the precise measures of the economic value of the differences in
health care utilization between the two cohorts, these expenditure differences must be substantial. The large differences in resource utilization observed in this study were not associated with strong differences
in clinical outcome.
The provision of health care services in the treatment of acute lowback pain is a second example of a dissonant pattern, where the intensity
of health care service use is not directly related to the duration of disability. Disabling back pain is common and, whether caused by workrelated exposures or non-work-related exposures, is one of the most
frequent reasons that patients visit primary care physicians. Patients
with acute low-back pain may seek care from among several types of
health care providers: primary care physicians, specialty-qualiﬁed physicians (particularly orthopedic specialists), or chiropractors. A number
of studies in both Canada (Côté et al. 2001) and the United States (Carey et al. 1995; Deyo et al. 1991; Deyo and Tsui-Wu 1987) have documented wide variation in the intensity of treatment for low-back pain,
both within clinical professions and between clinical professions. For
example, Carey et al. (1995) followed a group of 1,500 adults in North
Carolina who presented symptoms of low-back pain to one of six types
of practioners: 1) urban primary care physicians, 2) rural primary care
physicians, 3) urban chiropractors, 4) rural chiropractors, 5) orthopedic
surgeons, and 6) primary care physicians in a group-model health maintenance organization. At the six-month follow-up, the times to functional recovery, return to work, and complete recovery from low-back
pain were similar among patients seen by all six groups of providers.
Despite the similarities in clinical and functional outcomes, there were
marked differences in the intensity of health service utilization. Mean
total direct outpatient costs per episode of low-back pain ranged from
$435 for patients seeing an HMO provider to $783 for patients seeing
an urban chiropractor. Given the high prevalence of acute back pain in
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working-age populations, these differences in health care resource use
will be substantial. The absence of evidence of clinical beneﬁt associated with more intensive clinical resource use suggests that intensive
treatment of acute low-back pain is inefﬁcient.
As a ﬁnal example, we summarize a study that used an identical
study protocol to measure the prevalence of mental health disorder in
representative samples of U.S. residents and residents of the Canadian
province of Ontario (Katz, Kessler, Frank, Leaf, and Lin 1997; Katz,
Kessler, Frank, Leaf, Lin, and Edmund 1997). This study has produced
a fascinating series of ﬁndings. Among the ﬁndings salient for the purposes of this chapter was the observation that the use of mental health
services by persons without detectable mental health morbidity or disability in the U.S. sample was 75 percent higher than observed among
well-functioning Ontario respondents in the sample. This ﬁnding suggests that the probability of inappropriate use of mental health services
(treatment where no treatment was indicated) may be more likely in
a health care system with generous service supply. The study ﬁnding
also suggests that the moral hazard potential of a universal single-payer
ﬁrst-dollar insurance program (also known as Canadian health care)
may be overstated. In an important parallel ﬁnding, the study reported
that persons with detectable mental health disorder were more likely to
be provided mental health treatment services if resident in Ontario than
in the United States.
Effectiveness in Purchasing Quality Care
Contemporary health care systems face persistent deﬁcits in delivering health care of the highest quality. For example, one of the most consistent ﬁndings in health services research is the gap between evidence
and practice (Grol and Grimshaw 2003). Studies of health care systems
in the developed economies typically ﬁnd that about 30–40 percent of
patients do not receive care according to current scientiﬁc evidence, and
that about 20–25 percent of care provided is not needed or is potentially
harmful (Schuster, McGlynn, and Brook 1998). In the United States,
only one-half of the population receive needed preventive care; 70 percent receive recommended care for acute problems, such as colds or
stomach pain; and just 60 percent of those with a chronic illness such as
diabetes or hypertension get the care they need. In addition, about one-
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ﬁfth of the care given to persons with chronic conditions is unnecessary
and possibly harmful (McGlynn and Brook 2001).
Evidence of uneven quality performance in health care systems is
frequently suspected when different treatment rates or variations in treatment intensity are observed between similar geographic populations. As
one example of high variation in treatment across populations, Lavis et
al. (1998) described trends in hospital use for neck and back problems
(common conditions in workers’ compensation claims) in Ontario and
the United States. Between 1982 and 1992, the hospital admission rate
for medically treated cases (without surgery) decreased by 52 percent in
Ontario and by 75 percent in the United States. Over the same period,
the admission rate for surgically treated cases increased by 14 percent
and by 35 percent respectively. By 1992, the admission rate for medically treated cases in the United States was 23 percent higher than in
Ontario, whereas the rate for surgically treated cases was 164 percent
higher. In this study, the reduction in hospital admission for medically
treated cases would appear to be consistent with evidence that bed rest
and traction, two common forms of inpatient medical treatment, were
not effective. In contrast, the relatively strong increase in the frequency
of surgical treatment for neck and spine disorders in the United States
would appear to be more related to the more ample supply of surgical
specialist and diagnostic imaging facilities in the United States than to
clear evidence of the effectiveness of surgical intervention.
Over the past two decades, there has been more experimentation in
alternate approaches to the purchasing, organization, and delivery of
health services in the United States than in Canada. Most of these organizational reforms have been motivated by the twin goals of improving
efﬁciency and improving effectiveness of health care services. Baldwin, Johnson, and Marcus (2002) have recently reported on health care
costs and service differentials between preferred provider networks and
nonnetwork providers in the treatment of work-related injuries in the
United States. A sample of approximately 38,000 workers’ compensation claims with work absences of less than seven days that were provided care by network providers were compared with a matched sample
of 64,000 workers’ compensation claims provided care by nonnetwork
providers (claims were matched on type of injury, age, and gender). The
motivation of this study was to clarify how networks succeed in reducing costs, by examining evidence for cost reductions arising from three
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alternate strategies: 1) reducing the quantities of services provided to
injured workers, 2) shifting to more economical services, or 3) simply
reducing per unit prices.
In this sample of injured workers, the study found that average health
care costs are lower for network claims than for matched nonnetwork
claims. Price discounts explain the largest part of the cost differential,
with reductions in service utilization also being important for understanding resource use differentials in the treatment of acute back injuries and the treatment of cumulative stress injuries. Given that network
savings primarily reﬂect price discounts for the same services provided
by nonnetwork providers, network strategies result in an increase in the
efﬁciency and, therefore, the cost-effectiveness of care.
McGlynn and Brook (2001, p. 84) document the persistent failure
of public and private policymakers in the United States and elsewhere
to identify and solve the factors underlying the inconsistent quality performance of contemporary healthcare.
Serious deﬁcits are also manifest in how skilfully care is delivered. Coronary angiography is an invasive test used to diagnose
cardiac disease and determine what treatment is appropriate for a
patient. Analysis of a random sample of angiographies performed
in one state showed that only half of the tests were done competently enough to be accurately interpreted. When the tests were
reread by a group of expert cardiologists, one-quarter of patients
determined by the original reading to have the most severe disease
did not have it. Six percent of persons who were told that their test
results were not severely abnormal actually had severely abnormal
results. One third of persons whose bypass surgery was considered
necessary or appropriate based on the original interpretation of the
angiography results underwent surgery that was of uncertain beneﬁt or inappropriate based on the gold-standard review. Nearly 1.3
million coronary angiographies were performed in 1998 nationally. If the results of this study held nationally, nearly 650,000 tests
would be difﬁcult to interpret accurately; at $12,450 per test, that
is more than $8 billion in wasted expense.

Suboptimal health care quality is both inefﬁcient and ineffective.
McGlynn identiﬁes the following factors which, in their view, account
for the absence of a strong policy commitment to quality improvement
in contemporary health care. First, the responsibility for quality is diffuse, distributed among professional regulatory bodies, health protec-
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tion agencies, accreditation bodies, regulators, health care purchasers,
(and lawyers who bring malpractice suits alleging substandard care).
An unfortunate consequence of this diffusion of responsibility is a persistent policy failure to respond to substandard care practices. Second,
health care is characterized by outmoded system design, where quality
performance protocols well-established in other ﬁelds have either been
resisted or not adopted in much of contemporary health care. Finally,
there are very large information voids. There is, for example, no regular, ongoing surveillance of the quality of health care encounters, and
no monitoring of the progress across the system in adopting practices
with demonstrated effectiveness to improve quality. These problems are
as prevalent in the organization and delivery of health care services to
workers’ compensation beneﬁciaries as they are in the general health
care system. McGlynn and Brook argue that improvements will come
from policy initiatives which 1) create quality champions (presumably
with some authority to set ﬁnancial rewards and penalties); 2) create
functional information systems, and 3) routinely monitor and report on
the quality performance of the health care system.
LESSONS LEARNED
Thomason and Burton’s study of the economic performance of
workers’ compensation programs in Canada and the United States is an
excellent example of the potential of comparative cross-national studies to inform our understanding of the implications of different policy
choices. A comparison of the efﬁciency and effectiveness of health care
services purchased by workers’ compensation insurance providers in
Canada and the United States is an important case study of the more
global question of the relative beneﬁts and limitations of private markets and public monopolies in the provision of health care insurance.
Canadian workers’ compensation agencies purchase health services
within the publicly funded, single-payer health care insurance programs
in each province. In the United States, workers’ compensation insurance
is provided through private markets in a substantial number of state jurisdictions, and health services for injured workers are purchased in
competitive provider markets.
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In comparing the experience of the two systems over the past 30
years, it is clear that the publicly funded, single-payer health care insurance programs have been more successful in limiting medical care
price inﬂation. In addition to less success in disciplining medical care
prices, the U.S. reliance on private insurance markets appears to result
in a substantially higher proportion of health care resources allocated
to administrative functions. This higher expenditure on administrative
functions does not appear to increase the relative efﬁciency of the U.S.
health care system.
There is evidence that the more constrained supply of human and
physical capital in the Canadian health care system is associated with
less intensive medical care treatment compared to the United States.
There also is some evidence, however, that more intensive medical care
treatment does not result in signiﬁcant health beneﬁts for many classes
of morbidity.
Finally, both the Canadian and U.S. health care systems have struggled to align incentives to consistently improve the efﬁciency and the
quality of health care. Brook (1998) has argued that a systemic commitment to quality improvement in health care will require a stronger
commitment to ensuring that effective medical care is appropriately delivered to patients with need for care, and that care is provided to a high
standard of technical excellence. Aligning incentives to improve quality
is a challenge shared by health care purchasers in both Canada and the
United States.
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Over the last 30 years a number of theoretical and empirical advances have emerged in the study of how the risk of injury in the workplace inﬂuences labor market transactions. Economists have focused
particular attention on mechanisms that compensate individuals for
risk, primarily higher wages or workers’ compensation beneﬁts, and
how these compensation mechanisms inﬂuence the level of workplace
safety. These issues have not only been the focus of considerable attention by academics, but have also been applied to important public
policy issues such as evaluating the beneﬁts of safety programs and
determining the optimal levels of workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
As with most applications of economic theory, however, a number
of these results have relied on very speciﬁc assumptions about the ways
in which individuals obtain and use information about risk. Information plays a critical role in economic theory. While economists have
studied the role of information asymmetries in great detail, they have
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paid less attention to how individual agents accumulate information
and implement it in decision making. The standard economic model is
one in which people process information perfectly, fully comprehending (and using) all information available to them. Gradually, however,
economists have become increasingly interested in deviations from the
perfect rationality model, particularly with regard to the processing of
information about risk and uncertainty. We refer to the study of this issue broadly as behavioral economics.
For obvious reasons, the ability of individuals to accumulate and
process information about risk is particularly important for economists
studying occupational safety and health. If we fail to properly model
the ways in which individuals perceive, value, and respond to risk, it is
unlikely that we will be able to accurately predict behavioral responses
to changes in the risk of workplace injuries. This has important implications not only for economic research, but also for policies designed to
promote workplace safety.
The objective of this chapter is to both explore how past research
in the economics of occupational safety has dealt with deviations from
the perfect rationality model, and to ask how the standard predictions
change when we incorporate some of the key results of behavioral economics. Economists since Adam Smith have recognized that deviations
from the perfect rationality model would inﬂuence the way individuals
respond to occupational risk. However, most recent studies use the basic framework from the standard perfect rationality model and study the
effect of introducing a relatively small perturbation to the model, almost
always by adding a subjective probability function that underestimates
the true risk of occupational injuries. We attempt to incorporate some
of the richer and more complex elements of behavioral economics into
the analysis in the hopes of isolating some areas where current research
might provide either misleading or incomplete conclusions about the
role of occupational risk in employment and safety decisions.
Before proceeding we would like to note that this chapter is intended to be suggestive, and we do not presume to provide a comprehensive integration of behavioral economics with the economic analysis of
workplace safety. Both ﬁelds are vast and complex, and we focus our
attention on just a small sample of the possible set of issues. Nevertheless, we believe that the issues we focus on are important and illustrate
both that occupational safety is a natural place to apply (at least some
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of) the principles of behavioral economics, and that these principles can
have a profound impact on our predictions.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we outline the standard
model of occupational risk in an expected utility framework. We focus
on two key issues from the economics literature: the existence of compensating wage differentials for job risk, and the relationship between
workers’ compensation beneﬁts and workplace safety. Our discussion
focuses on the derivation of the main results in the perfect rationality
model and some of the empirical evidence. In the third section, we then
review some basic principles of behavioral economics. Our goal with
this section is to summarize some of the evidence on how individuals perceive, value, and respond to risk differently than in the standard
economic model. In the fourth section we discuss the extent to which
the behavioral model alters the predictions of the standard model. In the
ﬁfth section we discuss the possibility that employers might be subject
to some of the same behavioral phenomena that affect workers, and we
discuss how this could inﬂuence the predictions of the model. The sixth
section then draws out some of the policy implications from our integrated model, and the ﬁnal section concludes with recommendations
for future research.
THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
In this section we outline some of the basic results that have been
obtained from applying economic analysis to workplace safety. We focus our analysis on two central topics that have been studied in the
literature: the existence of compensating wage differentials for job risk,
and the relationship between the insurance for occupational injuries and
the level of workplace safety. These topics are particularly useful for
our purposes because they comprise many of the most important results
in the ﬁeld and, as we demonstrate later on, because they are sensitive
to assumptions about how individuals perceive, value, and respond to
risk.
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Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Risk
Adam Smith ﬁrst introduced the concept of compensating differentials for job risks in An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations. Smith (1937) argued that individuals faced with two
identical jobs would, all other things equal, require more compensation
to accept the job that involved a higher risk of personal injury or illness.
Nearly 200 years later, Rosen (1974) formalized this intuitive notion
and provided an empirical methodology to estimate the implicit “price”
that workers charge for bearing the risk of injury on the job. Rosen’s
work spawned a large literature dedicated to estimating this price using
labor market data.
The intuition behind the empirical methodology is straightforward.
Consider the empirical model relating individual wages to job characteristics:
(9.1)

wi = δ + Xiβ + Ziζ + αqi + εi ,

where wi represents the wage offer w for worker i, X represents a vector
of individual characteristics such as age, gender or education, Z represents a vector of characteristics of individual i’s job, q represents the
probability of injury on the job and ε is a random, mean zero error term.
Note that for simplicity we consider a single injury type here, but in
practice the model has been extended to include vectors of both fatal
and nonfatal risks.
For our purposes the chief parameter of interest in this regression
equation is α, which represents the compensating wage differential. Assuming that the parameter estimate of α is well identiﬁed (generally
that α is uncorrelated with ε), then we can literally interpret it as the
marginal increase in wages an individual would require to make him
or her indifferent to a marginal increase in job risk. This parameter is
important, because in theory the price individuals charge to bear risk
should be synonymous with their willingness to pay to reduce risk. The
ability to estimate the willingness to pay to reduce risks is of critical
importance for public policy, because this information is necessary if
we wish to monetize the beneﬁts of policies designed to increase safety.
With the wealth of available data on individual wages, the estimation of
compensating wage differentials for job risks has played a key role in
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cost–beneﬁt analysis for many environmental and health policies.
Numerous empirical studies have used Rosen’s approach to estimate α, beginning with Thaler and Rosen (1976). In general, the empirical results have shown evidence of a compensating wage differential
for fatal injury risk, but only mixed evidence of a wage differential for
nonfatal injury risk (Viscusi 1993). A number of explanations have been
posited for why the estimated differentials for nonfatal risks are difﬁcult
to estimate. From an empirical standpoint, the general problem is that
the parameter of interest α might be negatively correlated with the error term ε, which causes a negative bias in estimates of α. The primary
reasons for this suspected correlation presented in the literature are a
confounding effect of workers’ compensation beneﬁts, selection bias,
and measurement error.
A failure to include workers’ compensation beneﬁts in the vector
Z could bias α toward zero because these beneﬁts reduce the expected
cost of injuries, so workers with higher beneﬁts demand a lower compensating wage differential. To eliminate this bias, a number of studies
have included a measure of workers’ compensation beneﬁts and have
increased the size of the estimated compensating wage differential (Viscusi 1993).
Selection bias can result because the level of job risk may be a
choice variable for the worker. Individuals with a greater tolerance for
risk might be more willing to accept employment at a risky job, a tendency that would bias the compensating differential downward. Brown
(1980) used a ﬁxed-effects estimator to control for this selection and
found little evidence of compensating differentials for job risk. Garen
(1988) used an instrumental variables approach and found evidence of
relatively large compensating differentials. Measurement error is one
possible explanation for why Brown (1980) found no evidence of compensating differentials. Black and Kniesner (2003) found evidence of
signiﬁcant, nontrivial measurement error in published job-risk variables
that was correlated with other observable variables, making it impossible to consistently estimate compensating differentials with ordinary
least squares.
These are all plausible explanations as to why it is difﬁcult to estimate compensating wage differentials for nonfatal, or even fatal, job
risks. However, each of these can be overcome given the appropriate
econometric technique and the availability of instrumental variables.
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Later, when we discuss compensating wage differentials in the context
of behavioral economics, we will see how certain elements of the behavioral model will call into question our ability to obtain estimates that
are meaningful for policy analysis.
Optimal Workers’ Compensation Beneﬁts and Safety Incentives
In the United States, the primary relief for workers injured on the
job comes from workers’ compensation. One of the key features of
workers’ compensation is that it offers only partial compensation for
workplace injuries. Whereas an individual with a valid cause of action
suing for damages in the tort system would be eligible to recover full
economic losses as well as noneconomic losses (pain and suffering),
workers’ compensation provides only partial replacement for lost income and no compensation for noneconomic losses. On the other hand,
because individuals can recover damages regardless of whether or not
there was negligence, compensation occurs with much greater frequency than it would in the tort system.
A common justiﬁcation for the use of partial coverage in workers’
compensation is the potential impact of beneﬁts on safety incentives.
One facet of this argument supposes that individual workers have the
ability to take precautions that reduce the risk of injury but are unobservable (or unveriﬁable) to employers. If workers can control the level
of risk they face, and if safety precautions involve some cost, then nofault insurance will give workers the incentives to take fewer precautions and thereby reduce the overall level of safety. By only providing
partial income replacement, workers’ compensation beneﬁts reduce
any disincentive by workers to take care.1 It may also reduce employer
efforts to oppose reporting of legitimate claims, because such efforts
would yield greater savings (Chelius and Kavanaugh 1988; Azaroff,
Levenstein, and Wegman 2002). Note that there are other dimensions
of this problem that may be mitigated by partial insurance coverage
that might have little or no direct impact on actual safety levels, such
as fraudulent claiming or extending injury duration past the true recovery period. In addition, workers’ compensation may lead employers to
reduce safety precautions if they are imperfectly experience rated or if
workers do not demand the “optimal” level of precautions (Rea 1981;
Smith 1992).
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Worker safety precautions are not the only mechanism through
which workers’ compensation can inﬂuence the risk of occupational
illnesses or injuries. A natural argument against removing occupational
injuries from the tort system and restricting compensation is that it will
reduce the incentives of employers to invest in safety precautions that
reduce the frequency and/or severity of occupational injuries. Workers’
compensation provides incentives for employers to improve safety, as
fewer and less severe injuries will result in lower beneﬁt payments (and
correspondingly, lower workers’ compensation insurance premiums).
The effect of workers’ compensation beneﬁts on workplace safety
is the subject of debate in the literature. Studies such as Krueger (1990)
and Ruser (1993) generally ﬁnd evidence in support of the notion that
higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts lead to higher injury rates (for a
review of the literature see Butler 1994). Less evidence has been found
to support the claim that ﬁrms respond to incentives to improve workplace safety (see Roberts 2005). Later in this chapter, we explore how
behavioral economics changes our predictions about the relationship
between workers’ compensation and workplace safety, and ask if it offers any guidelines for public policy.
THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY
In this section we brieﬂy review how behavioral scientists have
thought about decision making under uncertainty, with a particular eye
for the decision elements relevant for the study of occupational safety.
We focus much of our discussion, at least in a broad sense, on the work
of Kahneman and Tversky, which has exposed some critical assumptions that have led economists traditionally to mischaracterize human
behavior (Rabin 2003). Speciﬁcally, we utilize the framework of prospect theory, introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
One of the most important contributions of behavioral economics
is to demonstrate that people make predictable judgment errors when
faced with uncertainty (Rabin 2003).2 Individuals frequently employ
rule-based, decision making techniques when they cannot calculate the
costs and beneﬁts of a choice. People may lack the time or the analytic skills necessary for the evaluation. For some, the dearth of cru-
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cial information regarding the choice, such as objective probabilities
and outcome values, hinders the rational decision-making process. For
others, the dizzying array of information simply overwhelms. The frequent practice of substituting heuristics, or cognitive rules of thumb, for
structured analysis helps to explain why normative theory tends to fall
short of reality. It also demonstrates the importance of considering the
bounds to human rational decision making.
Prospect theory provides a systematic methodology for reconciling
individual decision making with some of these errors. As a descriptive
theory of choice, prospect theory illustrates decision making under risk
as a selection among particular gambles or prospects. It distinguishes
between two stages of the decision making process: an editing phase
in which an individual organizes the problem into a choice between
changes in wealth (or utility), and a choice phase in which the individual chooses whichever outcome has the highest value. In this section
we discuss how individuals might “edit” the problems associated with
job risk. In particular, we focus on three aspects of the problem where
this editing is of key importance: the perception of risk, the valuation
of risk, and the response to risk. In the next section we then consider
how these edited problems produce results that are different from the
classical model.
Before moving on, we identify some subtle differences in what
we mean by “risk” in these three aspects of individual behavior. When
we discuss how individuals perceive risks we are generally referring
to their perception of the probability of an injury or illness occurring.
When discussing how individuals value risk we are talking more about
the magnitude of the loss in utility individuals face if an injury or illness occurs. Finally, when we discuss how individuals respond to risk
we refer to the behavior of individuals in response to the probability of
an injury, the size of the loss, or, most often, the expected value of the
loss.
How Do Individuals Perceive Risks?
In this section we are interested in the ways in which individuals
perceive risks to health. Perhaps the most important question is whether
or not individuals perceive risks accurately, i.e., does an individual’s
subjective assessment about the likelihood of some adverse event oc-
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curring equal the “true” likelihood on average. Evidence supports the
notion that individuals do not perceive risk accurately, and has led behaviorists to identify a number of cognitive biases that disturb an individual’s information processing about risk. Below we discuss three of
these biases that we feel are most relevant to the study of occupational
risk: the availability bias, the optimism bias and the accumulation bias.
We review the empirical evidence on each of these biases as they pertain to the workplace if such evidence is sufﬁciently available, and to
health risks more generally if it is not.
The availability bias
Biased predictive judgments and subjective probabilities frequently
result from the common use of the availability bias. Humans tend to
judge the likelihood of an event by its ease of recall: we tend to disproportionately weigh salient and memorable events even when better sources of information exist (Rabin 2003). To illustrate, consider
the fact that a substantial number of people have avoided ﬂying since
the 9-11 terrorism attacks but continue to drive at high speeds on the
nation’s highways, where physical injury is far more likely to occur.
Additionally, we observe that people tend to be overly inﬂuenced by
friends’ remarkable mishaps with certain car brands, ignoring the empirical evidence readily available from publications such as Consumer
Reports (Rabin 2003). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) further illustrate
this phenomenon as follows:
The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective
assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. These
judgments are all based on data of limited validity, which are processed according to heuristic rules. For example, the apparent distance of an object is determined in part by its clarity. The more
sharply the object is seen, the closer it appears to be. This rule
has some validity, because in any given scene the more distant
objects are seen less sharply than nearer objects. However, the reliance on this rule leads to systematic errors in the estimation of
distance. Speciﬁcally, distances are often overestimated when visibility is poor because the contours of objects are blurred. On the
other hand, distances are underestimated when visibility is good
because the objects are seen sharply. Thus, the reliance on clarity
as an indication of distance leads to common biases. Such biases
are also found in the intuitive judgment of probability.
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While some workers demonstrate a fairly accurate perception of
risk (for example, see Ostberg 1980; Singleton, Hicks, and Hirsch
1981), empirical studies provide some evidence of workers’ reliance
on availability for occupational risk perceptions. For instance, in his
survey of 915 workers on eight Norwegian oil rig platforms, Rundmo
(1992) found that people most frequently perceived risk in connection
with disasters and major accidents rather than with their routine tasks.
This result also indicates the “ﬂipside” of the availability bias—that
workers may grow accustomed to their frequent and routine occupational dangers. In so doing, these risks may lose their “remarkableness”
and are then underestimated as being “normal.”
Organizational behavior scholars have provided us with substantial
evidence of workers in familiar, highly risky work situations who underestimate their risk levels in comparison to workers in unknown situations with comparable risk proﬁles (Mearns and Flin 1996). For example, Zimolong (1985) found that workers in the construction industry
typically overestimate the risks involved in tasks that they perform infrequently or do not understand fully, while commonly underestimating
the risks involved in performing their routine tasks. In a subsequent
study, Zimolong (1991) found that railway shunters, who are responsible for coupling and uncoupling train cars, overestimate the risks for
tasks that have a reputation for being dangerous and underestimate the
risks involved with routine activities. Rundmo (1992) found similar results in his work concerning Norwegian oil rig personnel; workers frequently perceived risk in connection with disasters and major accidents
rather than in their common work responsibilities.
The optimism bias
Another form of bias that has commonly been demonstrated in perception of risk is the optimism bias. The optimism bias simply states
that people tend to underestimate their own injury risk compared to the
average risk. Health behavior researchers have found that people generally think that they are less vulnerable to adverse health outcomes than
the rest of the population. Speciﬁc examples appear frequently in the
AIDS risk perception literature.
One such study focused on people’s comparative AIDS risk assessments (van der Velde, van der Pligt, and Hooykaas 1994). The researchers surveyed four groups in Amsterdam, listed roughly in the order of

Roberts.indb 228

6/7/2005 9:29:29 AM

Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries 229
Figure 9.1 Mean Scores of AIDS Risk Perceptions, Own versus Others
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their increasing risk of contracting AIDS: a nationally representative
sample (n = 437), heterosexuals with multiple private sex partners (n =
241), homosexual men with multiple sex partners (n = 147), and heterosexuals with multiple prostitution partners (n = 493). They asked
the participants to assess their personal risk (i.e., the likelihood that the
subject himself or herself becomes infected) and average risk (i.e., the
likelihood that a random person in their age group becomes infected).
They found that people with more objective risk factors perceive themselves to be at greater risk. However, the subjects rated their personal
risk substantially lower than that of others and were extremely optimistic about their own chances of avoiding the virus (see Figure 9.1).
A similar form of the optimism bias appears in workplace-related
health risks. The more direct experience workers have with occupational hazards without adverse outcomes, the more conﬁdent they are
in their ability to control the risk (Weyman, Clarke, and Cox 2003). For
instance, a study of mine bunker operations reported that there was a
“widespread faith in their ability to respond to dangerous incidents”
(Rushworth et al. 1986). It thus appears that there is a kind of “Lake
Woebegon” effect: when it comes to evaluating one’s own ability to
avoid adverse health outcomes, everyone feels above average.
The accumulation bias
Other inaccurate risk perceptions result from the tendency of humans to form incomplete problem representations. Researchers have

Roberts.indb 229

6/7/2005 9:29:38 AM

230 Seabury et al.

observed that people do tend to learn about risks in ways that change
their original assessments of risk. In a study concerning 130 manufacturing workers, Cree and Kelloway (1997) found that accident history
as well as perceptions of others’ commitment to health and safety were
predictive of workers’ risk assessments. They also found these risk perceptions related to the workers’ willingness to participate and turnover
intentions. However, their risk perceptions may still fall short of the
real level of exposure occurring in their workplace because of the accumulation bias.
People have the tendency to perceive risks “in isolation” rather than
as a sequence of similar decisions or one that accumulates over a lifetime (Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 1993). Researchers have found
that people typically do not perceive a difference between the likelihood of injury occurring when a risky action is taken once versus the
likelihood that ensues through multiple exposures. For example, people
may understand that the chance of being injured in a car accident is
about 1 in 10,000 each time they drive. However, they typically fail to
realize that this statement is equivalent to a 33 percent probability of
being in an injurious accident at least once during their lifetime (Slovic,
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein 1978).
Researchers have observed this tendency in a variety of psychology
experiments related to health behaviors. Doyle (1997) found that people
underestimate the cumulative risk of contraception use by failing to use
the binomial probability model, where the probability of an unintended
pregnancy is equal to 1 minus the probability of an intended pregnancy
in one encounter raised to the number of sexual encounters. Likewise,
Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff (1993) found that peoples’ risk estimates for being infected with AIDS in more than 10 encounters were
far too small when considering the risk they perceived in one encounter. Their subjects’ median risk perception of transmitting AIDS from a
male to female when using a condom was 5 percent in one encounter,
10 percent in 10 encounters, and 20 percent in 100 encounters. If the
subjects had appropriately applied the binomial probability model, they
would have argued that the risk was 40.1 percent in 10 encounters and
99.4 percent in 100; these values differ with statistical signiﬁcance.
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Summary
Here we have discussed three important biases about the ways in
which people perceive risks. It is important to note that the biases are
not mutually exclusive, and often work together. For instance, in the
AIDS perception study by Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff (1993) it was
found that individuals underestimate lifetime risk given their own estimates of the risk from a single exposure. However, they found that individuals substantially overestimated both the single exposure risk and
lifetime risk. This is easily explained by the availability bias; the risk of
HIV infection is highly publicized and easy to recall, thus individuals
tend to overestimate it. When taken in concert with the results of van
der Velde, van der Pligt, and Hooykaas (1994), we can see how all three
biases can be present with an individual’s perception of a single risk to
health.
These misperceptions can inﬂuence individual behavior and potentially lead to poor health decisions, including those precautions taken
and protective equipment used to ensure occupational safety. For example, workers may neglect to wear a mask in a dusty warehouse because
the risk of developing asthma from a single day of inhaling pollutants
is relatively low. On the other hand, Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff
(1993) found that individuals overestimate the ability of condoms to
protect them from a sexually transmitted disease. This suggests that
in some cases individuals may place too much faith in protective technologies, and may avoid other kinds of precautions that are necessary
to minimize the risk of injury.
How Do Individuals Value Risks?
Prospect theory suggests that it is important not only to consider
how individuals perceive risks, but also the ways individuals value risks.
More precisely, it suggests that we should pay attention to the relative
weights that individuals place on the gains and losses that are at stake.
Standard economic theory predicts that people should value gains and
losses symmetrically. In general, prospect theory suggests that this symmetry does not hold, particularly when the gains and losses are uncertain. If true, this might cause us to not only change our predictions about
behavior, but to change the way we interpret observed behavior.
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More speciﬁcally, individuals frequently display signs of loss aversion, suggesting that they dislike losses more than they like gains of
equal magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). While there are many implications of loss aversion, for our
purposes we can illustrate the key concepts with the following hypothetical scenario. Consider a risk averse individual who receives utility from some good y according to the function U(y), where U is increasing and concave. Now suppose the individual faces two lotteries:
one (which we call A) in which she begins with y = 2,000 and faces a
gain of 1,000 with probability 0.25, and the other (called B) in which
she begins with y = 3,000 and faces a loss of 1,000 with probability
0.25. In this example the expected utility for the lottery A is equal to
0.75U(2,000) + 0.25U(3,000) and the expected utility for lottery B is
equal to 0.75U(3,000) + 0.25U(2,000). It is a simple enough matter to
show that the gain in expected utility from beginning with 2,000 and
participating in lottery A is equal to the loss in expected utility from
participating in lottery B.3 This is an important point, because expected
utility theory implies that the amount individuals would be willing to
pay to participate in lottery A should be equal to the amount they would
pay to avoid lottery B.
As we have stated, we would not expect this symmetry to hold under prospect theory. Prospect theory generally supposes that individuals evaluate changes based on gains and losses. Moreover, individuals
evaluate these changes in welfare using a value function, which we denote V(·), that assigns a subjective value to a given gain or loss. Suppose
we ignore the problems discussed in the previous section and assume
that individuals perceive the probability of gain and loss accurately. If
we let a = [U(3,000) − U(2,000)] and b = [U(2,000) − U(3,000)], we can
deﬁne the value of lottery A as V(a) and the value of lottery B as V(b).
Under expected utility theory, we would have V(a) = − V(b), but under
prospect theory we expect that V(a) < − V(b). The subjective value that
individuals place on a loss is greater than the value placed on an equivalent gain. Thus, we can say that if individuals are loss averse, then the
amount they would be willing to pay to participate in lottery A will be
less than the amount they would pay to avoid lottery B.
We should note that the concept of loss aversion is distinct from
the concept of risk aversion, which is fundamental to the neoclassical theory of insurance demand. Risk aversion essentially states that
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individuals dislike risk, and will require a premium to accept a lottery
with an uncertain outcome but the same expected value as one with a
certain outcome. Mathematically, risk aversion is incorporated under
the standard model through the assumption that the utility function, represented by U(y) is concave (so the marginal utility of income increases
at a decreasing rate). Although the two concepts sound similar, they
refer to two very different behavioral phenomena. Simply put, an individual who is risk averse dislikes uncertainty, even uncertainty between
two positive outcomes. Someone who is loss averse dislikes a shortfall,
whether it occurs with certainty or not. In general, an individual can
be loss averse and risk averse at the same time. However, an interesting implication of loss aversion pointed out by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) is that loss averse individuals will be risk loving with respect to
avoiding losses (in other words, they will prefer an uncertain loss to a
certain one with identical expected value).
There is a great deal of experimental evidence to support the existence of loss aversion in individuals (e.g., see Knetsch 1989; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; and Bateman et al. 1997). Most of the
studies we are aware of focus on actual consumption goods, and have
not established whether or not individuals are averse to losses of health.
Nevertheless, the evidence supporting loss aversion in empirical studies
is certainly strong enough to suggest that it is a phenomenon worthy of
further study in the context of job-related health risks. As we shall see
later on, the possibility that individuals are averse to health losses will
have substantial implications for the economic analysis of workplace
safety.
How Do Individuals Respond to Risk?
While the ways individuals perceive and value risks are important
considerations for studying human behavior with regards to workplace
injuries, in some sense they are both merely elements in the decision
process that drives individual choices. McFadden (1999) deﬁnes a cognitive process as “the mental mechanism that deﬁnes the cognitive task
and the role of perceptions, beliefs, attitudes preferences and motives in
performing this task, to produce a choice.” Therefore, we can think of
risk perception and the value placed on risky options as speciﬁc components in the larger problem of individual decision making.

Roberts.indb 233

6/7/2005 9:29:39 AM

234 Seabury et al.

Economists generally rely on the principle of utility maximization as the cognitive process that drives behavior. Taking preferences
as given, the economic model predicts that individual behavior can be
well explained by a process by which individuals choose whatever allocation of resources provides them with the highest overall beneﬁt.
While there can be no question that the utility maximization model has
proved extremely useful and provided countless valuable insights into
human behavior over the years, it has been criticized by behaviorists as
ignoring many other important principles that inﬂuence behavior. This
criticism is an important one for our purposes, because even if we make
the right assumptions about subjective probability and subjective value
we may still ﬁnd it difﬁcult to predict behavior if individuals do not
respond to risk as assumed in the standard economic model.
If individuals fail to (always) act as rational utility-maximizing
agents, then what principles do we expect to govern the choices that
they make? Prelec (1991) argues that individuals create decision rules
to guide choices in cases where ordinary cost–beneﬁt analysis is problematic. It is important to distinguish between these rules and the more
common bounded rationality model. Prelec explicitly distinguishes
rules that override cost–beneﬁt analysis even when the analysis is relatively straightforward from the rules associated with bounded rationality, which are used exclusively when cost–beneﬁt analysis is difﬁcult
and costly. For our purposes, bounded rationality would lead to similar
results if the cost–beneﬁt analyses associated with workplace safety decisions are sufﬁciently complicated.
Prelec suggests three cases in which cost–beneﬁt analysis might
fail. The ﬁrst case is that of a temporal mismatch, whereby individuals
have difﬁculty assessing the net gain or loss of a particular action when
its cost(s) and beneﬁt(s) are separated by a substantial period of time.
The second refers to a saliency mismatch, in which one of the pair (i.e.,
either the costs or the beneﬁts) is vivid and easy to understand or imagine while the other is vague or uncertain. The ﬁnal case is that of a scale
mismatch, in which either there is a large disparity between the costs
and beneﬁts or if one of them is only realized if the action is repeated
many times. Prelec argues that cost–beneﬁt analysis fails under each of
these because it leads to an asymmetry in the weight assigned to either
the cost or beneﬁts associated with the action.4
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Risks to health resulting from workplace injuries may be subject to
any of the three mismatches that confound cost–beneﬁt analysis. For
example, determining the level of care to exert when using certain machinery that may pose a risk of loss of limb potentially suffers from the
scale mismatch. The scale effect could arise because the cost of using
a machine carefully is relatively small while the beneﬁt of not suffering a loss of limb is large. Faced with the similar decision of whether
or not to wear a seat belt, Prelec (1991) argues that individuals may
develop a simple rule that governs use regardless of small permutations
of the problem (such as whenever it rains or whenever driving on the
highway).
The scale mismatch is only one example of how behavior related
to workplace risks might be subject to these cost–beneﬁt asymmetries.
Repetitive stress disorders represent a set of common occupational injuries that may suffer from the temporal mismatch, given that they only
develop over long periods of time. The saliency mismatch could arise
in cases where workers felt ﬁnancial pressure to take risk. Faced with
the threat of job loss because of low productivity, for example, workers
may take unsafe shortcuts or work too fast because the potential for job
loss seems more “real” than the possibility of injury. These mismatches need not be mutually exclusive; decisions relating to activities that
might involve exposure to toxic chemicals potentially may be subject
to all three mismatches (the cost of injuries are likely to be delayed, of
unknown severity, and probably occur only after multiple exposures).
In general, if individuals create rules that govern behavior with regard to workplace activities that inﬂuence the likelihood of workplace
injuries, then these rules will have several implications for the predictions of the standard model laid out in the second section. We explore
these implications in the following section.
INTEGRATING THE STANDARD MODEL AND THE
BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Here, we come back to the results of the standard model and examine how they are affected by the principles of behavioral economics. We follow the same outline as in the second section, focusing ﬁrst
on compensating wage differentials and then moving on to the optimal
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workers’ compensation beneﬁts and levels of workplace safety. We consider how the results of the behavioral model affect both the theoretical
predictions of the standard model and the empirical studies estimating
these predictions.
Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Risk
Generally speaking, integrating the principles of behavioral economics with the standard model has relatively little impact on the
theory of compensating wage differentials. The standard model states
that workers will require higher compensation to accept employment
in occupations associated with increased risk of workplace injuries or
illnesses, ceteris paribus. In the behavioral model, we need only reﬁne
this statement to say that individuals will require higher compensation
to accept employment in occupations in which there is perceived to be
a greater likelihood of an injury or illness.
The distinction between actual and perceived risks is an important
one. The standard economic model predicts that individuals will respond
to the actual level of risk. Economists interested in workplace safety
have generally understood that individuals may not perceive risks accurately, however, and it is often assumed that individuals underestimate
the risk of job injuries.5 This assumption seems widely supported by the
empirical evidence on the availability bias, optimism bias and accumulation bias discussed in the third section. Given that we expect workers
to respond to the risks that they perceive, the size of the compensating
wage differential they demand will be based upon the perceived risk as
opposed to the actual risk. Importantly, as long as the perceived risk of
injury is positively related to the actual risk, the compensating wage
differential will still be positive.
As discussed in Viscusi (1993), if workers systematically underestimate the level of occupational risk, then they will demand a lower
compensating wage differential. To see how this can matter empirically,
consider Equation (9.1) on p. 222. In this setting the true job risk variable q serves as a proxy for the perceived job risk, and the estimated
parameter α represents the compensating wage differential multiplied
by the correlation between the actual and perceived job risk. If workers
underestimate the risk of job injury then the correlation between the
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true and perceived levels of risk will be less than 1, implying a lower
observed compensating wage differential.
The underestimation of risk may lead to a lower compensating
wage differential than the standard model would predict, but loss aversion will tend to have the opposite effect. To see this, consider that,
according to prospect theory, individuals choose between different options by comparing the gains and losses associated with each. In the
case of choosing an occupation, this would suggest workers compare
the “gain” of staying healthy and receiving wages against the “loss” of
being injured and receiving workers’ compensation beneﬁts.6 If individuals are loss averse, they will place additional weight on the loss from
being injured relative to the gain from staying healthy and receiving the
compensating wage differential. This suggests that if individuals are
loss averse they will require extra compensation to accept higher levels
of perceived risk than what is predicted by the standard model.
While the predictions of the behavioral model are fairly benign from
a theoretical standpoint, they are problematic for the purposes of estimation because they have opposite effects on the size of the differential.
This makes it difﬁcult to interpret differences in the estimated coefﬁcient (α) for different kinds of risk. For instance, the fact that past studies have had relatively more success estimating positive compensating
wage differentials for fatal risks than nonfatal risks is consistent with
two behavioral explanations: 1) that individuals underestimate the risk
of nonfatal injuries more than fatal injuries (which perhaps are overestimated), or 2) that the impact of loss aversion will be more severe with
respect to fatal injuries than nonfatal ones (because clearly it makes
sense to think of fatal injuries as involving a greater loss). While these
explanations need not be mutually exclusive, they complicate matters
by adding two more to the (already long) laundry list of items that potentially confound the estimation of compensating wage differentials.
In some ways, the issues raised by the behavioral model pose greater challenges to obtaining meaningful compensating wage differential
estimates than the standard criticisms. Measurement error and selection bias are statistical problems that can be addressed using standard
econometric techniques, at least if the proper instrumental variables can
be obtained. However, disentangling the estimated compensating wage
differential from the impact of subjective evaluations of risk and loss
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can only be accomplished by eliciting additional information from individuals.
While our discussion in this section has focused on wage differentials, disability beneﬁts represent an alternate means of compensating individuals for bearing risk. So, if we broaden our perspective to
think about the implications of the behavioral model on the total injury
compensation available to workers, we obtain similar results. Viscusi
and Moore (1987) model the trade-off that workers implicitly accept
between wages and workers’ compensation beneﬁts as an increasing
function of the level of risk. Individual behavior should be governed
by perceived risk, so if workers underestimate the true level of risk
then they will be willing to trade off less wages in return for beneﬁts
and thereby lower the optimal level of workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
On the other hand, if individuals are loss averse then they will place
a greater weight on the possibility of a loss, which will increase their
willingness to trade off wages for beneﬁts at any given level of perceived risk. Thus, elements of the behavioral model may lead to either a
lower or higher optimal level of workers’ compensation beneﬁts when
compared to the standard model.
Worker learning
Before moving on to discuss the optimal workers’ compensation
policy, it is worth considering the possibility that individuals learn to
overcome their subjective evaluations as they gain experience. Viscusi
(1979) hypothesizes that workers may be poorly informed about the
level of risk at the start of their careers, but gradually learn about the
level of risk over time. This suggests that the differences between the
perceived probability of injury and the true probability may diminish
over time, with workers possibly becoming perfectly informed with
sufﬁcient experience. If workers become more informed about risks,
i.e., if they underestimate risk less, then workers with longer tenure in
riskier jobs will demand higher compensating differentials or quit. Various works broadly support this prediction, including Viscusi (1979) and
Moore and Viscusi (1990).
Another possibility is that individuals become less loss averse over
time, in the sense that their relative weights on gains and losses become equalized as they gain experience. In a recent paper, List (2003)
ﬁnds experimental evidence that individuals with more experience in
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the market for trading cards tend to exhibit little or no evidence of loss
aversion while those with less experience do. If this result held more
generally to the case of workplace injuries it would suggest that workers with longer tenure would place relatively less weight on the possible
loss from injuries and therefore require less compensation.
Thus, the effect of worker learning is to mitigate the impact of the
behavioral model on the estimation of compensating wage differentials
over time. Unfortunately, we know far too little about just how much
workers actually learn over time to say with any certainty that this is
the case. While the results of List (2003) are provocative, it is not clear
ex ante whether or not individuals could learn to overcome aversion
to health “losses” from injuries the same way they overcome aversion
to income losses from trading goods. Additionally, while workers may
become more informed about injury risk with experience, the availability bias suggests that it is possible that as risks associated with familiar
tasks become better understood, individuals may revise their risk perceptions downward. Even if individuals do become more informed over
time and their subjective risk assessments and loss valuations become
“better,” the pace of learning may differ. This suggests that experience
might have a nonmonotonic effect on the compensating differential,
further complicating our ability to make predictions. Ultimately, a great
deal of work needs to be done before we can understand the ways in
which individuals learn about risk in the workplace.
Safety Incentives
The predictions of the behavioral model on the relationship between workers’ compensation beneﬁts and safety incentives are varied
and complex. Workers’ compensation beneﬁts can affect the safety incentives of workers if, by reducing the ﬁnancial burden of an accident,
they make workers less cautious about avoiding accidents. Obviously
loss aversion matters in this sense, because if individuals are loss averse
then they will have more incentives to take care for a given level of beneﬁts, but they may also be more responsive to a change in beneﬁts. This
suggests that under loss aversion, individuals may be more responsive
to changes in beneﬁts than predicted by the standard model.
When talking about compensating wage differentials and workers’
compensation beneﬁts we focused on how individuals perceive the level
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of risk, but when considering safety incentives it is important to consider how individuals perceive the way risks change as safety precautions
change. Past studies such as Rea (1981) and Viscusi (1990) have generally assumed that the effect of precautions on perceived risk is directly
related to the impact of precautions on actual risk. This suggests that if
individuals underestimate the risk associated with workplace injuries,
they will undervalue the marginal beneﬁt of taking additional precautions. If this is so, then individuals will underinvest in safety for any
given level of workers’ compensation beneﬁts. By extension, if beneﬁts
increase (decrease) then workers will generally respond by decreasing
(increasing) precautions by more than what would be predicted in the
standard model.
However, there are reasons to suspect that the relationship between
safety precautions and perceived risk is not as straightforward as suggested in the literature. The optimism bias and the aforementioned results of Weyman, Clarke, and Cox (2003) and Rushworth et al. (1986)
suggest that individuals may overestimate their ability to control risks.
This suggests that for any given level of beneﬁts individuals will tend
to be more cautious than predicted by the standard model. This suggests a result opposite of the case discussed above; a change in workers’
compensation beneﬁts would have less of an impact on worker safety
precautions than the standard model predicts.7
The implications of individual perceptions of risk on safety are not
exclusive to the safety precautions taken by individual workers. As we
discuss later on, it is plausible to suppose that employers, at least large
corporations, are less subject to some of the behavioral criticisms than
individual agents. Nevertheless, worker perceptions of risk may have
an impact on employer safety measures. Rea (1981) demonstrates that
if individuals underestimate risk they will demand too few safety measures from employers. On the other hand, if workers place too much
faith in protective technologies, as Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff
(1993) showed individuals tend to do with condoms, they may demand
supraoptimal safety measures from employers.
Note that these different effects of the behavioral model on the
level of safety measures taken assume that precautions are set as the
result of an implicit cost–beneﬁt analysis made by workers, even if their
subjective evaluations of probability and loss differ from the standard
model. However, we discussed earlier how workplace injuries may suf-
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fer from the kinds of cognitive mismatches that Prelec (1991) argues
can confound cost–beneﬁt analyses. If this is so, workers may respond
by implementing decision rules that govern the level of safety precautions they take. If workers operate under decision rules such as “always
wear safety goggles,” it is quite possible that relatively small changes
in disability beneﬁts will not be enough incentive to induce workers to
change their safety precautions. Thus, in extreme cases the behavioral
model may contend that there should be no relationship between safety
levels and workers’ compensation beneﬁts.8
DOES THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL APPLY TO EMPLOYERS?
Until now, all of our discussion has focused on applying the models of behavioral economics to workers. One question we have not addressed, and to our knowledge has not been addressed in the literature,
is whether or not employers behave as the perfectly rational, perfectly
informed economic agents they are supposed to be in the standard model. In this section we provide a brief discussion of how the behavioral
model could be applied to employers and how this would change our
predictions.
It is typical in economics to view employers, or ﬁrms more generally, as impersonal entities that are motivated solely by maximizing profits and share few of the behavioral nuances of individuals. For example,
it is common to view employers as risk neutral while individual workers (or other agents) are typically assumed to be risk averse.9 Likewise,
models of occupational safety that incorporate risk misperceptions by
individual workers typically assume that ﬁrms are fully informed about
the true injury risk. There are a number of reasons that employers may
behave more like the rational economic agents than individual workers.
First, employers may have access to better data on the actual risk of injury to employees. Also, it is not clear the extent to which the personal
nature or risk inﬂuences individual behavior, and it is possible that employers would have a more accurate perception of risk because it did
not directly affect them.
On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that employers may
not perfectly ﬁt the rational economic model. In general, large employers are probably most likely to be able to accurately predict the risk

Roberts.indb 241

6/7/2005 9:29:41 AM

242 Seabury et al.

of injury to an individual worker, simply because of the law of large
numbers.10 Small employers will simply not have enough observations
to accurately formulate a probability. Even if employers as organizations understand the true risk of injury to workers, they are still driven
by the decision making of individuals. It seems reasonable to suspect
that individual managers might be poorly informed about the risk of
injury to workers, or suffer similar cognitive biases about risk as those
discussed above.
Another factor that might mitigate some of the impact of employers’
risk misperceptions that will likely not be available to workers (even
unionized ones) is the presence of insurance companies. Presumably,
insurance companies have the knowledge and expertise to construct
the most accurate estimates of the actual risk of injury for individuals.
Thus, even if an employer does not place the appropriate marginal beneﬁt on safety precautions, the insurance company could provide ﬁnancial incentives for safety through discounts in workers’ compensation
premiums.11
However, there are other ways that investment in workplace safety
might enter a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function than through premiums, such as the
direct cost of investment, the impact of workplace safety on the expected marginal productivity of labor, and reductions in the compensating
wage differential. Even if insurance companies can mitigate some of
the impact of risk misperceptions, they likely won’t have much effect
on the wage negotiations between workers and employers unless they
are able to communicate the appropriate risk levels. Also, the ability of
insurance companies to convey accurate risk information will be less
for smaller ﬁrms that are not perfectly experience rated. And ﬁnally,
there are some risks for which even insurance companies likely have
trouble assessing accurately, such as catastrophic risks. In these special
cases, which involve extreme losses but have uncertain probability, employers and workers may over- or underreact in a similar fashion.
If employers as whole, or individual managers within ﬁrms, deviate
from the perfectly rational model in ways that are similar to individual
workers, then our model would predict different behavior for them as
well. Consider the case of compensating wage differentials. If employers underestimate the risk of injury to individual workers, we might expect that this would make them less willing to negotiate compensating
wage differentials. However, note that injuries will affect the expected
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marginal productivity of labor, because injured workers are (at least
temporarily) less productive than healthy ones. In this case, if employers underestimate the risk of injury it might lead them to overestimate
the expected marginal productivity of labor (because more workers will
be injured, and therefore be less productive, than expected by the employer). If employer misconceptions were positively correlated with the
true injury risk, i.e., if they underestimated risk more in riskier jobs, this
could lead to an upward bias of the compensating wage differential.12
Investment in workplace safety provisions will also be affected if
employers deviate from the standard model. If employers underestimate the risk of injury, they may thereby underestimate the marginal
beneﬁt of safety measures. If this is the case, it will lead employers to
underinvest in safety. On the other hand, suppose that employers overestimated their ability to inﬂuence workplace safety measures. This will
lead employers to “oversupply” workplace safety, meaning they will
invest beyond the point where the true marginal beneﬁt equals marginal
cost. However, if employers underestimate their ability to inﬂuence risk
they will tend to undersupply workplace safety provisions. Ultimately,
the equilibrium level of safety will be a complex function depending on
both the employer’s and the employee’s perceptions of risk as well as
other fundamentals of the model.13
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The discussion in the previous two sections focused on the implications of the behavioral model for research on the economics of
workplace safety. However, just as this research has inﬂuenced public
policy we believe that the issues we raise also have important policy
implications. We focus our discussion on the two policy areas that are
most closely related to our previous analysis: the use of compensating
wage differentials to estimate the value of life, and policies designed to
improve workplace safety.
Using Value-of-Life Estimates in Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
Government policies and regulations can often reduce the risk of
fatal and nonfatal injuries to individuals, but sometimes only at substan-
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tial cost. In order to determine which policies are most cost-effective, it
is necessary to have some estimate of the willingness to pay for a reduction in the level of risk. Compensating wage differential estimates can
be used to provide an estimate of the “value-of-life,” allowing a computation of the expected beneﬁt of increased safety in terms of a dollar
amount. The use of value-of-life estimates to evaluate public policies
began in the 1980s and has become more widespread since (Viscusi
1993).
Obviously these estimates are only useful to the extent that we are
able to identify them well empirically, and as we have discussed there
are numerous problems to doing so. The criticisms that come from the
behavioral model are different, however, in that they do not question the
validity of the empirical predictions as much as they question how to
use the predictions. Speciﬁcally, while the behavioral model does predict that the size of the estimated compensating wage differential may
be different than predicted by the standard model, this is not the same
as saying that the estimated differential is biased. Indeed, if we ignore
the measurement error and selection issues, the estimated relationship
between wages and actual job risk should be well identiﬁed. The complication comes in interpreting the coefﬁcient, because it will implicitly
reﬂect the relationship between the actual risk and the individuals’ subjective risk perceptions and valuations. This is particularly troubling if
the value-of-life estimate is used to assess the cost and beneﬁts of some
policy designed to reduce a risk that is subject to different cognitive
biases than job-related risk (such as a plane crash, the risk of which
individuals overestimate).
In some sense, the key impact of the behavioral model on the use
of value of life estimates is to highlight the need for additional data.
We simply do not know enough about the ways workers (or employers)
perceive, value, or respond to risk. Survey and experimental data that
elicited this information for job-related health and income risks would
not only increase our understanding of many of these issues, it would
allow us to generalize and improve the policy usefulness of value-oflife estimates based on labor market data.
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Promoting Safety in the Workplace
Workers’ compensation is generally thought to provide employers
and workers with ﬁnancial incentives to improve safety. While this may
be true, the behavioral model questions the effectiveness of both our
ability to predict how strong the safety incentives are and whether or
not they will have much effect at all. However, workers’ compensation
is certainly not the only public policy that deals with workplace safety.
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
was founded in 1971 as a regulatory body to promote safer workplaces,
and 24 states have their own health and safety plans that are approved
and monitored by OSHA. Rather than rely (solely) on ﬁnancial incentives, these organizations rely on traditional regulatory measures such
as inspection and enforcement of safety programs.
However, it needs to be determined in light of the behavioral criticisms exactly what kinds of safety programs are most likely to be effective. Rea (1981) demonstrated that if individuals misperceive the
risk of injuries they might respond to employer precautions in ways
that mitigate the beneﬁts of reduced risk. Moreover, if individual safety
behavior is determined by rule-based decision making then it is difﬁcult
to predict how (if at all) individuals will respond not only to ﬁnancial
incentives but also to regulatory or programmatic incentives.
One important way to improve safety, or at least to improve the efﬁciency of safety decisions, may be to provide information to workers.14
We discussed above how experience and learning by individuals may
allow them to overcome some of their cognitive biases about risk and
act more like the rational economic agent. Of course, it often requires a
substantial investment of time and effort to obtain and process information. If there are economies of scale in acquiring information then we
might expect ﬁrms to have an advantage in this regard, which would
make them a more efﬁcient mechanism to collect and process the relevant data. More work needs to be done to say for sure, but it is possible
that doing more to educate workers in risky positions, and perhaps the
employers as well, would lead to more efﬁcient long-run employment
contracts between workers and employers.15
Even if information cannot fully overcome workers’ or employers’
biases, it may be helpful in other ways. Suppose worker safety precautions were governed by rules, but those rules were based on suboptimal
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perceptions about risk. Thus, information may be able to help individuals switch to “better” rules that make them choose more efﬁcient levels
of precautions. All of this is highly speculative, but it does suggest that
a better understanding of how individuals think about and respond to
risk may allow us to come up with superior policies regarding workplace safety.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have attempted to highlight some principles of
behavioral economics and show how they can inﬂuence the economic
analysis of occupational safety. Behavioral economics predicts that in
some cases individuals will fail to perceive, value, or respond to risk as
predicted in the standard economic model. We have shown that if the
behavioral model holds it will at the very least greatly complicate the
analysis of how individuals respond to the risk of workplace injuries,
and in many cases the standard model might make misleading (if not
actually false) predictions about behavior.
We fully acknowledge that our analysis raises many more questions
than it answers. Economists generally make assumptions to simplify
analysis, and the elements of behavioral economics we discuss add
complication back to our model. Given this, it is probably not surprising that, when we consider the additional dimensions that might govern
individual choices, we ﬁnd that these dimensions often work in different directions and restrict our ability to make clear predictions. That
said, in many cases the general predictions of standard economic model
hold, particularly with regard to compensating wage differentials. The
strongest effect of the behavioral model seems to be to change our interpretation of the results we ﬁnd empirically, and often this interpretation
cannot be made without more a priori information about how individuals actually perceive, value, or respond to risk.
Now we come to the place that many researchers arrive at—calling for more research. In this case, it should be clear to the reader that
we indeed know very little. Work is needed to disentangle the various
behavioral predictions about the ways people cope with the risk of injuries and illnesses at work. Speciﬁcally, we need information not only
on how individuals perceive the risk of injury in various occupations
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but how these perceptions change over time and in response to worker
and employer safety precautions. We need information about how individuals value the risk of injury relative to the way they value wages
and higher compensation, and we also need to see how this valuation
changes over time. We need to learn how individuals respond to perceived risk, and how increased information changes those responses (if
at all). This information is not readily available given current sources
of data, but we feel that future experimental and observational studies
that address these and related issues will greatly increase our ability to
conduct research and inform meaningful policy pertaining to occupational safety.

Notes
We would like to thank Karen Roberts and seminar participants at the University of
Rhode Island for helpful comments. We take full responsibility for any errors. All views
presented in this paper are those of the authors, and should not be attributed to any institutions that they are afﬁliated with.
1. It is worth noting that this argument is not necessary to justify the use of partial insurance coverage. Basic insurance theory tells us that the optimal level of
insurance will equalize the marginal utility of income in the “good” and “bad”
states. Viscusi and Moore (1987) and Viscusi and Evans (1990) argue that the
marginal utility of income is lower for individuals with disabling injuries, possibly because working becomes more difﬁcult when one is disabled, and so the
optimal insurance contract provides less than full coverage of economic losses.
2. The distinction between predictable and unpredictable errors in judgment is important. If individuals make predictable errors, this suggests that they (might)
behave in a way different than that predicted by the standard economic model.
If, on the other hand, errors are random, then the economic model should predict
behavior accurately on average.
3. The difference is equal in absolute value to 0.25[U(3,000) − U(2,000)].
4. Note that in many cases these mismatches are related to the subjective assignments of perception and value discussed previously. For example, the saliency
mismatch is closely related to the availability bias, suggesting that individuals
consistently place greater weight on situations or outcomes that are easily understood. Likewise, a failure to place the appropriate weight on costs (or beneﬁts)
that occur only after multiple actions is similar to the availability bias, in which
individuals appreciate the cumulative risk resulting from multiple exposures.
5. In addition to suggesting the existence of compensating wage differentials,
Adam Smith (1776) also proposed that individuals underestimate risk, noticing
the relatively small number of individuals who purchased ﬁre insurance. Spence
(1977) provided a formal model of how the underestimation of risk can lead in-
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dividuals to underinsure against the risk of product failure, and Diamond (1977)
and Rea, Jr. (1981) examined how underestimating risk affects optimal workers’
compensation insurance (which we discuss more later).
Presumably, the gain and loss is measured relative to some benchmark utility
level that is received with certainty, i.e., the “reservation” utility level.
Note that we are implicitly assuming here that there is no ﬁxed safety level that
workers are trying to obtain. If workers are maximizing expected utility with
respect to safety precautions then they will set the marginal beneﬁt equal to the
marginal cost, which will lead to more precautions taken if they perceive a higher
marginal reduction in risk. If, on the other hand, workers are trying to attain some
ﬁxed level of (perceived) safety then overestimating the productivity of safety
precautions could lead to reduced precautions, because they can achieve this
perceived level with fewer precautions.
As mentioned before, empirical evidence has demonstrated a relationship between workers’ compensation claims rates and workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
However, as we cannot rule out the possibility that this relationship is driven
either by fraud or simply the efﬁcient response by individuals to some unobservable (to econometricians) costs of claim ﬁling instead of some change in actual
safety behavior, we cannot dismiss the possibility that actual workplace safety is
unresponsive to beneﬁt levels.
The assumption of risk-neutral ﬁrms is generally justiﬁed by the notion that
shareholders drive the behavior of ﬁrms. If this is true and shareholders are able
to perfectly diversify assets, they will desire the managers of ﬁrms to maximize
expected proﬁts. While this assumption of risk neutrality might be valid for large
ﬁrms, the notion of perfectly diversiﬁed shareholders is probably less meaningful for small ﬁrms.
On the other hand, it is not clear why a large union would not have access to
similar information, so it seems less likely that there would be a divergence between the risk perceptions of employers and organized labor.
In the long run, insurance premiums should be completely “passed on” to workers in a perfectly competitive market. If wages are sticky, however, there will be
short run costs to premiums that will inﬂuence ﬁrm behavior.
Note that if workers underestimated risk in a similar fashion as employers, they
would demand less of a compensating differential in the same occupations that
ﬁrms would be willing to offer higher wages. Thus, the net effect on the compensating differential estimate would be ambiguous.
These other model primitives include such factors as the complimentarity of
worker and employer safety precautions and differences in utility and marginal
utility of income in the injured and health states.
It is important to distinguish efforts to increase safety from efforts to make the
level of safety more efﬁcient. Some of the predictions of the standard model actually predict that there might be too much safety relative to the standard model.
In this case, it could be efﬁcient to make people less careful.
Of course, we recognize that it is difﬁcult to communicate risk information so
that it is perceived accurately.
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Revisiting Black Lung
Can the Feds Deliver Workers’
Compensation for Occupational Disease?
Peter S. Barth
University of Connecticut

With only a few exceptions, American workers are protected from
work-caused injuries and diseases under state—not federal—workers’
compensation laws. As a result, it is an oddity to ﬁnd a speciﬁed category of private sector workers covered under a federal workers’ compensation program, and solely for one grouping of diseases. Since there
are strongly held positions on the desirability of having the federal government play a dominant role in compensation for other occupational
diseases, the track record of such a program can serve as an indicator
of how successful such a new approach might be. The central focus of
this chapter is the Black Lung Program, created to compensate workers
for occupational disease due to coal dust exposure. In this chapter I ﬁrst
describe the history and the development of the law, and then give some
emphasis to the beneﬁts that the program has delivered. I also consider
the challenges of federalizing a program that had been administered
previously, solely by the states. I conclude by attempting to lay out
some lessons that the program has provided us.
The origins of my interest in this subject can be traced to the early
1970s. Although the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act that created the
Black Lung Program was enacted in 1969, it was actually the passage
of the Occupation Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 that led me to
this subject area. Section 27 of the 1970 law created the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws to evaluate and make
recommendations on a host of issues related to those laws. While the
commission’s ﬁnal report assessed a variety of issues, including those
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that the OSHA statute expressly mandated, one issue that was barely
considered was that of compensation for occupational disease. As a result, I considered that a necessary trail to follow.
The second factor that led in this direction also followed from the
work of the commission. One of the central themes in the life of the
commission was the future role, if any, of the federal government in
workers’ compensation programs. A steady drumbeat of those opposed
to federal involvement was that the three programs for which the federal government had responsibility were, at best, no better than the state
programs. Like so much in this ﬁeld, it was difﬁcult to separate fact
from self-interest, conventional wisdom, and rumor.
I conducted several studies relating to occupational disease that led
me to conclude that the states were doing an ineffective job of compensating afﬂicted workers, or their survivors, for most diseases.1 While the
temptation was strong to suggest that this be left to the federal government to remedy, it seemed irresponsible to do so without ﬁrst examining
an existing federal program to compensate victims of occupational disease. The result of that was my examination of the federal Black Lung
Program, which left me wary of recommending that the state programs
for occupational disease be scrapped.2 If neither the state programs nor
the federal Black Lung Program were delivering beneﬁts well to workers with occupational diseases, what other alternatives existed? Several
things about the tort experience as found in the asbestos debacle or in
the Federal Employers Liability Act as it applied to railroad employees
offered little hope that this was the appropriate route to take in place of
workers’ compensation. In the absence of any more general approaches
to occupational disease compensation, it may be that the various state
and federal programs should be reexamined to determine whether the
more recent experience appears to be more promising.
The Black Lung experience is not the only source of learning on
federal involvement in occupational disease compensation. A new federal program for occupational disease compensation recently has been
created, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act of 2000. As its name indicates, this legislation targets a
highly speciﬁc group of workers. However, it is probably too soon to
evaluate at this point, particularly since the portion assigned to the Department of Energy (subsection D) has experienced some serious delays
in its implementation.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW
On November 20, 1968, an explosion occurred in a large mine
in Farmington, West Virginia. After an extraordinary amount of media coverage of the attempt to rescue miners trapped therein, the mine
was sealed 10 days after the blast, entombing 78 men. This tragedy led
Congress to pass the Coal Mine Health and Safety legislation, which
President Nixon signed 13 months later. The law aimed to improve the
safety conditions in America’s coal mines, and the bulk of the law is
directed that way. However, at the urging of some powerful members
of Congress from the coal-producing states, particularly West Virginia
and Kentucky, a Title IV was inserted to provide “black lung beneﬁts”
to miners with the disease.
As the statute was initially enacted, it can be separated into three
distinct portions. First, claims for old cases that met certain criteria
were to be paid. In some instances, these cases emanated from miners
or survivors of miners who had stopped working in coal mining many
years before. These claims were to be paid out of U.S. Treasury funds.
Secondly, compensation was to be paid for persons who became disabled or died more recently, and where claims were to be ﬁled in the period after the old cases had had time to make their claims. These claims
were to be paid initially by the U.S. government, with their liability to
be shifted to coal mine operators. Finally, eligibility for beneﬁts under
the federal law would expire in several years, subject to certiﬁcation
by the U.S. Department of Labor that the state programs met speciﬁed
standards, allowing the states to again assume sole responsibility to administer their workers’ compensation programs. Table 10.1 provides a
summary of the most signiﬁcant developments under the law.
The case for a federal black lung beneﬁts program partially rested
on the argument that the states were not providing compensation beneﬁts to coal miners who suffered from this condition. At the time, there
was little evidence to demonstrate how frequently states were granting compensation beneﬁts to miners disabled by respiratory illnesses
caused by their employment. Supporters of a federal black lung beneﬁts
program did not differentiate between the states as to those that were
doing a more conscientious job of providing compensation in a manner
consistent with their laws. The case for a federal program clearly left
unresolved a number of questions, including whether the states were
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Table 10.1 Historic Developments, Black Lung Program
Year
1969

Measure
CMHSA enacted.

Signiﬁcance
Creates Black Lung Program.

Part B established in SSA.
Part C established in USDOL.
1972

Law amended.

Extends Part B program by 18 months.
Part C program life extended from
1976 to 1981.
Federally funded beneﬁts under Part C
to end in 1973.

1977

Law amended and Black Lung
Revenue Act enacted.

Interim standards imposed on Part C
program.
Termination of Part C program is
dropped.
Creates Superfund-like arrangement.

1980

Ronald Reagan elected.

New administration.

1981

Black Lung Beneﬁts Act and
Black Lung Beneﬁts Revenue Act
of 1981 enacted.

Beneﬁt standards tightened. Coal
excise tax increased. Insurers escape
potentially high liabilities.

1985

COBRA enacted.

Excise tax increased as a temporary
measure.

1987

PL100-203.

Period of temporary excise tax
increase extended to 2013.

1988

Pittston Coal Group et al. v.
Sebben et al. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).

Trust fund and employers dodge
potentially large liability.

1997

USDOL propounds new
regulations.

Proposes tighter administration and
relaxation of some standards.

2000

New regulations promulgated.

NOTE: CMHSA = Coal Mine Health and Safety Act; SSA = Social Security
Administration; USDOL = U.S. Department of Labor; COBRA = Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
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enabling workers with other forms of occupational diseases to receive
compensation beneﬁts. And the case in favor of enactment of Title IV
was advanced vigorously on the grounds that it would be a very inexpensive draw on the federal budget. Advocates for enactment argued
that it would likely be a relatively inexpensive program for the coal
mine companies, who found themselves in an industry that was in secular and very serious decline, particularly in the underground sector.
Title IV largely consisted of two parts. For claims ﬁled on or before
December 31, 1971, the program, Part B, was to be administered by the
Social Security Administration (SSA). The goal was straightforward
enough: beneﬁts, funded by the U.S. Treasury, were to be provided for
persons who were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or to dependent survivors of miners who had died from that disease. The hope was
that in the ﬁrst two years of the program, all the old cases would be
compensated, leaving the newly developing cases for Part C of the program. The latter was to be the U.S. Department of Labor’s (USDOL’s)
responsibility beginning in 1973. That agency was to certify that the
states were meeting certain minimum standards, and that the new cases
of sickened miners then would be administered by the states. As such,
the Part B portion of the program would fade out of existence, as beneﬁt
determinations would cease after the initial two years, and as a result of
the attrition of beneﬁciaries through aging and passing on. The expectation was that through attrition, Part C would become superﬂuous as
states would administer their workers’ compensation law and accept the
coverage of mine workers with pneumoconiosis.
This phasing out of a federal role was linked to a timetable that
proved to be wholly unrealistic. The hope was that the “old” claims
would be dealt with under Part B, and that all of those claims would
have been ﬁled by Dec. 31, 1971. The transition year, 1972, was to have
claims paid by SSA only until the end of the year and then handed over
to USDOL. After December 31, 1972, the beneﬁts were to be paid by
coal mine operators under the USDOL’s Part C program, or through the
federally certiﬁed state workers’ compensation programs. In essence,
the plan was for those who ﬁled a claim in the transition year to be paid
after Dec. 31, 1972, in the same manner as were those who ﬁled a claim
after that date.
For those “new” claims ﬁled in 1972 and later, where beneﬁts were
not paid under a federally certiﬁed state law or by a coal mine operator,

Roberts.indb 257

6/7/2005 9:29:44 AM

258 Barth

federal general revenues were to be used to pay beneﬁts. The expectation by some was that the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act would
lead to a sharp reduction in the incidence of black lung disease. That
expectation relied upon the various health and safety provisions that
were the raison d’être of the 1969 law. The hope was that this would
enable federal involvement in these cases to cease by the end of 1976,
aside from simply continuing to pay beneﬁts under the Part B program.
Indeed, beneﬁt payments made under the Part C program, whether from
a mine operator or paid by USDOL, would no longer be required after
that time. Thus, the plan was that the liability of mine operators was to
be a temporary one, aside from any state law beneﬁts.
Some critics charged that Part B was not a workers’ compensation
program because it had characteristics that were different from all the
state programs. For example, beneﬁts for living miners was paid solely
for total disability (comparable to Social Security Disability Insurance),
once beneﬁts began, they were expected to be paid for a lifetime, and
beneﬁt amounts were not linked to the worker’s earnings. By contrast,
all workers’ compensation programs in the states (and all other jurisdictions that I know), pay beneﬁts also for partial disability, compensation
for temporary disability appears to be the cornerstone of all other programs, and beneﬁts are almost always linked to the worker’s preinjury
earnings level.
Another feature that seemed to differentiate the federal program
was that beneﬁts were awarded based on the date that the claim was
ﬁled, not on the date when total disability or death occurred. Since the
payments were considered to be workers’ compensation beneﬁts, any
Social Security disability beneﬁts were offset against the Part B payments, as were unemployment insurance, state workers’ compensation,
and temporary disability insurance beneﬁts. Beneﬁt levels were tied to
the federal employee pay scale so that beneﬁt payments (new and continuing) were adjusted (upward) annually in line with the federal pay
schedule.
Upon enactment of the law, claims for beneﬁts from workers or
survivors poured into local SSA ofﬁces. A variety of coal worker organizations worked at spurring the submission of claims, and since beneﬁts were to begin for successful claimants from the date of ﬁling, any
delays meant foregone income. In the ﬁrst year of the program, about
one-quarter of a million claims were ﬁled. Although 350,000 claims
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were ﬁled by the end of December 1971, new claims continued to ﬂow
in at the rate of about 1,500 per week. Clearly, coal mine operators
could foresee a massive liability awaiting them. Moreover, despite the
unexpectedly large volume of claims by Dec. 31, 1971, it was also apparent that not all of the “old” cases had been ﬁled; indeed, some were
for death or disability that had occurred many years previously. SSA
moved with extraordinary speed on the claims submitted, but much
to the disappointment of the program’s supporters, about half of the
claims were denied compensation. These three factors, the potentially
ruinous outlook for some mine operators, the continuing inﬂow of old
cases—many of which were based on employment in the mines that
ended before 1970—and SSA’s denial rate led those who supported the
1969 enactment to push to amend the law in 1972.
The 1972 amendments extended the Part B program for an additional 18 months. This would enable more of those with “old cases” to
ﬁle claims under the Part B program. The Part C program, which was
to have ceased at the end of 1976, was to be maintained until December 31, 1981. This gave the states more time to amend their laws and
change their practices so as to achieve certiﬁcation by USDOL. It would
also extend the period for which claims for newly developed illnesses
or fatalities would be eligible for beneﬁts that would be paid out of
federal funds. After December 31, 1981, it was envisioned that the payments under Part C were to end. A new transition period was mandated,
from July 1, 1973, to December 31, 1974. Under the 1972 amendments,
claims ﬁled prior to July 1, 1973, that were approved would receive
lifetime beneﬁts; those ﬁled from July 1, 1973, to December 31, 1973,
were to receive federally funded beneﬁts till December 31, 1973, and
then become the responsibility of the mine operators. Any claims ﬁled
after December 31, 1973, were to be the responsibility of the employers.
The hearings that led to the 1972 amendments along with the modiﬁcations caused SSA to grasp the message that Congress was conveying and substantially liberalize the standards for compensability. However, when USDOL was handed the administrative baton on July 1,
1973, a variety of disasters befell the agency. First, the agency was
overwhelmed by large numbers of old claims from the transition period
and from post-July 1. Second, the states did not respond as had been
forecast with the result that successful state certiﬁcation never material-
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ized. The states did not enact legislation to enable them to be certiﬁed
by USDOL, absolving the federal government from turning over the
administration and funding to the states. Additionally, unlike the Part
B program which used federal funds, USDOL was now responsible for
identifying responsible payers, a litigious and lengthy process. Indeed,
in most cases no responsible operator could be identiﬁed and made liable, so USDOL was the payer of last resort.
USDOL was not the only party that found the law difﬁcult, and it
received considerable heat for the way it carried out its responsibilities.
The law’s most ardent supporters were frustrated with the Labor Department as well, eventually resulting in amending the law again, this
time in 1977. For a number of reasons, delays of several years in adjudicating claims meant that applicants were not learning of the resolution
of their claims. Worse, for the law’s advocates, fewer than 8 percent of
claims were approved for beneﬁts where a decision had been rendered.
By the time of the 1977 amendments to the law, about 125,000 claims
had been ﬁled with USDOL, 6,000 received awards, and 70,000 claims
were denied.3 In sharp contrast, to that date SSA had achieved an approval rate of 70 percent. The difference was that the standards USDOL
used for compensability were based on the agency’s best efforts at compliance with a statute that was vague at best.
The 1977 amendments enabled USDOL to set its own medical standards for determining compensability. Until those standards were ﬁnalized, however, temporary standards were to be used and here the amendments imposed very strict guidance. The labor department’s interim
standards were to be no more restrictive than the ones used by SSA under the Part B program after the 1972 amendments (which achieved the
nearly 80 percent acceptance rate). In addition to lowering the standards
for ﬁnding the presence of the disease, evidentiary requirements on the
claimants were reduced, the notion of total disability was broadened,
and the occupational qualiﬁcations were expanded. Previously denied
claims were to be reviewed once again for entitlement by USDOL, as
were previously denied Part B claims, and claimants could provide new
evidence if they chose to do so.
In addition to greatly expanding the opportunity to obtain beneﬁts,
the termination date for the Part C program was dropped, essentially
making the program a permanent one. Further, Congress needed to ﬁx
the ﬁnancing problem that had resulted from the huge inﬂow of claims
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under Part C, along with USDOL’s inability to successfully assess liability against private coal companies in so many of the successful
claims. The result was a separate piece of legislation, the Black Lung
Revenue Act of 1977, which took a Superfund-like approach to ﬁnancing beneﬁts.4 A tonnage tax was levied on coal extracting companies
to support a federal trust fund that would pay beneﬁts in one of three
instances. First, for a compensable claim where a responsible operator
could not be identiﬁed, the fund would pay the appropriate beneﬁts.
Second, the fund would pay if the successful claimant had last worked
in the mines prior to January 1, 1970. Finally, the fund would pay beneﬁts in cases where a responsible operator did not begin to make payments in a timely manner, though the fund would then seek reimbursement from the business.
Despite the issuance and application of the more liberal, interim
rules, many claims were denied. While USDOL promulgated its interim
rules in a manner that it believed was no more strict than those it was
obliged not to exceed, this led to court challenges by claimants denied
beneﬁts under the interim rules. A critical issue was one of the presumptions in USDOL rules that could be invoked by a claimant if the worker
had at least 10 years of employment in coal mining. Four separate U.S.
Circuit Courts found the requirement that there must be at least 10 years
of employment before the presumption in the claimant’s favor could
be invoked to be unacceptably restrictive, and ordered that USDOL reopen over 94,000 cases. Had these cases been found to be successful,
the costs could have exceeded $13 billion, imposing a burden both on
the trust fund and on employers and their insurers. Strikingly, the Supreme Court found that the application of this key presumption had
been more restrictive than the interim standards were to allow, but that
the 94,000 cases would not have to be reopened.5 Instead, the decision
required reconsideration only of the small number of denied applications (6,000–7,000 claims) that had sought a judicial review at the time
of the denial.
Three things led to another major turning point in the program in
1980–1981. First, USDOL issued the new regulations for the program,
no longer tied to the liberal standards of the interim rules. Second, a new
administration was elected in 1980. It was evident that it would not continue the more inclusive type of program that had evolved under both
the SSA standards and the interim ones that USDOL employed after the
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1977 amendments. Third, by 1981 many claims had been determined
to be compensable. The new administration sought to tighten standards
under the law. The law’s most ardent supporters could consider that
their war had been won and that few older miners with respiratory illnesses (or survivors) had not received compensation. In 1981, the laws
were amended by enactment of the Black Lung Beneﬁts Revenue Act
of 1981 and the Black Lung Beneﬁts Amendments of 1981. The result
was legislation that emerged from compromises between the law’s defenders and those who believed that it had been overly generous in the
awarding of beneﬁts. Reﬂecting this compromise, while some standards
for beneﬁt eligibility were toughened, claims that had been ﬁled before
the effective date were to be evaluated under the criteria that were in
place previously.
The new amendments also made accommodations to most of the
interested parties, including the insurance industry, which was relieved
of having to pay beneﬁts for some of about 10,000 cases that would
now become the responsibility of the trust fund. At the time the 1981
amendments were passed, the trust fund was already indebted to the
U.S. Treasury by over $1.5 billion. To remedy that, the amendments increased the excise tax on the coal extraction industry. The tax was again
increased (as a temporary, 10-year measure) in 1985 in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which also placed a
5-year moratorium on the interest charges due to the Treasury. In 1987,
PL 100-203 extended the temporary tax rates that had been set in 1985
through 2013.
In 1997, USDOL announced changes that it sought to make in its
regulations. One of the goals was to improve the efﬁciency of claims
adjudication. Another aim was to reduce some of the difﬁculty that
some applicants faced in having their claims found to be compensable.
The ﬁnal regulations were announced in December 2000 and then were
subjected to serious challenge in the court. Widely varying estimates
were made about the impact of the changes on employer and trust fund
costs and on the incidence of successful claiming that would be expected to occur.
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BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES
Compensation for beneﬁts under the federal program varies only
with the presence of and number, if any, of dependents. As of 2003, the
compensation of a primary beneﬁciary was $534 per month, or $801 per
month for a primary beneﬁciary and one dependent. (The amounts are
the same in the Part B and Part C programs.) The maximum monthly
beneﬁt was $1,069 for a primary beneﬁciary and three dependents. Federal black lung beneﬁts are considerably lower than those payable in
state workers’ compensation programs, though the state claims appear
to be more difﬁcult to win. A sample of state workers’ compensation
beneﬁts is shown here for illustrative purposes, drawing on those states
that have had the largest number of federal claimants. The following
were the maximum weekly beneﬁts under state workers’ compensation
laws for total disability in 2003:
$569
Alabama
Illinois
$1,004
Kentucky
$571
Pennsylvania $675
Virginia
$681
West Virginia $527
The state beneﬁts rates assume total disability, and unlike the federal beneﬁts, are not payable for a lifetime, typically. Moreover, the
monthly federal beneﬁt rates are adjusted annually to reﬂect changes in
average price levels. Medical beneﬁts for treatment of the compensable
condition are paid fully, theoretically, in each system.
USDOL is not able to provide a single estimate of the number of
successful miner claimants over the life of the program. It can report,
however, the number of beneﬁciaries with “active claims” in a year.
Active claims (under Part C) include any of the following: those being
paid from the trust fund or by responsible mine operators, cases in interim pay status, those where offsets are taken and those that have been
suspended temporarily. In terms of the number of beneﬁciaries, both
primary and total (where total includes both primary and dependent
beneﬁciaries), the program is rapidly receding. Table 10.2 shows that
the Part C program has contracted from its high point in 1983, when
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Table 10.2 Black Lung Beneﬁciaries, Part C Program, Selective Years

Miners
Widows
Totala

1980

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

52,922
26,739
139,073

64,181
35,178
166,043

54,920
41,607
150,123

40,866
44,103
123,213

27,340
41,585
94,488

14,733
32,615
61,162

Total includes all primary and dependent beneﬁciaries and excludes medical-beneﬁtonly claims.
SOURCE: Unpublished and published annual reports, USDOL.
a

over 64,000 miners were receiving beneﬁts.6 Not surprisingly, the Part
B program has had a very substantial decline in the number of its beneﬁciaries, particularly miners, as can be seen in Table 10.3. The data
demonstrate how much the Part B beneﬁts provided ﬁnancial support to
an older miner population, many of whom had stopped working before
the law was enacted. SSA estimates that 97 percent of the miners and
widows were age 65 and over in 2001.
One of the more contentious issues over the life of the program has
been its utilization. When the law was ﬁrst proposed, and in its early
years, the numbers of potential (successful) applicants for beneﬁts were
greatly underestimated. In 1970, the ﬁrst full year of the program, coal
mining employed only 132,000 workers. While that number had been
declining for several decades, 15 years earlier, only 169,000 persons
were employed in coal mining. (Clearly, a number of those employed in
1955 were also employed in 1970.) About 350,000 claims (some from
survivors) were ﬁled within the ﬁrst two years of the Part B program. It
appears that more (former) miners were drawing Part B beneﬁts in 1974
Table 10.3 Black Lung Beneﬁciaries, Part B Program, Selective Years

Miners
Widows
Totala

1974

1979

1985

1990

1995

2001

169,097
134,700
487,216

129,558
146,527
419,948

77,836
138,328
294,846

45,643
118,705
210,678

24,573
91,517
143,011

9,779
55,412
79,518

Total includes all primary and dependent beneﬁciaries.
SOURCE: SSA (2002).

a
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Table 10.4 Part C Claims, Adjudication, Initial Level, FY 2001a
Findings
Trust fund approved
Trust fund denied
Responsible operator
approved
Responsible operator
denied
Total approved
Total denied
Total ﬁndings

Number decided
80
757
283

Approval rate (%)
9.6
8.0

3,269
363
4,026
4,389

8.3

a
Includes reconsidered claims.
SOURCE: USDOL (2001).

than were employed in the mines at the time or within any recent years.
It is evident that a very large proportion of persons who ever worked in
coal mining applied for and in many cases received beneﬁts from either
the Part B or the Part C programs. While this attests to the liberality of
the compensability standards of the law, at least during its ﬁrst decade,
it also suggests that respiratory illness in coal miners was widespread.
Table 10.4 shows the results of Part C claims decided in ﬁscal year
2001, the most recent year for which these data are available from the
Labor Department. While almost 4,300 Part C claims were decided that
year, only 363 (8.3 percent) were approved that year. Clearly, the level
of activity in terms of new claims has slowed down substantially from
earlier years. It seems likely that the most recent changes in regulations
will lead to a higher rate of claim acceptances, and this in turn may
generate some increase in claiming.
TRUST FUND EXPENSES
Though the volume of new claims decisions and acceptances is
small relative to previous years, the program’s continuing expenses are
not trivial. As shown in Table 10.5, expenditures by the trust fund for
the Part C program in ﬁscal year 2001 were approximately $1 billion,
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Table 10.5 Black Lung Beneﬁts Program Obligations, FY 2001,
Part C ($, 000)
Total obligations
Total beneﬁts
Income beneﬁts
Medical beneﬁts
Administrative costs
Interest charges
Coal tax revenues
Repayable advances from the Treasury Department
Cumulative trust fund debt

1,016,994
396,928
336,813
60,116
52,252
567,814
522,200
505,000
7,253,557

SOURCE: USDOL (2001).

including the interest charges to the fund for current and previous borrowing from the Treasury Department. Strikingly, though the number
of recipients has been declining over the previous 10 years, obligations
have increased, albeit slowly. The reason for this is that despite the decline (in nominal dollars) in expenditures for indemnity and medical
beneﬁts, the increase in interest charges has more than offset this. Since
tax revenue from coal mining was about one-half of that amount, the
fund needed to borrow another $500 million in FY 2001. The result is
that the fund is indebted to the Treasury by about $7.3 billion. Note that
this does not include payments made during the year by mine operators
under the Part C program for new and continuing beneﬁciaries. Expenditures for the Part B program in 2001 continued to decline, falling to
$470 million for the year (SSA 2002). Note also the relatively small
proportion of total beneﬁts that went for medical beneﬁts. It reﬂects
several things, including the limited ability to treat such respiratory
conditions, and the absence of certain costly medical procedures that
other illnesses and injuries would require.
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SOME LESSONS IN RETROSPECT FROM THE BLACK LUNG
EXPERIENCE
What lessons can be drawn from the experience of a program that is
almost 35 years old? The issue may be more than one of academic interest. The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) is a new federal, occupational disease program. It
may not be the last time that the federal government seeks to replace or
augment portions of the states’ workers’ compensation laws.
Breadth versus Depth in Beneﬁts
The Black Lung Program is a prototype of those transfer payment
programs where government opts for extremely broad coverage (in this
instance with respect to the nature of the health condition), but very
modest amounts for beneﬁciaries. Though state workers’ compensation programs can scarcely be characterized as generous in their beneﬁts, they appear to be absolutely muniﬁcent compared to the federal
standard.7 Any new transfer payment program may face some trade-off
between coverage and beneﬁt adequacy that is the result of implicit
budget constraints. At the birth of this program, its supporters understated the potential number of beneﬁts applicants. Once the legislation
was enacted, a widespread effort to generate applications began, and
the numbers of applicants—and eventually beneﬁciaries—swelled. Yet
despite the changes enacted during the program, little effort was made
by program advocates to increase the basic level of beneﬁt.
Problems with Multiple Agency Delivery
The Black Lung Program can be analyzed as two distinct ones.
Though the Part B (SSA) and Part C (USDOL) components of the law
were quite clearly delineated, they both were responsible for providing
beneﬁts for black lung disease to coal mine workers or their survivors.
As a result, for several years the standards for compensability were
markedly different in the two agencies. This created enormous problems for those responsible for the less liberally administered program,
in seeking to mollify those who were denied beneﬁts. Thereafter, the
more liberal standards applied by one agency were essentially imposed
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on the other, only to change again. The observation that multiple agency administration was problematic is hardly one that required over 30
years of program experience. However, it may have been lost on those
who created the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation
Program Act of 2000. A few years into the life of that program, a variety of groups called for the Department of Energy to relinquish its role
under Part D and transfer the administration of that portion of the law to
the Department of Labor. Recall also that in 1997 the administration of
the Part B program was transferred from SSA to USDOL.
State Workers’ Compensation Programs Still Have Difﬁculty with
Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis
The original plan for this law was to turn it over to the states after
the federal government certiﬁed the adequacy of the state laws. That
proved to be one of the many missteps taken by the law. For all purposes, the states did not rush in to do so as had been forecast. The result
is that USDOL is still responsible for determining both compensability
and liability under the law. There does not appear to be any statutory
bar on a worker’s successfully winning compensation in the state systems. And since beneﬁt levels tend to be higher in the state programs,
one would expect that most applicants would seek beneﬁts there. Data
are lacking on the numbers of workers who have successfully gained
beneﬁts in the states, but there are reasons to believe that gaining them
is difﬁcult. First, the number of workers with federally derived beneﬁts
who are also obtaining state beneﬁts appears to be minuscule. USDOL
has reported that only 4 percent of the total cohort of Black Lung Program beneﬁciaries have an offset of their federal awards. Additionally,
USDOL provides SSA with a listing of Part C beneﬁciaries in order to
apply the SSDI offset.8 The annual amount of the offset savings to SSA
was less than $400,000. Data from the states reinforces the view that
the states are not paying many new black lung claims. In at least one
state, Kentucky, the law was tightened in 1996, and although it appears
to have been liberalized in 2002, for all purposes, virtually no new beneﬁciaries are being compensated. Until 1996, Kentucky may have been
the most liberal of the states with regard to compensating this disease.
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Deﬁning the Disease
Historically, many jurisdictions worldwide and in the various states
have “scheduled” diseases that would be compensable in their systems.
By deﬁning the conditions that would be compensable, at least under
certain conditions, these laws reduced the difﬁculty in administering them. The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act followed that model,
though it did so inadequately. Prior to its enactment in 1969, there was
no disease known as black lung. (History now has it that this was a legislatively created disease.) The law’s supporters and their representatives led the miners to expect federal compensation for any respiratory
ailment. Clearly, that magniﬁed the potential scope of coverage and included a wide range of medical conditions. Certainly, the proponents
of the law aimed to cover as broad a range of conditions as they could.
Those who sought to limit the range of compensable conditions deﬁned
the disease as disabling or even “complicated” coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. Those who administered the law had to determine its intent
in the absence of a well-deﬁned, legislative-targeted disease condition.
The various measures to amend the law and to force SSA and USDOL
to review claims that had been denied were a product of this difference in perception about the coverage of the law. The issue continues
to characterize the program. Two weeks before the close of the Clinton
administration, USDOL promulgated ﬁnal rules to revise its regulations
of the law. (The original proposed rules changes were put forward in
1997.) Among other changes, the regulations expanded the deﬁnition
of the disease.
The “Desk Book” of the administrative law judges points out that
the disease is both medical and legal, with the former being “merely a
small subset of the afﬂictions compensable under the Act.”9 It continues, “a medical diagnosis of no pneumoconiosis is not equivalent to a
legal ﬁnding of no pneumoconiosis.”10
Presumptions Carry Both Advantages and Disadvantages
The statute and the regulations for Black Lung Program beneﬁts include a number of presumptions. Presumptions are placed into laws as
a way to ease or shift the burden of proof in a claim for beneﬁts. There
are several reasons why the use of presumptions can be helpful to all
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parties in adjudicating workers’ compensation claims for nontraumatic
conditions. The major virtue of using them is that it eliminates the need
to litigate the same (or broadly similar) issues repeatedly. As a result,
outcomes are more predictable, and they can be derived more expeditiously and with lower transaction costs. For example, expert witnesses
need not be used repeatedly in disputes over the same set of questions.
Large numbers of claims can be moved through the adjudication process
more rapidly in the presence of presumptions. Additionally, they reduce
the likelihood that “individual justice” will result in opposite outcomes
in cases with the same or similar fact conditions. The party to whom
the burden of proof has been shifted can overcome rebuttable presumptions. Irrebuttable presumptions cannot be overcome and, therefore, affect more than the matter of who bears the burden of proof.
The use of presumptions for occupational disease is more commonly found in other jurisdictions than in the U.S. states, where individual justice seems to be the norm and where litigation and attorney
representation are not unusual. The major downside with the use of
presumptions is that they can be used as a device to manipulate the ease
or difﬁculty in receiving compensation. Perhaps this is simply to note
the obvious, i.e., presumptions that are consistent with the overall intent
of the law, that are in line with medical science, and that bring greater
equity are to be preferred to those that do not.
The Black Lung Law, originally and in amendments and in regulations, made extensive use of presumptions. As an example, the 1969
statute established that “if a miner who is suffering or suffered from
pneumoconiosis was employed for 10 years or more in one or more coal
mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis
arose out of such employment.”11 Since the worker still had to prove
that there had been 10 years’ employment in coal mines and that he had
pneumoconiosis, those burdens of proof remained with the claimant.
However, if the worker was able to establish those arguments, it became
the defense’s burden to prove that the illness arose out of any other
employment or nonemployment exposure. And if the worker could not
show that 10 years had been worked in coal mining, it did not prevent
the worker from seeking to establish that his condition arose out of his
exposure in coal mining. Clearly, that would have made it more difﬁcult
to win compensation beneﬁts. Perhaps this is simply to note the very
obvious, that is, presumptions that are consistent with the overall intent
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of the law, that are in line with medical science, and that bring greater
equity are to be preferred to those that do not.
As much as anything else, presumptions were used to raise or lower
rates of successful ﬁling under the law, and they remain most susceptible to being used to loosen or tighten eligibility, regardless of the scientiﬁc merits. Congress, in particular, was responsible for this continuing
effort to tweak the standards, at least for the ﬁrst dozen years of the law.
However, we can ﬁnd a similar type of manipulation that has occurred
in the states. Kentucky has witnessed a number of law changes that
aimed to raise or lower the success rate in the ﬁling of state black lung
claims. In 1996, eligibility under the law was tightened in response to a
concern about the cost of such claims. In 2002, the law was liberalized
because the 1996 amendments were found to be excessively restrictive. The 2002 amendments have been reported to still leave virtually
no claimants eligible for beneﬁts and consideration is being given to
loosening the standards further. As was the case in the federal arena, the
standard does not appear to be motivated by science and medicine as it
is for the number or the rate of successful claim ﬁling.
Inconsistent Offsets of Beneﬁts
This entire chapter could be written around the issue of offsets under
the law. Sufﬁce it to say that there have been a host of complications,
indicating that a simple generalization of the treatment of the issue is
not possible. Over time, the law regarding offsets has been changed
several times. The Part B program operates with different rules than
does Part C. Further, offsets have and have not been applied to earnings
(for the totally disabled miners but not for widows), or depending upon
the date that a claim was ﬁled, to SSDI, and to state workers’ compensation beneﬁts (for respiratory diseases and/or for occupational injuries
or illnesses). As an example of a further complication, at least one state
(Pennsylvania) paid beneﬁts to miners with dust diseases out of general revenues, raising the issue of whether or not this was a (offsetable)
workers’ compensation beneﬁt.12 It is difﬁcult to establish how well the
offsets are monitored, though they are likely most carefully monitored
where a mine operator or insurer would be able to reduce payments due
to the presence of multiple income sources. USDOL provides SSA with
information on Part C beneﬁciaries on a monthly basis, and SSA reports
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that it offsets less than $400,000 a month from its SSDI payments. As
noted earlier, fewer than 4 percent of Part C beneﬁciaries are affected
by the offset taken by USDOL for the payment of state workers’ compensation beneﬁts. The “offset story” reveals how difﬁcult it can be to
overlay a federal program onto an existing state program, made more
complex by an attempt to legislate different criteria for conditions arising in previous years (Part B-SSA) and for current and future ones (Part
C-USDOL).
The Challenge of Finding Responsible Operators
About one in ﬁve approved claims become the responsibility of the
trust fund. Unlike the earliest years of the program, when some miners
had not worked for several years, there is less of a catch-up now, and
less reason for the mine operator to have disappeared from the scene.
There is little doubt that USDOL is aiming to have successful claimants
become the responsibility of the employers or their insurers, and not
that of the already indebted trust fund. Here are simply two kinds of
problems that emerge when the responsible operator approach is used.
Consider a claim where a miner submits a successful claim for beneﬁts. Suppose that subsequently, the mine operator who was initially
liable for beneﬁts is shown to be not responsible and another operator is
then identiﬁed as “responsible.” The timing is likely to be such that no
defense of the claim by the subsequently identiﬁed operator is practically possible. (The courts have held that once a claimant is successful
in claiming a beneﬁt, USDOL cannot assess liability against a newly
named mine operator.)13 That would lead to a potential liability of the
trust fund. To prevent that, USDOL might name several employers as a
“potentially liable operator.” That can result in multiple defenses being
prepared to defeat the claim, including the need for multiple, duplicative
medical examinations. Or consider the requirement that mine operators
are required to be insured for federal black lung claims. (Approval for
self-insurance is permitted under the law.) But not all responsible operators are coal mine operators—the law provides considerable latitude
over coverage, occupationally. Thus, some employers may be found to
be “responsible operators,” yet uninsured for federal beneﬁts, though
they are in compliance with respect to coverage under state workers’
compensation laws.
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Can a Federal Workers’ Compensation Program Be Shut Down?
Although some people argue that a federal government program is
not likely ever to shut down, the Black Lung Program appears headed
in that direction. Clearly, the Part B portion has experienced a huge
decline in numbers of beneﬁciaries, and the Part C section is far smaller
today than it has been. Moreover, there is no evidence that all the states
have stepped up efforts to ﬁnd and compensate victims of coal workers’
pneumoconiosis. Some may argue that 31 years after the enactment of
the Black Lung provisions, the federal government has decided that it
is prepared to tackle another situation where it appeared that the states
were not compensating victims of occupational disease. Again, the law
creates separate, though less parallel responsibilities for two agencies in
the EEOICPA of 2000. Again, it has picked a speciﬁc group of workers,
and identiﬁed certain diseases to receive special treatment and beneﬁts.
As was the case with black lung, supporters of the EEOICPA of 2000
argued that state workers’ compensation laws had not been providing
justiﬁable beneﬁts to a speciﬁc group of workers. And as was the case
with black lung three decades ago, it has not taken long for bipartisan
criticisms of the administration of the law to emerge, requiring amendments because of a lack of movement on beneﬁts being delivered to
workers or survivors.14

Notes
1. In particular, see Barth and Hunt (1980).
2. Barth (1987). Sources for some of the history that follows can be found in this
study.
3. The Black Lung Beneﬁts Reform Act of 1977 (PL 95-239) was actually signed
into law on March 1, 1978.
4. PL95-227 was signed into law early in 1978.
5. Pittston Coal Group et al. v. Sebben et al. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
6. The highest year for the number of all beneﬁciaries was 1982, but the high point
for the number of miners receiving Part C beneﬁts was 1983.
7. The basic, no dependent beneﬁt was set at 50 percent of the entitlement due to
a totally disabled federal employee at the GS-2, step 1 level, under the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act.
8. Offsets are discussed later in the chapter. Such provisions exist in laws to limit
the degree to which recipients might receive beneﬁts from multiple sources. Off-
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

sets can have several aims including limiting payer costs and limiting excessive
beneﬁt amounts.
USDOL, Ofﬁce of Administrative Law Judges, “Judges Benchbook of the Black
Lung Beneﬁts Act, August 2001,” Chap. 16, Sec III a (1). Also, see Richardson
v. Director, OWCP, 94 F. 3d 164 (1996).
From Hobbs v. Clinchﬁeld Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819 (4th Cir. 1995).
Section 411 (c)(1).
Director v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54 F. 3d 141 (1995).
Director, OWCP v. Trace Fork Coal Co., 67 F. 3d 503 (1995).
See Congressional Record–Senate, June 16, 2004, pp. 6837–6847, and S. 2400
June 7, 2004, Amendments to Title XXXVI of the Floyd D. Spence National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 (Bunning Amendments).
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Workers’ Compensation
in Rhode Island
Reform through Business/Labor Cooperation
Matthew Carey
Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training

A major legislative overhaul of the Rhode Island workers’ compensation system took place between 1990 and 1992. However, it is
important to note that prior efforts laid the groundwork for this successful reform. Continually, throughout the 1970s and 1980s both labor and
management tried, usually separately, to ﬁx a system that was serving
neither well. Despite attempts at reform, premiums continued to rise
while claims’ administration worsened. Injured workers were not receiving timely beneﬁts, and little effort was put into getting people back
to work. Further, the adjudication processes of the Workers’ Compensation Commission were terribly inefﬁcient, with cases often taking years
to be settled.
In 1985, the legislature made a major attempt at reform. The Department of Workers’ Compensation was created, and an informal hearing
process—with the goal of quick dispute settlements—was established.
An employer or injured worker could request a hearing, which was statutorily required to be held within 14 days. At the end of a 30-minute
hearing, the parties were supposed to have received a determination
as to whether beneﬁts were granted, denied, terminated, or continued.
Either party could appeal the determination to the commission, which
would hear the case de novo. Under this system, representation by attorneys was not required during the hearing at the department. Instead,
the legislation created positions for “employee assistants” who helped
injured workers through the process by answering questions, helping
workers assemble evidence, etc. Insurers were required to accept or
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deny a claim within 45 days under a “memorandum of payment” or
“notice of controversy.”
Unfortunately, soon after it was established, the system began to
bog down. Separate hearings were required for matters such as the determination of wages, and occasionally hearings would have to be continued because of incomplete medical information. The 14-day requirement was, by necessity, ignored, and stretched ﬁrst to 21 days, then 30
days and beyond.
A further ﬂaw in the system was the role played by the employee assistants. The Rhode Island Bar Association brought a successful action
against the department claiming the illegal practice of law by the employee assistants. In response, the department curtailed the assistants’
duties, opening the door for greater attorney involvement.
Within a couple of years, the system broke down completely. Virtually every decision of the department was appealed to the commission
for a de novo hearing. The losing parties always wanted “another bite
at the apple,” plus there was a strong ﬁnancial incentive for attorneys
to appeal: their allowable fee was higher at the commission than at
the department level. Hence, some attorneys appealed even successful cases—citing one or another technicality—to take advantage of this
perverse incentive.
It is signiﬁcant that the 1986 reform had the support of business and
insurance interests but lacked labor’s backing. Further, the legislation
did little or nothing to coordinate the work of the department of Workers’ Compensation and the Workers’ Compensation Commission.
By the late 1980s, insurers were requesting double- and even tripledigit premium rate increases. A 32 percent increase was approved by
the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation, and a further 123
percent increase was sought by the National Council on Compensation
Insurance, but was denied. The latter move resulted in an open protest
by employers at the state capitol. In 1990, the informal hearing process—the centerpiece of the 1986 reforms—was scrapped.
However, in 1989, the business and labor communities had come
together to discuss the severe problems with the system. That reform effort, which thus far has proven very successful, led to major legislative
actions in 1990 and 1992, and some more minor reforms since. Although
a number of labor, business, and government leaders deserve credit for
the reforms, George Nee, Secretary-Treasurer of the RI AFL-CIO, and
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Sheldon Sollosy, the (now-retired) owner of the Rhode Island division
of Manpower, Inc., were the principal negotiators of the reforms. The
extraordinary trust and cooperation between labor and business set the
tone for the further involvement of the legal and medical communities,
and, in turn, the support of the legislative and executive branches.
THE 1990 REFORMS
The Workers’ Compensation Court
Prior to 1990, the Workers’ Compensation Commission was the
principal adjudicator of workers’ compensation disputes. The 1990 legislation elevated the status of the commission to that of a court with
bona ﬁde judicial appointments. With the elimination of the informal
hearing process, the court became the initial forum for resolving disputes. Judges are required by statute to hold a pretrial hearing within
21 days of request. While the parties may still request a trial, the case
remains with the judge who rendered the pretrial decision. As a result,
consistency has been brought to decisions, and appeals have been reduced. Under the leadership of Chief Judge Robert Arrigan, who recently retired from the bench, the pretrial conference proved to be a
highly effective means of resolving disputes and avoiding costly litigation. The court has become a model of efﬁciency and a key ingredient
in the system’s success.
Changes in Administration
With the 1990 reforms, insurers are allowed to ﬁle “nonprejudicial
agreements,” which allow claims to be paid for up to 13 weeks with
no acceptance of liability by the insurer. Hence, the injured worker receives a beneﬁt immediately while the case is investigated. If the insurer determines that it is not liable, the worker receives notice and has
two years to ﬁle a petition to establish liability. Alternatively, the insurer
may voluntarily accept liability by ﬁling a memorandum of agreement.
As well, the 1990 legislation allows for a “deny and dismiss settlement,” which the parties can submit to the court. If accepted, the matter
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is considered a “compromised payment” and the insurer is freed from
further liability.
Controls on Fraud
Despite the high levels of trust and cooperation, employee fraud
proved a contentious issue for labor and business negotiators. Nonetheless, the parties agreed that workers who misrepresent injuries or fail to
report income should not beneﬁt from the system. Therefore, insurers
are allowed to request periodic reports of income from injured workers
and to recover money from overpayments. Further, workers’ compensation fraud was made a felony. However, the harassment of injured
workers or a delay in the payment of beneﬁts carry ﬁnancial penalties
for insurers.
Changes in Beneﬁts
The 1990 reform package included major changes in partial disability beneﬁts. Both the amount an individual may collect and the length
of time that beneﬁts may be received were changed. For injuries occurring after the effective date of the legislation, the insurer may reduce
beneﬁts to 70 percent of the weekly beneﬁt paid once a worker has
achieved “maximum medical improvement.” However, a reduction is
not allowed if a worker can demonstrate a good faith, but unsuccessful,
effort at obtaining work. The length of time that partial beneﬁts may be
collected was limited by the legislation to 312 weeks. However, this
limit may be extended if the individual can establish that the injury or
illness continues to pose a material hindrance to obtaining work. For
collection beyond the 312 weeks, annual cost-of-living adjustments are
required.
The Creation of a State Fund
By the late 1980s—and owing to the difﬁculties in the system—90
percent of Rhode Island employers were in a residual risk pool. The
leaders of the reform effort determined, therefore, that the creation of
a state fund to be the insurer of last resort would allow for greater local control over premium rates. Legislation created a private, domes-
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tic, mutual insurance company with a $5 million government loan. The
company is now called Beacon Mutual and is the state’s largest workers’ compensation insurer. The loan was repaid and the company now
functions completely independent of state government.
The Creation of an Advisory Council
Another key element of the success of the 1990 reform effort was
the creation of an 11-member advisory council comprised of representatives of the state legislature, the executive branch, the Workers’ Compensation Court, business, labor, and the general public. The council
is required to make quarterly reports designed to identify and possibly
head off small problems before they can grow. The creation of the advisory council was, in a sense, an attempt to codify and formalize the
cooperative relationships that were formed at the time of the reform
effort. The council has been very successful and has served as forum
where problems, ideas, and legislative proposals can be discussed and
analyzed in a nonpartisan and rational manner. The result is that solutions reﬂect the desires of all of the stakeholders rather than simply
those with the most political power.
THE 1992 REFORMS
Evidence of the success of the advisory council and the cooperative
approach came with the 1992 reforms. A legislative package was presented that built upon the measures taken in 1990. Today, many view the
1992 reforms as the ﬁnal touches that truly turned the system around.
Medical Reforms
Mirroring the advisory council itself, an 11-member medical advisory board was established. The duties of the board include advising the
chief judge of the court of medical protocols for the treatment of compensable illness and injuries, preparing standards to guide the court’s
consideration of medical evidence (particularly standards to determine
the extent of an injury or illness and the achievement of maximum medical improvement), and reviewing and approving the Preferred Provider

Roberts.indb 279

6/7/2005 9:29:49 AM

280 Carey

Network lists submitted by insurers and self-insured employers. The
medical advisory board may also disqualify or suspend a medical provider for certain legislated infractions.
Employee Choice and Preferred Provider Networks
Under the 1992 legislation, injured workers are allowed to choose
their primary medical provider. However, if the worker wishes to change
physicians he or she must select a physician from the network list or obtain prior approval from the insurer. The purpose of the reform was to
reduce “doctor shopping” by individuals intent on ﬁnding a favorable
medical opinion.
Fee Schedules
The legislation mandated that the Department of Labor and Training in consultation with the court develop a workers’ compensation
medical fee schedule. Prior attempts to set schedules had failed, since
physician reimbursement rates were set at Medicaid levels, which were
considered too low by doctors. This led to good doctors leaving the
system or challenging the fees in court. In consultation with the medical advisory board, fees were set that were generous when compared to
other states, but were designed to keep highly regarded physicians on
board. The success of the effort again showed the beneﬁts of cooperative decision making, which took into account the needs of important
stakeholders—in this case, the medical community.
Beneﬁts
The 1992 legislation recognized that workers’ compensation beneﬁts should, in most cases, be a temporary replacement of income,
but not at levels that would provide a rational disincentive to return to
work. Hence, weekly compensation was set at 75 percent of average
weekly spendable base earnings (or after-tax income excluding overtime). Earlier, the beneﬁt rate was 66.66 percent of gross earning including overtime. An offset was established for retirement income, so
that employees would not receive both full workers’ compensation and
retirement beneﬁts. The offset can take place for injuries received or
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illnesses occurring less than ﬁve years before retirement or after age 55.
However, if the problem occurs less than two years before retirement,
indemnity beneﬁts are due.
The 1992 legislation adopted a chart, based on the American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) Guides to the Value of Permanent Impairment, to reduce partial beneﬁts upon maximum medical improvement.
This reduction was in addition to the ability to reduce beneﬁts 70 percent per the 1990 legislation. The 1992 statute also deﬁned material
hindrance as a greater than 65 percent degree of functional impairment
per the AMA Guides. Therefore, a partially incapacitated employee
could not collect beneﬁts past 312 weeks unless the disability surpassed
the 65 percent degree of functional impairment.
Not all beneﬁts were reduced by the legislation. For example, dependency beneﬁts for totally disabled workers were actually increased,
and a cost-of-living adjustment for individuals totally disabled for at
least 52 weeks was also added.
Reinstatement
The 1992 legislation gave an injured worker the right to be reinstated to his or her former position with reasonable accommodation by the
employer within a year of injury (or 18 months of injury if the worker
had spent time in an approved rehabilitation program). This right applies only to workers injured after May 18, 1992, only to ﬁrms with 10
or more workers, and not to seasonal or temporary workers. However,
the reinstatement right is signiﬁcant and is another example of a compromise between labor and business. The right is a clear victory for injured workers, but it also provides an incentive to return to work before
exhausting beneﬁts.
MORE RECENT REFORMS
The cooperative system of reform, which began in the late 1980s,
remains intact today, and in fact many of the same individuals are involved. Sheldon Sollosy is now the chairman of the board of Beacon
Mutual, and George Nee chairs the Workers Compensation Advisory
Council. Since 1992, all legislative proposals have been referred by the
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house and senate labor committees for consideration by the council.
While there have been no large-scale changes since 1992, a number of
smaller modiﬁcations have been made.
Material Hindrance
Enforcement of the 1992 statute’s deﬁnition of material hindrance
has been postponed several times. Labor prefers that the determination
be left to a judge rather than be based on the automatic application of
an arbitrary ﬁgure. Thus far, business and insurers have agreed to the
postponement, and, in exchange, labor has not sought a total repeal of
the deﬁnition.
The Workers’ Compensation Administration Fund
Prior to the 1992 reforms, assessments on insurers to support the
Workers’ Compensation Administration Fund were based on educated
guesses about prospective gross premium levels. This resulted in surpluses in the fund, which were raided on a couple of occasions by the
Department of Administration and the legislature to ﬁll gaps in the state
budget. This was clearly not what the fund was intended for, and was in
a sense an additional tax on insurers. In 1998, the council and the court
supported legislation to move the date of assessment to a time when the
gross premium ﬁgure was known. This has allowed for a more accurate
assessment and has prevented funds from being used for purposes other
than funding the workers’ compensation systems.
Adjustments to Fee Schedules
Since 1992, the collaborative model has been extended with the
establishment of a fee schedule task force composed of representatives
of the Department of Labor and Training, the Medical Advisory Board,
and medical and insurance communities. A couple of amendments to
the fee schedule have been made, but only after a consensus has been
reached by the task force. In 1998, the task force agreed to the reduction
of several fees, but also to a general annual escalation of fees based on
the consumer price index.
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Employer Compliance
The collaborative model was also used to address employer compliance issues that came to light after the tragic ﬁre at the Station nightclub
in Rhode Island in February 2003. One hundred people, including a
number of club employees, died and many were injured. After the ﬁre,
it was discovered that the club lacked workers’ compensation insurance. Department of Labor and Training ofﬁcials, along with business,
labor, and insurance industry representatives, revisited the statute and
methods to ensure compliance, including sanctions against delinquent
employers. The legislature approved a package to increase ﬁnes and
penalties, move serious case hearings from the department to the court,
and allow for the closing of businesses that do not secure insurance
promptly. These measures have proven extremely successful in increasing the rate of compliance.
CONCLUSIONS
By almost any measure, the reforms that began in 1990 have proven
successful. By way of illustration, let us consider the achievements of
the court, the number of self-insured employers, and trend in insurance
premium rates.
The Court
Unlike the former informal hearing process, the court’s pretrial
hearing program continues to be successful. Nearly all cases receive a
hearing within 21 days and are disposed of promptly. Although credit
for much of the early success rightly belongs to Chief Judge Robert F.
Arrigan, his replacement, Chief Judge George Healy, has a great deal
of experience both as an insurance company advocate and jurist, and is
equally committed to the success of the program.
Self-Insured Employers
In the early 1990s, before the reforms began to take effect, there
were 185 certiﬁed, self-insured employers in Rhode Island. Most were
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self-insured because they could not afford the high premium rates at
the time, even though, in general, they had low loss rates. Today, there
are only 47 self-insured employers in the state. Since 1991, only two
employers have applied for self-insurance certiﬁcation, and both are afﬁliated with ﬁrms that have national self-insurance programs.
Premium Rates
Beacon Mutual, which, as mentioned earlier, is today the largest
workers’ compensation insurer in the state, has proven that it can, under the current system, operate proﬁtably without the large premium
increases sought by companies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In
fact, Beacon Mutual has many discount programs for employers and
has decreased rates three times since 1994.
In short, the collaborative efforts at workers’ compensation reform
have proven very successful in Rhode Island. The system now provides
adequate and timely beneﬁts for injured workers, reasonable premium
rates for employers, fair reimbursements for physicians, and a reasonable rate of return for insurance companies. The essential ingredient in
all of this success was the ability of business and labor to come together,
work out their problems cooperatively, and then spread the same spirit
of goodwill and common endeavor to other essential stakeholders.
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